Imprecise Credences and Acceptance
Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 9, 200-229
Abstract
Elga (2010) argues that no plausible decision rule governs action with imprecise credences. I follow Moss (2015a) in claiming that the solution to Elga's challenge is found in the philosophy of mind, not in devising a special new decision rule. Moss suggests that in decision situations that involve imprecise credences, we must identify with a precise credence, but she says little about identification. By reflecting on the common conception of identification and on what is necessary for Moss's solution to succeed, I argue that identifying with a precise credence is fundamentally accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992; Cohen 1989) a proposition about probabilities. The norm on action with imprecise credences is then a special case of the general norm on action and acceptance. I delineate a number of attractive features of this position. 1. Carr (2020) argues, however, that even in cases of imprecise evidence, it is permissible to have precise credences.Keywords
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