JGJerg Gutmann

Jerg Gutmann

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Jerg Gutmann has a total of 39 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Culture and constitutional compliance

    by Jerg Gutmann, Anna Lewczuk-Czerwińska, Jacek Lewkowicz, Stefan Voigt

  • Open Access

    International Sanctions and Constitutional Compliance

    by Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch

    Judging governments' responses to international sanctions based on their compliance with a universal human rights standard can be criticized as an imposition of Western values. We propose an alternative benchmark for government action that is not subject to the same potential criticism: whether governments comply with their own national constitutions as codified forms of the social contract. Our analysis of 182 countries from 1962 to 2022 using state-of-the-art panel DiD and event study estimators corroborates our theoretical expectation that government responses depend on regime type. Whereas democracies improve their constitutional compliance under sanction pressure, autocracies start complying even less. These results suggest that sanctions can only make governments comply with their legal commitments if those governments are dependent on broad popular support.

  • Leader Similarity and International Sanctions

    by Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch

    It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is comparatively scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 2.3 percent at the highest observed leader similarity to 7.2 percent at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Can new constitutions tighten the reins? The effect of constitutional change on constitutional compliance

    by Jerg Gutmann, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, Stefan Voigt

    Constitutional compliance varies significantly across countries and over time. One might, therefore, expect that constitutional change is systematically used to bring constitutional rules in line with constitutional practice. We investigate whether constitutional change indeed induces better compliance by the government with the constitution. Using an event study design to analyze constitutional changes in 171 countries between 1951 and 2020, we find that new constitutions lead to durable improvements in constitutional compliance in democracies. The effect of constitutional change in nondemocracies, however, is small and short-lived.


  • Political economy of international sanctions

    by Jerg Gutmann, Matthias Neuenkirch, Florian Neumeier


  • Open Access

    Leader similarity and international sanctions

    by Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch

    It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.

  • Open Access

    Women’s rights and the gender migration gap

    by Jerg Gutmann, Léa Marchal, Betül Simsek


  • Open Access

    Leader similarity and international sanctions

    by Jerg Gutmann, Pascal Langer, Matthias Neuenkirch

    It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. We ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data from 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanctions ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity especially matters for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War.

  • Open Access

    Measuring constitutional loyalty

    by Jerg Gutmann, Roee Sarel, Stefan Voigt

    We introduce a new concept, constitutional loyalty, which we define as the importance citizens ascribe to their government’s compliance with constitutional rules. Its measurement across countries is challenging due to differences in context, history, and culture. We overcome this challenge by exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic as a setting in which societies around the world face unfamiliar and similar public health challenges, inducing governments to adopt comparable, yet legally untested policies. Based on novel data from a global online survey collected between 2021 and 2022, we show that citizens’ support for COVID-19 mitigation policies declines if a court signals doubts about their constitutionality. We further demonstrate that this effect of constitutional loyalty depends on citizens’ characteristics, such as their confidence in the courts and their moral convictions.