MNMatthias Neuenkirch

Matthias Neuenkirch

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Matthias Neuenkirch has a total of 52 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Estimating the Demand for a Digital Euro: A Survey Approach for France, Germany and Italy

    by Bernd Hayo, Matthias Neuenkirch, Manuel Walz

    This paper analyses the extensive and intensive margins of demand for a retail digital euro. We conducted a representative survey in France, Germany and Italy in November-December 2023. We find that 52-62% of respondents are willing to hold a digital euro, depending on the interest rate spread, with a higher share in Italy than in France or Germany. Design features (cash-like vs deposit-like) appear to play only a very limited role. Average demand depends on the hypothetical interest rate spread relative to current accounts and ranges from EUR 700 to EUR 1,100, implying an aggregate demand of 1.5-2.5% of GDP. Willingness to hold a digital euro is associated with socio-demographic factors, trust in the ECB and the EU, digitalisation and payment behaviour. Negative interest rate spreads relative to current accounts reduce willingness to hold the digital euro more strongly than positive spreads increase it. Behavioural characteristics tend to be correlated with the likelihood of adoption, whereas economic factors, particularly income and interest rates, are mainly related to the level of demand. This distinction becomes more pronounced when conditioning on positive demand, suggesting that socio-demographic factors primarily influence participation decisions rather than quantities demanded.


  • Open Access

    Estimating the Demand for a Digital Euro: A Survey Approach for France, Germany and Italy

    by Bernd Hayo, Matthias Neuenkirch, Manuel Walz

    This paper analyses the extensive and intensive margins of demand for a retail digital euro. We conducted a representative survey in France, Germany and Italy in November–December 2023. We find that 52–62% of respondents are willing to hold a digital euro, depending on the interest rate spread, with a higher share in Italy than in France or Germany. Design features (cash-like vs deposit-like) appear to play only a very limited role. Average demand depends on the hypothetical interest rate spread relative to current accounts and ranges from EUR 700 to EUR 1,100, implying an aggregate demand of 1.5–2.5% of GDP. Willingness to hold a digital euro is associated with socio-demographic factors, trust in the ECB and the EU, digitalisation and payment behaviour. Negative interest rate spreads relative to current accounts reduce willingness to hold the digital euro more strongly than positive spreads increase it. Behavioural characteristics tend to be correlated with the likelihood of adoption, whereas economic factors, particularly income and interest rates, are mainly related to the level of demand. This distinction becomes more pronounced when conditioning on positive demand, suggesting that socio-demographic factors primarily influence participation decisions rather than quantities demanded.

  • Open Access

    International Sanctions and Constitutional Compliance

    by Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch

    Judging governments' responses to international sanctions based on their compliance with a universal human rights standard can be criticized as an imposition of Western values. We propose an alternative benchmark for government action that is not subject to the same potential criticism: whether governments comply with their own national constitutions as codified forms of the social contract. Our analysis of 182 countries from 1962 to 2022 using state-of-the-art panel DiD and event study estimators corroborates our theoretical expectation that government responses depend on regime type. Whereas democracies improve their constitutional compliance under sanction pressure, autocracies start complying even less. These results suggest that sanctions can only make governments comply with their legal commitments if those governments are dependent on broad popular support.

  • Leader Similarity and International Sanctions

    by Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch

    It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is comparatively scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 2.3 percent at the highest observed leader similarity to 7.2 percent at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.

  • Political economy of international sanctions

    by Jerg Gutmann, Matthias Neuenkirch, Florian Neumeier


  • Open Access

    Leader similarity and international sanctions

    by Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch

    It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.

  • Open Access

    Leader similarity and international sanctions

    by Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch

    It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.

  • Der Digitale Euro

    by Manuel Walz, Matthias Neuenkirch