Алексей Васильевич Королёв
Алексей Васильевич Королёв has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gennady Anatolievich Ougolnitsky
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia
6 shared publications G. A. Ugolnitsky
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia
2 shared publications- M. A. Kotova
Branch of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russia
2 shared publications - Nailya Galieva
ПАО «Татнефть» имени В. Д. Шашина, ул. Ленина, д. 75, 423450, Альметьевск, Республика Татарстан, Россия
2 shared publications - Vladimir Matveenko
Higher School of Economics (National Research University), St. Petersburg Branch
2 shared publications 75 Lenina Street Tatneft
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 April 2025
- Published by St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University LETI in Computer tools in education
- No. 1,p. 5-26
Dynamic Cooperative Game Theoretic Models of Opinion Control
In this paper we consider dynamic cooperative game theoretic models of control on networks. We suppose that all strong subgroups are determined in the stage of analysis of the influence digraph, and the control impact is exerted only to the members of those subgroups because they determine all stable final opinions. An agent’s opinion is interpreted as his expenses for buying goods (services) of a firm. We show that due to the model assumptions the characteristic functions by Neumann-Morgenstern, Petrosyan-Zaccour, and Gromova-Petrosyan coincide. We find Shapley value for this common characteristic function, prove its time inconsistency, and built an imputation distribution procedure. We compared the components of Shapley value with players’ payoffs for different forms of non-cooperative behavior.
- 20 April 2025
- Published by St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University LETI in Computer tools in education
- No. 1,p. 5-26
Open AccessDynamic Cooperative Game Theoretic Models of Opinion Control
In this paper we consider dynamic cooperative game theoretic models of control on networks. We suppose that all strong subgroups are determined in the stage of analysis of the influence digraph, and the control impact is exerted only to the members of those subgroups because they determine all stable final opinions. An agent’s opinion is interpreted as his expenses for buying goods (services) of a firm. We show that due to the model assumptions the characteristic functions by Neumann-Morgenstern, Petrosyan-Zaccour, and Gromova-Petrosyan coincide. We find Shapley value for this common characteristic function, prove its time inconsistency, and built an imputation distribution procedure. We compared the components of Shapley value with players’ payoffs for different forms of non-cooperative behavior.
- Open Access
- 20 April 2025
- Published by St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University LETI in Computer tools in education
- No. 1,p. 5-26
Dynamic Cooperative Game Theoretic Models of Opinion Control
In this paper we consider dynamic cooperative game theoretic models of control on networks. We suppose that all strong subgroups are determined in the stage of analysis of the influence digraph, and the control impact is exerted only to the members of those subgroups because they determine all stable final opinions. An agent’s opinion is interpreted as his expenses for buying goods (services) of a firm. We show that due to the model assumptions the characteristic functions by Neumann-Morgenstern, Petrosyan-Zaccour, and Gromova-Petrosyan coincide. We find Shapley value for this common characteristic function, prove its time inconsistency, and built an imputation distribution procedure. We compared the components of Shapley value with players’ payoffs for different forms of non-cooperative behavior.
- 20 April 2025
- Published by St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University LETI in Computer tools in education
- No. 1,p. 5-26
Open AccessDynamic Cooperative Game Theoretic Models of Opinion Control
In this paper we consider dynamic cooperative game theoretic models of control on networks. We suppose that all strong subgroups are determined in the stage of analysis of the influence digraph, and the control impact is exerted only to the members of those subgroups because they determine all stable final opinions. An agent’s opinion is interpreted as his expenses for buying goods (services) of a firm. We show that due to the model assumptions the characteristic functions by Neumann-Morgenstern, Petrosyan-Zaccour, and Gromova-Petrosyan coincide. We find Shapley value for this common characteristic function, prove its time inconsistency, and built an imputation distribution procedure. We compared the components of Shapley value with players’ payoffs for different forms of non-cooperative behavior.
- Open Access
Differential Games of Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of Pollution, Network Structure, and Continuous Updating
We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed time consistency for a cooperative solution of the game. For a specific example, we built a non-empty subgame perfect subcore. We considered stochastic versions of the proposed model and received results similar to the deterministic case.
Open AccessDifferential Games of Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of Pollution, Network Structure, and Continuous Updating
We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed time consistency for a cooperative solution of the game. For a specific example, we built a non-empty subgame perfect subcore. We considered stochastic versions of the proposed model and received results similar to the deterministic case.
