Benjamin Lennertz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Benjamin Lennertz has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Journal of Philosophy Inc.
1 shared publicationPhilosophy Documentation Center
1 shared publication- Stephen Finlay
University of Southern California
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12
Are Credences Thoughts about Probability? A Reply to the Inscrutable Evidence Argument
The Inscrutable Evidence Argument targets the thesis that credences are thoughts about evidential probabilities (CTEP). It does so using cases where one knows one’s evidence speaks either strongly in favor of or strongly against a proposition, but one doesn’t know which; in such cases, it seems possible to have a middling credence in that proposition even though one doesn’t think the probability of the proposition is near 50%—contra CTEP. In this paper, I defend CTEP by conceiving of the thoughts involved differently than usual. My diagnosis of the argument turns on appreciating the difference between believing and accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992) that a proposition has probability n, where accepting is context dependent and allows for guidance in action without commitment to truth. I develop this diagnosis in two directions, one according to which acceptances of probability-involving propositions are credences and another according to which they aren’t. Both views elude the Inscrutable Evidence Argument and are compatible with CTEP.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12
Open AccessAre Credences Thoughts about Probability? A Reply to the Inscrutable Evidence Argument
The Inscrutable Evidence Argument targets the thesis that credences are thoughts about evidential probabilities (CTEP). It does so using cases where one knows one’s evidence speaks either strongly in favor of or strongly against a proposition, but one doesn’t know which; in such cases, it seems possible to have a middling credence in that proposition even though one doesn’t think the probability of the proposition is near 50%—contra CTEP. In this paper, I defend CTEP by conceiving of the thoughts involved differently than usual. My diagnosis of the argument turns on appreciating the difference between believing and accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992) that a proposition has probability n, where accepting is context dependent and allows for guidance in action without commitment to truth. I develop this diagnosis in two directions, one according to which acceptances of probability-involving propositions are credences and another according to which they aren’t. Both views elude the Inscrutable Evidence Argument and are compatible with CTEP.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 25 (3) , 580-607
Uncertainty and Intention
Speakers typically use the sentence 'I will go to the store' to simultaneously express an intention to go to the store and a belief that they will go to the store. This is consonant with two popular theses about intentions: first, intending to j implies believing that one will j; second, intending to j commits one to j-ing. In this paper, I argue that at least one of these theses is false. I do so by exploring what speakers express when they utter a sentence with a slightly different form, like 'I will probably go to the store' in a typical situation. After laying down a framework for thinking about this sort of communication, I explore some different things speakers might express with this sentence in different situations. Most importantly, I argue that in some typical situations speakers express either ordinary intentions but not beliefs or partial intentions that don’t commit them to performing the intended action. Either way, at least one of the popular theses is false.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 25 (3) , 580-607
Open AccessUncertainty and Intention
Speakers typically use the sentence 'I will go to the store' to simultaneously express an intention to go to the store and a belief that they will go to the store. This is consonant with two popular theses about intentions: first, intending to j implies believing that one will j; second, intending to j commits one to j-ing. In this paper, I argue that at least one of these theses is false. I do so by exploring what speakers express when they utter a sentence with a slightly different form, like 'I will probably go to the store' in a typical situation. After laying down a framework for thinking about this sort of communication, I explore some different things speakers might express with this sentence in different situations. Most importantly, I argue that in some typical situations speakers express either ordinary intentions but not beliefs or partial intentions that don’t commit them to performing the intended action. Either way, at least one of the popular theses is false.
- 6 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (3) , 1235-1255
Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality
- 6 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (3) , 1235-1255
Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 9, 200-229
Imprecise Credences and Acceptance
Elga (2010) argues that no plausible decision rule governs action with imprecise credences. I follow Moss (2015a) in claiming that the solution to Elga's challenge is found in the philosophy of mind, not in devising a special new decision rule. Moss suggests that in decision situations that involve imprecise credences, we must identify with a precise credence, but she says little about identification. By reflecting on the common conception of identification and on what is necessary for Moss's solution to succeed, I argue that identifying with a precise credence is fundamentally accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992; Cohen 1989) a proposition about probabilities. The norm on action with imprecise credences is then a special case of the general norm on action and acceptance. I delineate a number of attractive features of this position. 1. Carr (2020) argues, however, that even in cases of imprecise evidence, it is permissible to have precise credences.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 9, 200-229
Open AccessImprecise Credences and Acceptance
Elga (2010) argues that no plausible decision rule governs action with imprecise credences. I follow Moss (2015a) in claiming that the solution to Elga's challenge is found in the philosophy of mind, not in devising a special new decision rule. Moss suggests that in decision situations that involve imprecise credences, we must identify with a precise credence, but she says little about identification. By reflecting on the common conception of identification and on what is necessary for Moss's solution to succeed, I argue that identifying with a precise credence is fundamentally accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992; Cohen 1989) a proposition about probabilities. The norm on action with imprecise credences is then a special case of the general norm on action and acceptance. I delineate a number of attractive features of this position. 1. Carr (2020) argues, however, that even in cases of imprecise evidence, it is permissible to have precise credences.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 118 (11) , 585-613
Quantificational Attitudes
