Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Gennady Anatolievich Ougolnitsky has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The Problem of Redistributing Quotas for Training between Structural Divisions of a Higher Educational Institution

    by V. Yu. Kalachev, G. A. Ougolnitsky, A. B. Usov

    The problem of redistributing quotas for training among structural divisions of a higher education institution is considered. The problem of redistributing quotas has a wide range of applications, in particular, in preventing environmental pollution. The article assumes that a higher education institution has several structural divisions. The management of the higher education institution allocates some quotas for training to structural divisions (SD). The head of each SD can give part of the quota of his SD to another division, receiving some compensation in return. In this case, if the quota is not given, it must be fully used in the joint venture to which it was allocated. The head of each joint venture strives to maximize his gain, expressed by his objective function. For simplicity, it can be considered that the goal of the head of each joint venture is to maximize the amount of funds accumulated in the centralized fund of this joint venture. In this case, the head of the joint venture can manage the share of the quota allocated to him, which he wants to give or receive from another joint venture. It is shown in which cases all structural divisions manage to receive optimal quotas for them as a result of redistribution. Three cases are considered: when the total value of the quota that the divisions want to give is greater than, less than or equal to the total value of the quota that other structural divisions want to acquire. Algorithms for redistributing quotas in each of these cases are proposed. The study is conducted analytically for a particular type of input functions, which are taken as power functions. Numerical examples are given and an analysis of the results obtained is given. A number of meaningful conclusions are made.

  • Dynamic Game-theoretical Models of Innovation Management in Universities Taking into Account Opportunistic behavior

    by V. Yu. Kalachev, G. A. Ougolnitsky, A. B. Usov

    The article studies the issues of innovation implementation in universities. A three-level hierarchically organized model is proposed to describe the process of innovation implementation in universities. The model includes agents (followers, in whose role teachers act), supervisors (subjects of middle-level management, universities) and a principal (leader, the state). The principal (the state) is the first to announce its behavior strategy. Supervisors choose their management strategies when the principal’s choice is already known, but the agents’ choice is not yet known. Agents (teachers) make their choice when the management strategies of the other subjects are already known. Supervisors, like agents, make their choice independently of each other. The principal subsidizes the innovative development of higher education institutions by allocating funds for the development of new electronic courses. The new electronic courses being developed are considered as innovative products that contribute to the innovative development of higher education institutions. Supervisors receive subsidies from the principal for the development and implementation of innovative products. They determine the required volume of new courses issued by agents. Agents develop new electronic training courses for subsequent sale and implementation in the educational process. Supervisors keep part of the subsidies received from the principal for themselves, and transfer part to agents. Agents receive subsidies, the amount of which depends on the demand for the courses they develop, and manage the quality of the courses they develop, improving their qualifications. The possibility of corruption in the system is provided for and methods for combating it are defined. Lower and middle management entities may be subject to corruption. Agents may offer bribes to supervisors, in exchange for which they inflate the portion of subsidies transferred to agents. An analysis is conducted of how the presence of corruption affects the innovative development of universities. Thus, a dynamic three-level model is constructed, in which the dynamics are described by a difference equation reflecting the change in the general innovative level of the education system depending on the agents’ controls. Algorithms for constructing a solution for different combinations of Stackelberg games with and without feedback on control between the state and universities and between universities and teachers are indicated. In a non-antagonistic game of universities among themselves, as in a game of teachers, a Nash equilibrium is built. The results of numerical experiments are presented, their analysis is given. A number of meaningful conclusions and recommendations are made.

  • Open Access

    A Model of Cooperation Formation Among States Based on a Mutual Trust

    by Guennady Ougolnitsky, Anatoly Usov

    The paper examines stationary and dynamic gametheoretic models of cooperation formation among agents based on mutual trust. The dynamic model confirms that trust is a critically important factor in economic interactions. Mutual trust can significantly increase the payoffs for all agents, but its achievement is possible only for a certain class of input parameters of the model and requires a significant return on each agent’s investment in the public good. The model uses the value of social trust to describe social norms accepted in society. The study of the dynamic model was conducted based on Nash equilibrium in the static case and via simulation modelling for heterogeneous agents with different objective functionals. In the model, individual states act as agents. It is shown that the payoff of states directly depends on the degree of trust between them and can grow significantly in the presence of trust. Simulation experiments were conducted in the dynamic case, and the results were analysed.

  • Open Access

    Optimal Control in Financial Markets for the Uncertain Volatility Model

    by Grigory Belyavski, Natalia Danilova, Irina Zemlyakova, Gennady Ougolnitsky

    This paper generalizes the well-known Black–Scholes model, specifically the uncertain volatility model. To calculate the fair price range of a payment obligation, Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations are derived and transformed into nonlinear heat equations with boundary conditions. Theorems are proven stating that, for a certain class of payment obligations, solutions to nonlinear heat equations satisfy the linear heat equations. A computational example using real data is provided.


  • Open Access

    Optimal Control in Financial Markets for the Uncertain Volatility Model

    by Grigory Belyavski, Natalia Danilova, Irina Zemlyakova, Gennady Ougolnitsky

    This article generalizes the well-known Black-Scholes model, specifically the uncertain volatility model. To calculate the fair price range of a payment obligation, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are derived and transformed into nonlinear heat equations with boundary conditions. Theorems are proven stating that, for a certain class of payment obligations, solutions to nonlinear heat equations satisfy the linear heat equations. A computational example using real data is provided.

  • Open Access

    Sustainable Management in a Multipolar World as a Global Organizational System

    by Guennady Ougolnitsky

    This paper is devoted to the sustainable management problem of a multipolar world. The description of a multipolar world as a global organizational system is given. For the first time in the literature, all elements of the global organizational system mathematical model are specified in terms of a multipolar world order where civilizations act as agents. The peculiarities of viability conditions for such a global socio-ecological-economic system are indicated. The solvability conditions of the sustainable management problem under multipolarity are identified.

  • MACHINE LEARNING METHODS IN A RANDOM INVESTMENTS PROBLEM

    by Grigory Beliavsky, Natalia Danilova, Guennady Ougolnitsky, Keyu Yao

  • Open Access

    Dynamic Cooperative Game Theoretic Models of Opinion Control

    by Nailya Galieva, Aleksey Korolev, Gennady Ougolnitsky, 75 Lenina Street Tatneft

    In this paper we consider dynamic cooperative game theoretic models of control on networks. We suppose that all strong subgroups are determined in the stage of analysis of the influence digraph, and the control impact is exerted only to the members of those subgroups because they determine all stable final opinions. An agent’s opinion is interpreted as his expenses for buying goods (services) of a firm. We show that due to the model assumptions the characteristic functions by Neumann-Morgenstern, Petrosyan-Zaccour, and Gromova-Petrosyan coincide. We find Shapley value for this common characteristic function, prove its time inconsistency, and built an imputation distribution procedure. We compared the components of Shapley value with players’ payoffs for different forms of non-cooperative behavior.

  • Open Access

    Differential Games of Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of Pollution, Network Structure, and Continuous Updating

    by Guennady Ougolnitsky, Alexey Korolev

    We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed time consistency for a cooperative solution of the game. For a specific example, we built a non-empty subgame perfect subcore. We considered stochastic versions of the proposed model and received results similar to the deterministic case.