- Open Access
Game-Theoretic Models of Coopetition in Cournot Oligopoly
Coopetition means that in economic interactions, both competition and cooperation are presented in the same time. We built and investigated analytically and numerically game theoretic models of coopetition in normal form and in the form of characteristic function. The basic model in normal form reflects competition between firms in Cournot oligopoly and their cooperation in mutually profitable activities such as marketing, R&D, and environmental protection. Each firm divides its resource between competition and cooperation. In the model in normal form we study Nash and Stackelberg settings and compare the results. In cooperative setting we consider Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan versions of characteristic functions and calculate the respective Shapley values. The payoffs in all cases are compared, and the respective conclusions about the relative efficiency of different ways of organization for separate agents and the whole society are made.
Open AccessGame-Theoretic Models of Coopetition in Cournot Oligopoly
Coopetition means that in economic interactions, both competition and cooperation are presented in the same time. We built and investigated analytically and numerically game theoretic models of coopetition in normal form and in the form of characteristic function. The basic model in normal form reflects competition between firms in Cournot oligopoly and their cooperation in mutually profitable activities such as marketing, R&D, and environmental protection. Each firm divides its resource between competition and cooperation. In the model in normal form we study Nash and Stackelberg settings and compare the results. In cooperative setting we consider Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan versions of characteristic functions and calculate the respective Shapley values. The payoffs in all cases are compared, and the respective conclusions about the relative efficiency of different ways of organization for separate agents and the whole society are made.
- 13 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 14 (2) , 362-395
Dynamic Resource Allocation Networks in Marketing: Comparing the Effectiveness of Control Methods
- 13 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 14 (2) , 362-395
Dynamic Resource Allocation Networks in Marketing: Comparing the Effectiveness of Control Methods
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International
- Vol. 62 (1) , 99-123
Comparison of Methods of Organization and Management Efficiency in Dynamic Models of Cournot Oligopoly
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for dynamic game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models in normal form with inhomogeneous agents are found analytically. Cooperative game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models of three persons in the form of the von Neumann–Morgenstern and Gromova–Petrosyan characteristic functions are studied, including the calculation of the Shapley vector. A comparative analysis of the payoffs of agents, according to the solutions obtained, is carried out for games in normal form and in the form of a characteristic function.
- 1 February 2023
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International
- Vol. 62 (1) , 99-123
Comparison of Methods of Organization and Management Efficiency in Dynamic Models of Cournot Oligopoly
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for dynamic game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models in normal form with inhomogeneous agents are found analytically. Cooperative game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models of three persons in the form of the von Neumann–Morgenstern and Gromova–Petrosyan characteristic functions are studied, including the calculation of the Shapley vector. A comparative analysis of the payoffs of agents, according to the solutions obtained, is carried out for games in normal form and in the form of a characteristic function.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by The Russian Academy of Sciences in Известия Российской академии наук. Теория и системы управления
- No. 1,p. 82-105
Comparison of Methods of Organization and Management Efficiency in Dynamic Models of Cournot Oligopoly
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for dynamic game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models in normal form with inhomogeneous agents are found analytically. Cooperative game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models of three persons in the form of the von Neumann–Morgenstern and Gromova–Petrosyan characteristic functions are studied, including the calculation of the Shapley vector. A comparative analysis of the payoffs of agents, according to the solutions obtained, is carried out for games in normal form and in the form of a characteristic function.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by The Russian Academy of Sciences in Известия Российской академии наук. Теория и системы управления
- No. 1,p. 82-105
Open AccessComparison of Methods of Organization and Management Efficiency in Dynamic Models of Cournot Oligopoly
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for dynamic game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models in normal form with inhomogeneous agents are found analytically. Cooperative game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models of three persons in the form of the von Neumann–Morgenstern and Gromova–Petrosyan characteristic functions are studied, including the calculation of the Shapley vector. A comparative analysis of the payoffs of agents, according to the solutions obtained, is carried out for games in normal form and in the form of a characteristic function.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Automation and Remote Control
- Vol. 83 (6) , 960-978
Adjustment Dynamics in a Network Game with Stochastic Parameters
