Richard D. Lange
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Richard D. Lange has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ralf. M. Haefner
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester
9 shared publications - Ankani Chattoraj
University of Rochester
3 shared publications Ankani Chattoraj
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, USA
2 shared publications- Jacob Lachenmyer Yates
University of California, Berkeley
2 shared publications - Sabyasachi Shivkumar
Department of Brain and Cognitive Science, University of Rochester
2 shared publications Andrew Richmond
Western University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 April 2026
- Published by The Neurons Behavior Data Analysis and Theory collective in Neurons, Behavior, Data analysis, and Theory
Use and usability: concepts of representation in philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive science, and computer science
Representations play a central role in the study of both biological and artificial intelligence, as well as philosophy of mind. Across neuroscience, computer science, and philosophy, a recurring theme is that representations not only carry information but should be “useful” for or “usable” by an agent in some sense. Here, we review how the “usefulness” of representations has been conceptualized and how it figures into different conceptions of representation. We identify and explore four aspects of use and usability: representations generally carry information ; that information may or may not be useful and it may or may not be encoded in a usable format ; and the representations may or may not be used downstream . Building on these four aspects of information and use, we then organize existing perspectives on neural representations into three levels: Representations as Information (Level 1); Representations as Usable (Level 2); and Representations as Used (Level 3). Our account is meant to give readers an appreciation for the diversity of notions of “neural representation,” help them navigate the vast and multi-disciplinary literature on the topic, and help them clarify the appropriate notion of representation for their own investigations. This paper is the result of a Generative Adversarial Collaboration that began at the Cognitive Computational Neuroscience conference in 2021, originally titled “What makes representations ‘useful’?”.
- 17 April 2026
- Published by The Neurons Behavior Data Analysis and Theory collective in Neurons, Behavior, Data analysis, and Theory
Use and usability: concepts of representation in philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive science, and computer science
Representations play a central role in the study of both biological and artificial intelligence, as well as philosophy of mind. Across neuroscience, computer science, and philosophy, a recurring theme is that representations not only carry information but should be “useful” for or “usable” by an agent in some sense. Here, we review how the “usefulness” of representations has been conceptualized and how it figures into different conceptions of representation. We identify and explore four aspects of use and usability: representations generally carry information ; that information may or may not be useful and it may or may not be encoded in a usable format ; and the representations may or may not be used downstream . Building on these four aspects of information and use, we then organize existing perspectives on neural representations into three levels: Representations as Information (Level 1); Representations as Usable (Level 2); and Representations as Used (Level 3). Our account is meant to give readers an appreciation for the diversity of notions of “neural representation,” help them navigate the vast and multi-disciplinary literature on the topic, and help them clarify the appropriate notion of representation for their own investigations. This paper is the result of a Generative Adversarial Collaboration that began at the Cognitive Computational Neuroscience conference in 2021, originally titled “What makes representations ‘useful’?”.
- 23 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Neuroscience
- Vol. 26 (12) , 2063-2072
Bayesian encoding and decoding as distinct perspectives on neural coding
The Bayesian brain hypothesis is one of the most influential ideas in neuroscience. However, unstated differences in how Bayesian ideas are operationalized make it difficult to draw general conclusions about how Bayesian computations map onto neural circuits. Here, we identify one such unstated difference: some theories ask how neural circuits could recover information about the world from sensory neural activity (Bayesian decoding), whereas others ask how neural circuits could implement inference in an internal model (Bayesian encoding). These two approaches require profoundly different assumptions and lead to different interpretations of empirical data. We contrast them in terms of motivations, empirical support and relationship to neural data. We also use a simple model to argue that encoding and decoding models are complementary rather than competing. Appreciating the distinction between Bayesian encoding and Bayesian decoding will help to organize future work and enable stronger empirical tests about the nature of inference in the brain.
