The institutional design of joint bodies in trade agreements: monitoring commitments, facilitating negotiations, avoiding ratification
Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- journal article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1-32
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- Austrian Science Fund (M 3285-G)
- HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council (724107)
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