Andreas Dür
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Andreas Dür has a total of 51 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Gemma Mateo
University of Salzburg
10 shared publications- Gemma Mateo
School of Politics and International Relations , University College Dublin
10 shared publications - Robert Alexander Huber
University of Salzburg
8 shared publications - David Marshall
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, Reading, UK
5 shared publications - Gemma Mateo4 shared publications
- Leonardo Baccini
McGill University
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 August 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
Trade cooperation, exclusion, and public perceptions of conflict: Evidence from China and the USA
Economic cooperation is often seen as promoting peace, yet many arrangements include some states while excluding others. Does inclusion or exclusion shape public perceptions of the including or excluding country and expectations about bilateral relations? We expect exclusion (inclusion) to produce more negative (positive) views of the excluding (including) country and of relations with it. Views always turn negative when cooperation yields military gains for the other side. We test these expectations using survey experiments with quota-based samples in China and the USA. Results support the main effect of exclusion, but evidence for the other expectations is mixed.
- 5 August 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
Open AccessTrade cooperation, exclusion, and public perceptions of conflict: Evidence from China and the USA
Economic cooperation is often seen as promoting peace, yet many arrangements include some states while excluding others. Does inclusion or exclusion shape public perceptions of the including or excluding country and expectations about bilateral relations? We expect exclusion (inclusion) to produce more negative (positive) views of the excluding (including) country and of relations with it. Views always turn negative when cooperation yields military gains for the other side. We test these expectations using survey experiments with quota-based samples in China and the USA. Results support the main effect of exclusion, but evidence for the other expectations is mixed.
- Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1-32
The institutional design of joint bodies in trade agreements: monitoring commitments, facilitating negotiations, avoiding ratification
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1-32
Open AccessThe institutional design of joint bodies in trade agreements: monitoring commitments, facilitating negotiations, avoiding ratification
- Open Access
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- p. 1-8
Who Drives the Security Narrative in US Trade Policy?
Appeals to national security play a central role in contemporary US trade politics. Who drives this security narrative and why? We argue that executive branch actors, regardless of political party affiliation, are more likely to frame trade policy in national-security terms. In Congress, however, we expect Republicans to rely more heavily than Democrats on a national-security narrative. We tested these expectations through a systematic analysis of trade-related discourse by congressional and executive actors from 2001 to early 2025. Using a large language model to examine a substantial corpus of speeches, press releases, and official statements, we find only partial support for our argument: the anticipated partisan difference appears, but security framing is more prevalent in Congress than in the executive branch. Overall, the evidence suggests that actors use security framing as a strategic tool to reinforce their role and confer legitimacy on particular trade policies.
- 8 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- p. 1-8
Open AccessWho Drives the Security Narrative in US Trade Policy?
Appeals to national security play a central role in contemporary US trade politics. Who drives this security narrative and why? We argue that executive branch actors, regardless of political party affiliation, are more likely to frame trade policy in national-security terms. In Congress, however, we expect Republicans to rely more heavily than Democrats on a national-security narrative. We tested these expectations through a systematic analysis of trade-related discourse by congressional and executive actors from 2001 to early 2025. Using a large language model to examine a substantial corpus of speeches, press releases, and official statements, we find only partial support for our argument: the anticipated partisan difference appears, but security framing is more prevalent in Congress than in the executive branch. Overall, the evidence suggests that actors use security framing as a strategic tool to reinforce their role and confer legitimacy on particular trade policies.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1-19
Business versus citizens: legislators’ responsiveness in trade policy
Legislators may consider the preferences of both business actors and citizens when making trade policy decisions. But when business and citizen preferences diverge, what makes legislators more responsive to one side or the other? We argue that when levels of political engagement are kept constant, legislators are more responsive to citizens than business. This effect should be particularly large for left-leaning legislators and legislators who conceive of themselves as delegates. We use three survey experiments with over 1000 legislators from 47 countries across the globe and qualitative evidence from an open survey question and 30 interviews with legislators to test our expectations. Based on this unique evidence, we find strong support for our expectations. These findings contribute to research on trade policy-making, the interaction between elites and the public in international relations, and responsiveness.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1-19
Open AccessBusiness versus citizens: legislators’ responsiveness in trade policy
Legislators may consider the preferences of both business actors and citizens when making trade policy decisions. But when business and citizen preferences diverge, what makes legislators more responsive to one side or the other? We argue that when levels of political engagement are kept constant, legislators are more responsive to citizens than business. This effect should be particularly large for left-leaning legislators and legislators who conceive of themselves as delegates. We use three survey experiments with over 1000 legislators from 47 countries across the globe and qualitative evidence from an open survey question and 30 interviews with legislators to test our expectations. Based on this unique evidence, we find strong support for our expectations. These findings contribute to research on trade policy-making, the interaction between elites and the public in international relations, and responsiveness.