- 23 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Neuroscience
- Vol. 26 (12) , 2063-2072
Bayesian encoding and decoding as distinct perspectives on neural coding
The Bayesian brain hypothesis is one of the most influential ideas in neuroscience. However, unstated differences in how Bayesian ideas are operationalized make it difficult to draw general conclusions about how Bayesian computations map onto neural circuits. Here, we identify one such unstated difference: some theories ask how neural circuits could recover information about the world from sensory neural activity (Bayesian decoding), whereas others ask how neural circuits could implement inference in an internal model (Bayesian encoding). These two approaches require profoundly different assumptions and lead to different interpretations of empirical data. We contrast them in terms of motivations, empirical support and relationship to neural data. We also use a simple model to argue that encoding and decoding models are complementary rather than competing. Appreciating the distinction between Bayesian encoding and Bayesian decoding will help to organize future work and enable stronger empirical tests about the nature of inference in the brain.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2023
- Published by American Physiological Society in Journal of Neurophysiology
- Vol. 129 (5) , 1021-1044
Weak evidence for neural correlates of task-switching in macaque V1
Converging evidence suggests that decision processes affect sensory neural activity, and this has informed numerous theories of neural processing. We set out to replicate and extend previous results on decision-related information and noise correlations in V1 of macaque monkeys. However, in our data, we find little evidence for a number of expected effects. Our null results therefore call attention to differences in task training, stimulus design, recording, and analysis techniques between our and prior studies.
- 1 May 2023
- Published by American Physiological Society in Journal of Neurophysiology
- Vol. 129 (5) , 1021-1044
Open AccessWeak evidence for neural correlates of task-switching in macaque V1
Converging evidence suggests that decision processes affect sensory neural activity, and this has informed numerous theories of neural processing. We set out to replicate and extend previous results on decision-related information and noise correlations in V1 of macaque monkeys. However, in our data, we find little evidence for a number of expected effects. Our null results therefore call attention to differences in task training, stimulus design, recording, and analysis techniques between our and prior studies.
- Open Access
- 8 March 2022
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 18 (3) , e1009557
Task-induced neural covariability as a signature of approximate Bayesian learning and inference
Perception is often characterized computationally as an inference process in which uncertain or ambiguous sensory inputs are combined with prior expectations. Although behavioral studies have shown that observers can change their prior expectations in the context of a task, robust neural signatures of task-specific priors have been elusive. Here, we analytically derive such signatures under the general assumption that the responses of sensory neurons encode posterior beliefs that combine sensory inputs with task-specific expectations. Specifically, we derive predictions for the task-dependence of correlated neural variability and decision-related signals in sensory neurons. The qualitative aspects of our results are parameter-free and specific to the statistics of each task. The predictions for correlated variability also differ from predictions of classic feedforward models of sensory processing and are therefore a strong test of theories of hierarchical Bayesian inference in the brain. Importantly, we find that Bayesian learning predicts an increase in so-called “differential correlations” as the observer’s internal model learns the stimulus distribution, and the observer’s behavioral performance improves. This stands in contrast to classic feedforward encoding/decoding models of sensory processing, since such correlations are fundamentally information-limiting. We find support for our predictions in data from existing neurophysiological studies across a variety of tasks and brain areas. Finally, we show in simulation how measurements of sensory neural responses can reveal information about a subject’s internal beliefs about the task. Taken together, our results reinterpret task-dependent sources of neural covariability as signatures of Bayesian inference and provide new insights into their cause and their function.
- 8 March 2022
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 18 (3) , e1009557
Open AccessTask-induced neural covariability as a signature of approximate Bayesian learning and inference
Perception is often characterized computationally as an inference process in which uncertain or ambiguous sensory inputs are combined with prior expectations. Although behavioral studies have shown that observers can change their prior expectations in the context of a task, robust neural signatures of task-specific priors have been elusive. Here, we analytically derive such signatures under the general assumption that the responses of sensory neurons encode posterior beliefs that combine sensory inputs with task-specific expectations. Specifically, we derive predictions for the task-dependence of correlated neural variability and decision-related signals in sensory neurons. The qualitative aspects of our results are parameter-free and specific to the statistics of each task. The predictions for correlated variability also differ from predictions of classic feedforward models of sensory processing and are therefore a strong test of theories of hierarchical Bayesian inference in the brain. Importantly, we find that Bayesian learning predicts an increase in so-called “differential correlations” as the observer’s internal model learns the stimulus distribution, and the observer’s behavioral performance improves. This stands in contrast to classic feedforward encoding/decoding models of sensory processing, since such correlations are fundamentally information-limiting. We find support for our predictions in data from existing neurophysiological studies across a variety of tasks and brain areas. Finally, we show in simulation how measurements of sensory neural responses can reveal information about a subject’s internal beliefs about the task. Taken together, our results reinterpret task-dependent sources of neural covariability as signatures of Bayesian inference and provide new insights into their cause and their function.