The literature contains a popular argument in favor of the position that conditional attitudes (especially intentions and desires) are not simple attitudes with conditional contents but, rather, have a more complex structure. In this paper I show that an analogous argument applies to what we might call quantificational attitudes—like an intention to follow every bit of good advice I receive or a desire to get rabies shots for each bite I incur from an infected bat. The conditions under which these attitudes are satisfied and thwarted are not captured by claiming that they are simple attitudes with quantificational contents. So, the argument supports a novel position—that quantificational attitudes have a more complex structure. After sketching the form of this extra structure, I show how similar considerations count in favor of the existence of genuinely quantificational speech acts.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 118 (11) , 585-613
Quantificational Attitudes
The literature contains a popular argument in favor of the position that conditional attitudes (especially intentions and desires) are not simple attitudes with conditional contents but, rather, have a more complex structure. In this paper I show that an analogous argument applies to what we might call quantificational attitudes—like an intention to follow every bit of good advice I receive or a desire to get rabies shots for each bite I incur from an infected bat. The conditions under which these attitudes are satisfied and thwarted are not captured by claiming that they are simple attitudes with quantificational contents. So, the argument supports a novel position—that quantificational attitudes have a more complex structure. After sketching the form of this extra structure, I show how similar considerations count in favor of the existence of genuinely quantificational speech acts.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 51 (1) , 62-79
Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes
I generalize the notion of a conditional attitude by bringing together two topics of inquiry. One is the ordinary inquiry into conditional attitudes. The other topic is the inquiry into the attitude of thinking that a proposition is likely, or having a high credence in a proposition. For instance, what is it to intend to go to the game if it is likely that Kershaw pitches? Being likely that Kershaw pitches is the condition of the attitude. Given a natural position about statements like "It is likely that Kershaw pitches," the target attitude looks different from ordinary conditional attitudes.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 51 (1) , 62-79
Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes
I generalize the notion of a conditional attitude by bringing together two topics of inquiry. One is the ordinary inquiry into conditional attitudes. The other topic is the inquiry into the attitude of thinking that a proposition is likely, or having a high credence in a proposition. For instance, what is it to intend to go to the game if it is likely that Kershaw pitches? Being likely that Kershaw pitches is the condition of the attitude. Given a natural position about statements like "It is likely that Kershaw pitches," the target attitude looks different from ordinary conditional attitudes.
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 80 (4) , 647-656
What might but must not be
We examine an objection to analysing the epistemic ‘might’ and ‘may’ as existential quantifiers over possibilities. Some claims that a proposition “might” be the case appear felicitous although, according to the quantifier analysis, they are necessarily false, since there are no possibilities in which the proposition is true. We explain such cases pragmatically, relying on the fact that ‘might’-sentences are standardly used to convey that the speaker takes a proposition as a serious option in reasoning. Our account explains why it makes sense to utter these sentences despite their being literally false and why their falsity is easily missed.
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 80 (4) , 647-656
What might but must not be
We examine an objection to analysing the epistemic ‘might’ and ‘may’ as existential quantifiers over possibilities. Some claims that a proposition “might” be the case appear felicitous although, according to the quantifier analysis, they are necessarily false, since there are no possibilities in which the proposition is true. We explain such cases pragmatically, relying on the fact that ‘might’-sentences are standardly used to convey that the speaker takes a proposition as a serious option in reasoning. Our account explains why it makes sense to utter these sentences despite their being literally false and why their falsity is easily missed.
Evaluating the multiple proposition strategy
Contextualism about many expressions faces a common objection: in some discourses it appears that there is no single interpretation which can explain how a speaker is justified in making her assertion and how a hearer with different information or standards is justified in negatively evaluating what the speaker said. According to theMultiple Proposition Strategy, contextualists may attempt to explain these competing features pragmatically in terms of different propositions in play. In this paper I argue against the Multiple Proposition Strategy, first focusing on epistemic modals and then generalising the results to other expressions. I show how when purportedly contextualist terms are embedded in belief reports, we get similar problems but that the Multiple Proposition Strategy does not provide a satisfactory explanation of such cases. I suggest, therefore, that we reject the Multiple Proposition Strategy in favour of a theory that explains the unembedded and embedded cases in similar ways.
Evaluating the multiple proposition strategy
Contextualism about many expressions faces a common objection: in some discourses it appears that there is no single interpretation which can explain how a speaker is justified in making her assertion and how a hearer with different information or standards is justified in negatively evaluating what the speaker said. According to theMultiple Proposition Strategy, contextualists may attempt to explain these competing features pragmatically in terms of different propositions in play. In this paper I argue against the Multiple Proposition Strategy, first focusing on epistemic modals and then generalising the results to other expressions. I show how when purportedly contextualist terms are embedded in belief reports, we get similar problems but that the Multiple Proposition Strategy does not provide a satisfactory explanation of such cases. I suggest, therefore, that we reject the Multiple Proposition Strategy in favour of a theory that explains the unembedded and embedded cases in similar ways.
- 16 September 2019
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 102 (1) , 184-208
Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology
- 16 September 2019
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 102 (1) , 184-208
Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology
- 30 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 196 (11) , 4775-4805
Might-beliefs and asymmetric disagreement
- 30 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 196 (11) , 4775-4805
Might-beliefs and asymmetric disagreement