- Open Access
- 16 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 65 (3) , 1-19
Compensating the losers: The (limited) elite–public gap in trade politics
Compensatory policies for the losers of trade are a key feature of the liberal economic order established after the Second World War. Legislators have a variety of policy options to choose. But do political elites and the public have the same attitudes toward compensatory policies? We expect an elite–public gap with the public relatively less supportive of spending policies and more supportive of tax cuts and trade restrictions than political elites. Moreover, we reason that ideology should matter more for elites than the public. Unique data from a survey with legislators in 19 European countries and public opinion surveys in three countries allow us to test this argument. We find that elites and the public indeed differ in their attitudes toward compensatory policies. However, these differences pale in comparison to variation in support for various compensatory policies. These findings shed light on the politics of compensation and on the political attitudes of elites and the public more broadly.
- 16 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 65 (3) , 1-19
Open AccessCompensating the losers: The (limited) elite–public gap in trade politics
Compensatory policies for the losers of trade are a key feature of the liberal economic order established after the Second World War. Legislators have a variety of policy options to choose. But do political elites and the public have the same attitudes toward compensatory policies? We expect an elite–public gap with the public relatively less supportive of spending policies and more supportive of tax cuts and trade restrictions than political elites. Moreover, we reason that ideology should matter more for elites than the public. Unique data from a survey with legislators in 19 European countries and public opinion surveys in three countries allow us to test this argument. We find that elites and the public indeed differ in their attitudes toward compensatory policies. However, these differences pale in comparison to variation in support for various compensatory policies. These findings shed light on the politics of compensation and on the political attitudes of elites and the public more broadly.
- Open Access
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 79 (S1) , S194-S208
Weathering the Storm: US Trade Policy Beyond Trump
The liberal international trading system has underpinned decades of unprecedented globalization. Yet the imposition of across-the-board and country- and sector-specific tariffs by the second Trump administration in early 2025 has reignited debates over the system’s survival. We challenge the notion that the regime is on the brink of collapse. Drawing on historical patterns of United States trade policy, we argue that US engagement with global commerce has mostly been eclectic, characterized by the coexistence of protectionist and liberal impulses. We show that the system has demonstrated resilience and an ability to adapt to challenges resulting from this eclecticism. While current US trade actions are unprecedented since World War II, we present three reasons to expect a return to the traditional US approach to trade policy. We therefore argue that, despite the protectionist turn and the disruptions created by current US trade policy, predictions about the death of the system underestimate its adaptive flexibility and are thus premature.
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 79 (S1) , S194-S208
Open AccessWeathering the Storm: US Trade Policy Beyond Trump
The liberal international trading system has underpinned decades of unprecedented globalization. Yet the imposition of across-the-board and country- and sector-specific tariffs by the second Trump administration in early 2025 has reignited debates over the system’s survival. We challenge the notion that the regime is on the brink of collapse. Drawing on historical patterns of United States trade policy, we argue that US engagement with global commerce has mostly been eclectic, characterized by the coexistence of protectionist and liberal impulses. We show that the system has demonstrated resilience and an ability to adapt to challenges resulting from this eclecticism. While current US trade actions are unprecedented since World War II, we present three reasons to expect a return to the traditional US approach to trade policy. We therefore argue that, despite the protectionist turn and the disruptions created by current US trade policy, predictions about the death of the system underestimate its adaptive flexibility and are thus premature.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- p. 1-22
A fair deal: Inequity aversion and individual attitudes toward trade agreements
International trade can cause winners and losers within and across countries. How do these distributional effects matter for individual attitudes toward trade agreements? We argue that individuals exhibit inequity aversion, meaning that they prefer agreements that result in relatively similar payoffs within and across countries. Inequity aversion should be stronger in cases where individuals are personally disadvantaged than when they gain relatively more than others. Two conjoint experiments fielded in two surveys in three countries, a battery of survey questions, a list experiment, and qualitative evidence from open survey questions allow us to test these expectations. The results indicate that aversion to unequal payoffs both within and across countries is indeed a relevant factor shaping attitudes toward trade agreements. We also find some evidence that aversion to disadvantageous inequality is stronger than aversion to advantageous inequality. The study contributes to a rich literature on trade attitudes and our general understanding of how citizens form political attitudes.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- p. 1-22
Open AccessA fair deal: Inequity aversion and individual attitudes toward trade agreements
International trade can cause winners and losers within and across countries. How do these distributional effects matter for individual attitudes toward trade agreements? We argue that individuals exhibit inequity aversion, meaning that they prefer agreements that result in relatively similar payoffs within and across countries. Inequity aversion should be stronger in cases where individuals are personally disadvantaged than when they gain relatively more than others. Two conjoint experiments fielded in two surveys in three countries, a battery of survey questions, a list experiment, and qualitative evidence from open survey questions allow us to test these expectations. The results indicate that aversion to unequal payoffs both within and across countries is indeed a relevant factor shaping attitudes toward trade agreements. We also find some evidence that aversion to disadvantageous inequality is stronger than aversion to advantageous inequality. The study contributes to a rich literature on trade attitudes and our general understanding of how citizens form political attitudes.