- Open Access
- 29 November 2021
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 17 (11) , e1009517
A confirmation bias in perceptual decision-making due to hierarchical approximate inference
Making good decisions requires updating beliefs according to new evidence. This is a dynamical process that is prone to biases: in some cases, beliefs become entrenched and resistant to new evidence (leading to primacy effects), while in other cases, beliefs fade over time and rely primarily on later evidence (leading to recency effects). How and why either type of bias dominates in a given context is an important open question. Here, we study this question in classic perceptual decision-making tasks, where, puzzlingly, previous empirical studies differ in the kinds of biases they observe, ranging from primacy to recency, despite seemingly equivalent tasks. We present a new model, based on hierarchical approximate inference and derived from normative principles, that not only explains both primacy and recency effects in existing studies, but also predicts how the type of bias should depend on the statistics of stimuli in a given task. We verify this prediction in a novel visual discrimination task with human observers, finding that each observer’s temporal bias changed as the result of changing the key stimulus statistics identified by our model. The key dynamic that leads to a primacy bias in our model is an overweighting of new sensory information that agrees with the observer’s existing belief—a type of ‘confirmation bias’. By fitting an extended drift-diffusion model to our data we rule out an alternative explanation for primacy effects due to bounded integration. Taken together, our results resolve a major discrepancy among existing perceptual decision-making studies, and suggest that a key source of bias in human decision-making is approximate hierarchical inference.
- 29 November 2021
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 17 (11) , e1009517
Open AccessA confirmation bias in perceptual decision-making due to hierarchical approximate inference
Making good decisions requires updating beliefs according to new evidence. This is a dynamical process that is prone to biases: in some cases, beliefs become entrenched and resistant to new evidence (leading to primacy effects), while in other cases, beliefs fade over time and rely primarily on later evidence (leading to recency effects). How and why either type of bias dominates in a given context is an important open question. Here, we study this question in classic perceptual decision-making tasks, where, puzzlingly, previous empirical studies differ in the kinds of biases they observe, ranging from primacy to recency, despite seemingly equivalent tasks. We present a new model, based on hierarchical approximate inference and derived from normative principles, that not only explains both primacy and recency effects in existing studies, but also predicts how the type of bias should depend on the statistics of stimuli in a given task. We verify this prediction in a novel visual discrimination task with human observers, finding that each observer’s temporal bias changed as the result of changing the key stimulus statistics identified by our model. The key dynamic that leads to a primacy bias in our model is an overweighting of new sensory information that agrees with the observer’s existing belief—a type of ‘confirmation bias’. By fitting an extended drift-diffusion model to our data we rule out an alternative explanation for primacy effects due to bounded integration. Taken together, our results resolve a major discrepancy among existing perceptual decision-making studies, and suggest that a key source of bias in human decision-making is approximate hierarchical inference.
- Open Access
Bayesian Encoding and Decoding as Distinct Perspectives on Neural Coding
One of the most influential, and controversial, ideas in neuroscience has been to understand the brain in terms of Bayesian computations. Unstated differences in how Bayesian ideas are operationalized across different models make it difficult to ascertain both which empirical data support which models, and how Bayesian computations might be implemented by neural circuits. In this paper, we make one such difference explicit by identifying two distinct philosophies that underlie existing neural models of Bayesian inference: one in which the brain recovers experimenter-defined structures in the world from sensory neural activity (Decoding), and another in which the brain represents latent quantities in an internal model that explains its inputs (Encoding). These philosophies require profoundly different assumptions about the nature of inference in the brain, and lead to different interpretations of empirical data. Here, we characterize and contrast both philosophies in terms of motivations, empirical support, and relationship to neural data. We also show that this implicit difference in philosophy underlies some of the debate on whether neural activity is better described as a sampling-based, or a parametric, distributional code. Using a simple model of primary visual cortex as an example, we show mathematically that it is possible that the very same neural activity can be described as probabilistic inference by neural sampling in the Encoding framework while also forming a linear probabilistic population code (PPC) in the Decoding framework. This demonstrates that certain families of Encoding and Decoding models are compatible with each other rather than competing explanations of data. In sum, Bayesian Encoding and Bayesian Decoding are distinct, non-exclusive philosophies, and appreciating their similarities and differences will help organize future work and allow for stronger empirical tests about the nature of inference in the brain.