In this paper, stochastic parameters are introduced into the network games model with production and externalities of knowledge. This model was formulated by V. Matveenko and A. Korolev and generalized the two-period Romer model. The agents’ productivities have deterministic and Wiener components. We consider the dynamics that occur when two complete networks are combined. Explicit expressions in the form of Brownian random processes are obtained. A qualitative analysis of the solution of a system of stochastic equations is carried out.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Automation and Remote Control
- Vol. 83 (6) , 960-978
Adjustment Dynamics in a Network Game with Stochastic Parameters
In this paper, stochastic parameters are introduced into the network games model with production and externalities of knowledge. This model was formulated by V. Matveenko and A. Korolev and generalized the two-period Romer model. The agents’ productivities have deterministic and Wiener components. We consider the dynamics that occur when two complete networks are combined. Explicit expressions in the form of Brownian random processes are obtained. A qualitative analysis of the solution of a system of stochastic equations is carried out.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Automation and Remote Control
- Vol. 83 (3) , 483-501
Transition Dynamics in a Network Game with Heterogeneous Agents: the Stochastic Case
Stochastic parameters are introduced into a model of network games with production and knowledge externalities. The model was formulated by V. Matveenko and A. Korolev and generalizes Romer’s two-period model. The agents’ productivities have both deterministic and Wiener components. The research represents the dynamics of a single agent and the dynamics in a triangle that occurs in the process of combining the agents. Explicit expressions for the dynamics of a single agent and dyad agents are obtained in the form of Brownian random processes. Solutions of stochastic equations and systems are analyzed qualitatively.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Automation and Remote Control
- Vol. 83 (3) , 483-501
Transition Dynamics in a Network Game with Heterogeneous Agents: the Stochastic Case
Stochastic parameters are introduced into a model of network games with production and knowledge externalities. The model was formulated by V. Matveenko and A. Korolev and generalizes Romer’s two-period model. The agents’ productivities have both deterministic and Wiener components. The research represents the dynamics of a single agent and the dynamics in a triangle that occurs in the process of combining the agents. Explicit expressions for the dynamics of a single agent and dyad agents are obtained in the form of Brownian random processes. Solutions of stochastic equations and systems are analyzed qualitatively.
- Open Access
- 7 September 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 8 (9) , 1529
Modeling and Simulation of Impact and Control in Social Networks with Application to Marketing
The problems of social networks analysis and calculation of the resulting opinions of network agents are considered. Algorithms for identifying strong subgroups and satellites as well as for calculating some quantitative characteristics of a network are implemented by the R programming language and tested on model examples. A new algorithm for calculating the resulting opinions of agents is developed by the R toolkit and tested on model examples. It is important that control actions that exert impact to the opinions should be applied exclusively to the members of strong subgroups (opinion leaders of a target audience), since they fully determine the stable resulting opinions of all network members. This approach allows saving control resources without significantly affecting its efficiency. Much attention is paid to the original models of optimal control (single subject) and conflict control (several competing subjects) under the assumption that the members of strong subgroups (opinion leaders) are already identified at the previous stage of network analysis. Models of optimal opinion control on networks are constructed and investigated by computer simulations using the author’s method of qualitatively representative scenarios. Differential game-based models of opinion control on networks with budget constraints in the form of equalities and inequalities are constructed and analytically investigated. All used notions, approaches and results of this paper are interpreted in terms of marketing problems.
- 7 September 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 8 (9) , 1529
Open AccessModeling and Simulation of Impact and Control in Social Networks with Application to Marketing
The problems of social networks analysis and calculation of the resulting opinions of network agents are considered. Algorithms for identifying strong subgroups and satellites as well as for calculating some quantitative characteristics of a network are implemented by the R programming language and tested on model examples. A new algorithm for calculating the resulting opinions of agents is developed by the R toolkit and tested on model examples. It is important that control actions that exert impact to the opinions should be applied exclusively to the members of strong subgroups (opinion leaders of a target audience), since they fully determine the stable resulting opinions of all network members. This approach allows saving control resources without significantly affecting its efficiency. Much attention is paid to the original models of optimal control (single subject) and conflict control (several competing subjects) under the assumption that the members of strong subgroups (opinion leaders) are already identified at the previous stage of network analysis. Models of optimal opinion control on networks are constructed and investigated by computer simulations using the author’s method of qualitatively representative scenarios. Differential game-based models of opinion control on networks with budget constraints in the form of equalities and inequalities are constructed and analytically investigated. All used notions, approaches and results of this paper are interpreted in terms of marketing problems.