- Open Access
- 16 May 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 62 (6) , 1968-1983
Shock and awe: Economic sanctions and relative military spending
Economic sanctions could cause substantial harm to target states, forcing them to undertake tough guns-versus-butter trade-offs. Although existing research has argued that sanctioned countries reduce their military spending in absolute terms, it is unclear whether they do trade more guns for butter in relative terms. We argue that in the short run, sanctioned states have an incentive to channel proportionally more resources to the military for two primary reasons. First, this allows them to signal their resolve not to back down to sanctioning states and potentially maintain their bargaining leverage. Second, higher relative military spending can strengthen leaders’ hold on power by improving their ability to co-opt and repress political opponents. However, this combined incentive to signal resolve and consolidate power weakens after the initial economic and political shocks. As such, we also expect that the increase in relative military spending will diminish gradually. To test our theory, we propose a new measurement of sanction shocks that carefully accounts for the salience, costs, and duration of different sanction episodes. Using this measure, we apply dynamic panel modeling to examine the military spending of 166 countries from 1962 to 2015. We find strong support for our theoretical expectations. In response to sanction shocks, target states choose to spend proportionally more on the military; this increase peaks in the first few years and dissipates over time. These results hold important implications for research on both economic sanctions and military spending.
- 16 May 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 62 (6) , 1968-1983
Open AccessShock and awe: Economic sanctions and relative military spending
Economic sanctions could cause substantial harm to target states, forcing them to undertake tough guns-versus-butter trade-offs. Although existing research has argued that sanctioned countries reduce their military spending in absolute terms, it is unclear whether they do trade more guns for butter in relative terms. We argue that in the short run, sanctioned states have an incentive to channel proportionally more resources to the military for two primary reasons. First, this allows them to signal their resolve not to back down to sanctioning states and potentially maintain their bargaining leverage. Second, higher relative military spending can strengthen leaders’ hold on power by improving their ability to co-opt and repress political opponents. However, this combined incentive to signal resolve and consolidate power weakens after the initial economic and political shocks. As such, we also expect that the increase in relative military spending will diminish gradually. To test our theory, we propose a new measurement of sanction shocks that carefully accounts for the salience, costs, and duration of different sanction episodes. Using this measure, we apply dynamic panel modeling to examine the military spending of 166 countries from 1962 to 2015. We find strong support for our theoretical expectations. In response to sanction shocks, target states choose to spend proportionally more on the military; this increase peaks in the first few years and dissipates over time. These results hold important implications for research on both economic sanctions and military spending.
- Open Access
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 48 (5) , 1059-1085
EU trade agreements and external differentiation: a large language model approach
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 48 (5) , 1059-1085
Open AccessEU trade agreements and external differentiation: a large language model approach
- Open Access
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 63 (4) , 1712-1723
It's trade, stupid! How changes in trade competitiveness affect incumbents' electoral success
The consequences of economic globalization on electoral outcomes have recently become a prominent topic of research. We complement the emerging literature on this topic by studying whether changes in a subnational region's trade competitiveness affect the incumbent's vote share in that region. Using a novel dataset that relates subnational trade competitiveness to election results in 29 countries over a 20‐year period, we show that this is indeed the case. We also show that this effect is most pronounced for elections where the clarity of responsibility is high. Finally, we find mixed evidence for a moderating effect of incumbents' economic ideology as a moderator. These findings also contribute to the broader economic voting literature.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 63 (4) , 1712-1723
Open AccessIt's trade, stupid! How changes in trade competitiveness affect incumbents' electoral success
The consequences of economic globalization on electoral outcomes have recently become a prominent topic of research. We complement the emerging literature on this topic by studying whether changes in a subnational region's trade competitiveness affect the incumbent's vote share in that region. Using a novel dataset that relates subnational trade competitiveness to election results in 29 countries over a 20‐year period, we show that this is indeed the case. We also show that this effect is most pronounced for elections where the clarity of responsibility is high. Finally, we find mixed evidence for a moderating effect of incumbents' economic ideology as a moderator. These findings also contribute to the broader economic voting literature.