Jerg Gutmann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jerg Gutmann has a total of 39 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stefan Voigt
Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
30 shared publications - Matthias Neuenkirch
Universität Trier
14 shared publications Stefan Voigt
7 shared publicationsFlorian Neumeier
Ifo Institute University of Munich, CESifo, and MACIE Munich Germany
6 shared publications- Pascal Langer
University of Trier - Faculty of Economics
5 shared publications - Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 190
Culture and constitutional compliance
- 30 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 190
Open AccessCulture and constitutional compliance
- Open Access
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
International Sanctions and Constitutional Compliance
Judging governments' responses to international sanctions based on their compliance with a universal human rights standard can be criticized as an imposition of Western values. We propose an alternative benchmark for government action that is not subject to the same potential criticism: whether governments comply with their own national constitutions as codified forms of the social contract. Our analysis of 182 countries from 1962 to 2022 using state-of-the-art panel DiD and event study estimators corroborates our theoretical expectation that government responses depend on regime type. Whereas democracies improve their constitutional compliance under sanction pressure, autocracies start complying even less. These results suggest that sanctions can only make governments comply with their legal commitments if those governments are dependent on broad popular support.
- 24 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInternational Sanctions and Constitutional Compliance
Judging governments' responses to international sanctions based on their compliance with a universal human rights standard can be criticized as an imposition of Western values. We propose an alternative benchmark for government action that is not subject to the same potential criticism: whether governments comply with their own national constitutions as codified forms of the social contract. Our analysis of 182 countries from 1962 to 2022 using state-of-the-art panel DiD and event study estimators corroborates our theoretical expectation that government responses depend on regime type. Whereas democracies improve their constitutional compliance under sanction pressure, autocracies start complying even less. These results suggest that sanctions can only make governments comply with their legal commitments if those governments are dependent on broad popular support.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (10) , 1872-1899
Leader Similarity and International Sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is comparatively scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 2.3 percent at the highest observed leader similarity to 7.2 percent at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (10) , 1872-1899
Leader Similarity and International Sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is comparatively scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 2.3 percent at the highest observed leader similarity to 7.2 percent at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (1-2) , 221-238
Can new constitutions tighten the reins? The effect of constitutional change on constitutional compliance
Constitutional compliance varies significantly across countries and over time. One might, therefore, expect that constitutional change is systematically used to bring constitutional rules in line with constitutional practice. We investigate whether constitutional change indeed induces better compliance by the government with the constitution. Using an event study design to analyze constitutional changes in 171 countries between 1951 and 2020, we find that new constitutions lead to durable improvements in constitutional compliance in democracies. The effect of constitutional change in nondemocracies, however, is small and short-lived.
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (1-2) , 221-238
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessCan new constitutions tighten the reins? The effect of constitutional change on constitutional compliance
Constitutional compliance varies significantly across countries and over time. One might, therefore, expect that constitutional change is systematically used to bring constitutional rules in line with constitutional practice. We investigate whether constitutional change indeed induces better compliance by the government with the constitution. Using an event study design to analyze constitutional changes in 171 countries between 1951 and 2020, we find that new constitutions lead to durable improvements in constitutional compliance in democracies. The effect of constitutional change in nondemocracies, however, is small and short-lived.
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 571-578
Political economy of international sanctions
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 571-578
Political economy of international sanctions
- Open Access
- 27 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Leader similarity and international sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- 27 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Open AccessLeader similarity and international sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- Open Access
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in World Development
- Vol. 195
Women’s rights and the gender migration gap
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in World Development
- Vol. 195
Open AccessWomen’s rights and the gender migration gap
- Open Access
- 25 June 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Leader similarity and international sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- 25 June 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Advance
Open AccessLeader similarity and international sanctions
It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.
- Open Access
- 12 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- p. 1-2
Introduction to the Special Issue on Constitutional Compliance
- 12 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- p. 1-2
Open AccessIntroduction to the Special Issue on Constitutional Compliance
- Open Access
- 8 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 205 (1-2) , 1-18
Measuring constitutional loyalty
We introduce a new concept, constitutional loyalty, which we define as the importance citizens ascribe to their government’s compliance with constitutional rules. Its measurement across countries is challenging due to differences in context, history, and culture. We overcome this challenge by exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic as a setting in which societies around the world face unfamiliar and similar public health challenges, inducing governments to adopt comparable, yet legally untested policies. Based on novel data from a global online survey collected between 2021 and 2022, we show that citizens’ support for COVID-19 mitigation policies declines if a court signals doubts about their constitutionality. We further demonstrate that this effect of constitutional loyalty depends on citizens’ characteristics, such as their confidence in the courts and their moral convictions.
- 8 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 205 (1-2) , 1-18
Open AccessMeasuring constitutional loyalty
We introduce a new concept, constitutional loyalty, which we define as the importance citizens ascribe to their government’s compliance with constitutional rules. Its measurement across countries is challenging due to differences in context, history, and culture. We overcome this challenge by exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic as a setting in which societies around the world face unfamiliar and similar public health challenges, inducing governments to adopt comparable, yet legally untested policies. Based on novel data from a global online survey collected between 2021 and 2022, we show that citizens’ support for COVID-19 mitigation policies declines if a court signals doubts about their constitutionality. We further demonstrate that this effect of constitutional loyalty depends on citizens’ characteristics, such as their confidence in the courts and their moral convictions.