Matthias Neuenkirch
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Matthias Neuenkirch has a total of 52 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jerg Gutmann
Universität Hamburg
14 shared publications Bernd Hayo
13 shared publications- Bernd Hayo
Marburg Center for Institutional Economics and Sustainability (MACIES), Philipps-Universität Marburg, Marburg, Germany
13 shared publications Florian Neumeier
Ifo Institute University of Munich, CESifo, and MACIE Munich Germany
10 shared publications- Pierre L. Siklos
Wilfrid Laurier University
7 shared publications - Joern Hendrich Block
University of Trier
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Estimating the Demand for a Digital Euro: A Survey Approach for France, Germany and Italy
This paper analyses the extensive and intensive margins of demand for a retail digital euro. We conducted a representative survey in France, Germany and Italy in November-December 2023. We find that 52-62% of respondents are willing to hold a digital euro, depending on the interest rate spread, with a higher share in Italy than in France or Germany. Design features (cash-like vs deposit-like) appear to play only a very limited role. Average demand depends on the hypothetical interest rate spread relative to current accounts and ranges from EUR 700 to EUR 1,100, implying an aggregate demand of 1.5-2.5% of GDP. Willingness to hold a digital euro is associated with socio-demographic factors, trust in the ECB and the EU, digitalisation and payment behaviour. Negative interest rate spreads relative to current accounts reduce willingness to hold the digital euro more strongly than positive spreads increase it. Behavioural characteristics tend to be correlated with the likelihood of adoption, whereas economic factors, particularly income and interest rates, are mainly related to the level of demand. This distinction becomes more pronounced when conditioning on positive demand, suggesting that socio-demographic factors primarily influence participation decisions rather than quantities demanded.
- 11 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEstimating the Demand for a Digital Euro: A Survey Approach for France, Germany and Italy
This paper analyses the extensive and intensive margins of demand for a retail digital euro. We conducted a representative survey in France, Germany and Italy in November-December 2023. We find that 52-62% of respondents are willing to hold a digital euro, depending on the interest rate spread, with a higher share in Italy than in France or Germany. Design features (cash-like vs deposit-like) appear to play only a very limited role. Average demand depends on the hypothetical interest rate spread relative to current accounts and ranges from EUR 700 to EUR 1,100, implying an aggregate demand of 1.5-2.5% of GDP. Willingness to hold a digital euro is associated with socio-demographic factors, trust in the ECB and the EU, digitalisation and payment behaviour. Negative interest rate spreads relative to current accounts reduce willingness to hold the digital euro more strongly than positive spreads increase it. Behavioural characteristics tend to be correlated with the likelihood of adoption, whereas economic factors, particularly income and interest rates, are mainly related to the level of demand. This distinction becomes more pronounced when conditioning on positive demand, suggesting that socio-demographic factors primarily influence participation decisions rather than quantities demanded.
- Open Access
- 30 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Estimating the Demand for a Digital Euro: A Survey Approach for France, Germany and Italy
This paper analyses the extensive and intensive margins of demand for a retail digital euro. We conducted a representative survey in France, Germany and Italy in November–December 2023. We find that 52–62% of respondents are willing to hold a digital euro, depending on the interest rate spread, with a higher share in Italy than in France or Germany. Design features (cash-like vs deposit-like) appear to play only a very limited role. Average demand depends on the hypothetical interest rate spread relative to current accounts and ranges from EUR 700 to EUR 1,100, implying an aggregate demand of 1.5–2.5% of GDP. Willingness to hold a digital euro is associated with socio-demographic factors, trust in the ECB and the EU, digitalisation and payment behaviour. Negative interest rate spreads relative to current accounts reduce willingness to hold the digital euro more strongly than positive spreads increase it. Behavioural characteristics tend to be correlated with the likelihood of adoption, whereas economic factors, particularly income and interest rates, are mainly related to the level of demand. This distinction becomes more pronounced when conditioning on positive demand, suggesting that socio-demographic factors primarily influence participation decisions rather than quantities demanded.
- 30 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEstimating the Demand for a Digital Euro: A Survey Approach for France, Germany and Italy
This paper analyses the extensive and intensive margins of demand for a retail digital euro. We conducted a representative survey in France, Germany and Italy in November–December 2023. We find that 52–62% of respondents are willing to hold a digital euro, depending on the interest rate spread, with a higher share in Italy than in France or Germany. Design features (cash-like vs deposit-like) appear to play only a very limited role. Average demand depends on the hypothetical interest rate spread relative to current accounts and ranges from EUR 700 to EUR 1,100, implying an aggregate demand of 1.5–2.5% of GDP. Willingness to hold a digital euro is associated with socio-demographic factors, trust in the ECB and the EU, digitalisation and payment behaviour. Negative interest rate spreads relative to current accounts reduce willingness to hold the digital euro more strongly than positive spreads increase it. Behavioural characteristics tend to be correlated with the likelihood of adoption, whereas economic factors, particularly income and interest rates, are mainly related to the level of demand. This distinction becomes more pronounced when conditioning on positive demand, suggesting that socio-demographic factors primarily influence participation decisions rather than quantities demanded.
- Open Access
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
International Sanctions and Constitutional Compliance
Judging governments' responses to international sanctions based on their compliance with a universal human rights standard can be criticized as an imposition of Western values. We propose an alternative benchmark for government action that is not subject to the same potential criticism: whether governments comply with their own national constitutions as codified forms of the social contract. Our analysis of 182 countries from 1962 to 2022 using state-of-the-art panel DiD and event study estimators corroborates our theoretical expectation that government responses depend on regime type. Whereas democracies improve their constitutional compliance under sanction pressure, autocracies start complying even less. These results suggest that sanctions can only make governments comply with their legal commitments if those governments are dependent on broad popular support.
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInternational Sanctions and Constitutional Compliance
Judging governments' responses to international sanctions based on their compliance with a universal human rights standard can be criticized as an imposition of Western values. We propose an alternative benchmark for government action that is not subject to the same potential criticism: whether governments comply with their own national constitutions as codified forms of the social contract. Our analysis of 182 countries from 1962 to 2022 using state-of-the-art panel DiD and event study estimators corroborates our theoretical expectation that government responses depend on regime type. Whereas democracies improve their constitutional compliance under sanction pressure, autocracies start complying even less. These results suggest that sanctions can only make governments comply with their legal commitments if those governments are dependent on broad popular support.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (10) , 1872-1899
Leader Similarity and International Sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is comparatively scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 2.3 percent at the highest observed leader similarity to 7.2 percent at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (10) , 1872-1899
Leader Similarity and International Sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is comparatively scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 2.3 percent at the highest observed leader similarity to 7.2 percent at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 571-578
Political economy of international sanctions
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 571-578
Political economy of international sanctions
- Open Access
- 27 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Leader similarity and international sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- 27 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Open AccessLeader similarity and international sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- Open Access
- 25 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 89
Hawks and Doves: Financial market perception of Western support for Ukraine
- 25 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 89
Open AccessHawks and Doves: Financial market perception of Western support for Ukraine
- Open Access
- 25 June 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Leader similarity and international sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- 25 June 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Open AccessLeader similarity and international sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- Open Access
- 26 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economics of Innovation and New Technology
- Vol. 35 (2) , 259-283
The interdependence of intellectual property rights and sales in the manufacturing industry: evidence from the triangle of patents, trademarks, and sales
- 26 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economics of Innovation and New Technology
- Vol. 35 (2) , 259-283
Open AccessThe interdependence of intellectual property rights and sales in the manufacturing industry: evidence from the triangle of patents, trademarks, and sales
- 20 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 843-852
Der Digitale Euro