Open AccessBayesian Encoding and Decoding as Distinct Perspectives on Neural Coding
One of the most influential, and controversial, ideas in neuroscience has been to understand the brain in terms of Bayesian computations. Unstated differences in how Bayesian ideas are operationalized across different models make it difficult to ascertain both which empirical data support which models, and how Bayesian computations might be implemented by neural circuits. In this paper, we make one such difference explicit by identifying two distinct philosophies that underlie existing neural models of Bayesian inference: one in which the brain recovers experimenter-defined structures in the world from sensory neural activity (Decoding), and another in which the brain represents latent quantities in an internal model that explains its inputs (Encoding). These philosophies require profoundly different assumptions about the nature of inference in the brain, and lead to different interpretations of empirical data. Here, we characterize and contrast both philosophies in terms of motivations, empirical support, and relationship to neural data. We also show that this implicit difference in philosophy underlies some of the debate on whether neural activity is better described as a sampling-based, or a parametric, distributional code. Using a simple model of primary visual cortex as an example, we show mathematically that it is possible that the very same neural activity can be described as probabilistic inference by neural sampling in the Encoding framework while also forming a linear probabilistic population code (PPC) in the Decoding framework. This demonstrates that certain families of Encoding and Decoding models are compatible with each other rather than competing explanations of data. In sum, Bayesian Encoding and Bayesian Decoding are distinct, non-exclusive philosophies, and appreciating their similarities and differences will help organize future work and allow for stronger empirical tests about the nature of inference in the brain.
- Open Access
A probabilistic population code based on neural samples
Sensory processing is often characterized as implementing probabilistic inference: networks of neurons compute posterior beliefs over unobserved causes given the sensory inputs. How these beliefs are computed and represented by neural responses is much-debated (Fiser et al. 2010, Pouget et al. 2013). A central debate concerns the question of whether neural responses represent samples of latent variables (Hoyer & Hyvarinnen 2003) or parameters of their distributions (Ma et al. 2006) with efforts being made to distinguish between them (Grabska-Barwinska et al. 2013). A separate debate addresses the question of whether neural responses are proportionally related to the encoded probabilities (Barlow 1969), or proportional to the logarithm of those probabilities (Jazayeri & Movshon 2006, Ma et al. 2006, Beck et al. 2012). Here, we show that these alternatives - contrary to common assumptions - are not mutually exclusive and that the very same system can be compatible with all of them. As a central analytical result, we show that modeling neural responses in area V1 as samples from a posterior distribution over latents in a linear Gaussian model of the image implies that those neural responses form a linear Probabilistic Population Code (PPC, Ma et al. 2006). In particular, the posterior distribution over some experimenter-defined variable like "orientation" is part of the exponential family with sufficient statistics that are linear in the neural sampling-based firing rates.
Open AccessA probabilistic population code based on neural samples
Sensory processing is often characterized as implementing probabilistic inference: networks of neurons compute posterior beliefs over unobserved causes given the sensory inputs. How these beliefs are computed and represented by neural responses is much-debated (Fiser et al. 2010, Pouget et al. 2013). A central debate concerns the question of whether neural responses represent samples of latent variables (Hoyer & Hyvarinnen 2003) or parameters of their distributions (Ma et al. 2006) with efforts being made to distinguish between them (Grabska-Barwinska et al. 2013). A separate debate addresses the question of whether neural responses are proportionally related to the encoded probabilities (Barlow 1969), or proportional to the logarithm of those probabilities (Jazayeri & Movshon 2006, Ma et al. 2006, Beck et al. 2012). Here, we show that these alternatives - contrary to common assumptions - are not mutually exclusive and that the very same system can be compatible with all of them. As a central analytical result, we show that modeling neural responses in area V1 as samples from a posterior distribution over latents in a linear Gaussian model of the image implies that those neural responses form a linear Probabilistic Population Code (PPC, Ma et al. 2006). In particular, the posterior distribution over some experimenter-defined variable like "orientation" is part of the exponential family with sufficient statistics that are linear in the neural sampling-based firing rates.
- Open Access
A confirmation bias in perceptual decision-making due to hierarchical approximate inference
Making good decisions requires updating beliefs according to new evidence. This is a dynamical process that is prone to biases: in some cases, beliefs become entrenched and resistant to new evidence (leading to primacy effects), while in other cases, beliefs fade over time and rely primarily on later evidence (leading to recency effects). How and why either type of bias dominates in a given context is an important open question. Here, we study this question in classic perceptual decision-making tasks, where, puzzlingly, previous empirical studies differ in the kinds of biases they observe, ranging from primacy to recency, despite seemingly equivalent tasks. We present a new model, based on hierarchical approximate inference and derived from normative principles, that not only explains both primacy and recency effects in existing studies, but also predicts how the type of bias should depend on the statistics of stimuli in a given task. We verify this prediction in a novel visual discrimination task with human observers, finding that each observer’s temporal bias changed as the result of changing the key stimulus statistics identified by our model. By fitting an extended drift-diffusion model to our data we rule out an alternative explanation for primacy effects due to bounded integration. Taken together, our results resolve a major discrepancy among existing perceptual decision-making studies, and suggest that a key source of bias in human decision-making is approximate hierarchical inference.
Open AccessA confirmation bias in perceptual decision-making due to hierarchical approximate inference
Making good decisions requires updating beliefs according to new evidence. This is a dynamical process that is prone to biases: in some cases, beliefs become entrenched and resistant to new evidence (leading to primacy effects), while in other cases, beliefs fade over time and rely primarily on later evidence (leading to recency effects). How and why either type of bias dominates in a given context is an important open question. Here, we study this question in classic perceptual decision-making tasks, where, puzzlingly, previous empirical studies differ in the kinds of biases they observe, ranging from primacy to recency, despite seemingly equivalent tasks. We present a new model, based on hierarchical approximate inference and derived from normative principles, that not only explains both primacy and recency effects in existing studies, but also predicts how the type of bias should depend on the statistics of stimuli in a given task. We verify this prediction in a novel visual discrimination task with human observers, finding that each observer’s temporal bias changed as the result of changing the key stimulus statistics identified by our model. By fitting an extended drift-diffusion model to our data we rule out an alternative explanation for primacy effects due to bounded integration. Taken together, our results resolve a major discrepancy among existing perceptual decision-making studies, and suggest that a key source of bias in human decision-making is approximate hierarchical inference.
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Current Opinion in Neurobiology
- Vol. 46, 84-89
Characterizing and interpreting the influence of internal variables on sensory activity
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Current Opinion in Neurobiology
- Vol. 46, 84-89
Characterizing and interpreting the influence of internal variables on sensory activity
- Open Access
- 6 March 2017
- Published by Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in bioRxiv
- p. 114439
Characterizing and interpreting the influence of internal variables on sensory activity
The concept of a tuning curve has been central for our understanding of how the responses of cortical neurons depend on external stimuli. Here, we describe how the influence of unobserved internal variables on sensory responses, in particular correlated neural variability, can be understood in a similar framework. We suggest that this will lead to deeper insights into the relationship between stimulus, sensory responses, and behavior. We review related recent work and discuss its implication for distinguishing feedforward from feedback influences on sensory responses, and for the information contained in those responses.Highlights: Re-interpretation of neural correlations in terms of internal variables… …can clarify whether they limit or enhance information Influence of internal variables can be captured by interpretable ‘tuning functions’ Estimation of both internal variables and tuning possible from population recordings
- 6 March 2017
- Published by Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in bioRxiv
- p. 114439
Open AccessCharacterizing and interpreting the influence of internal variables on sensory activity
The concept of a tuning curve has been central for our understanding of how the responses of cortical neurons depend on external stimuli. Here, we describe how the influence of unobserved internal variables on sensory responses, in particular correlated neural variability, can be understood in a similar framework. We suggest that this will lead to deeper insights into the relationship between stimulus, sensory responses, and behavior. We review related recent work and discuss its implication for distinguishing feedforward from feedback influences on sensory responses, and for the information contained in those responses.Highlights: Re-interpretation of neural correlations in terms of internal variables… …can clarify whether they limit or enhance information Influence of internal variables can be captured by interpretable ‘tuning functions’ Estimation of both internal variables and tuning possible from population recordings