Tamer Boyacı
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tamer Boyacı has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Caner Canyakmaz
Faculty of Business, Ozyegin University, Istanbul 34794, Turkey
3 shared publications - Yalçın Akçay
Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia
3 shared publications - Francis de Véricourt
European School of Management and Technology Berlin, 10178 Berlin, Germany
2 shared publications - Frank Huettner
ESMT European School of Management and Technology
2 shared publications - Arcan Nalca
Queen’s University
1 shared publication Huseyin Gurkan
ESMT Berlin, Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Beyond the Black Box: Unraveling the Role of Explainability in Human-Artificial Intelligence Collaboration
Explainable artificial intelligence (AI) models have been proposed to mitigate overreliance and underreliance on AI, which reduce the effectiveness of human-AI collaborative tools. Yet, empirical evidence is mixed, and the impact of explainable AI on the cognitive effort and fatigue of a decision maker (DM) is often overlooked. This paper offers a theoretical perspective on these issues. We develop an analytical model that incorporates the defining features of human and machine intelligence, capturing the limited but flexible nature of human cognition with imperfect machine recommendations. Crucially, we represent how AI-based explanations influence the DM’s belief in the algorithm’s predictive quality. Our results indicate that explainable AI has varying effects depending on the level of explainability provided. Although low explainability levels have no impact on decision accuracy and reliance behavior, they lessen the cognitive burden on the DM. In contrast, higher explainability levels enhance accuracy by improving overreliance but at the expense of increased underreliance. Further, the relative impact of explainability is higher when the DM is more cognitively constrained, when the decision task is sufficiently complex, or when the stakes are lower. Importantly, higher explainability levels can escalate the DM’s cognitive burden (and hence, overall processing time and fatigue) precisely when explanations are most needed (i.e., when the DM is pressed for time to complete a complex task and doubts the machine’s quality). Our study clarifies how explainability affects decision outcomes and cognitive effort, informing the design of effective human-AI systems across decision environments. This paper was accepted by Jeannette Song, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07450 .
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Beyond the Black Box: Unraveling the Role of Explainability in Human-Artificial Intelligence Collaboration
Explainable artificial intelligence (AI) models have been proposed to mitigate overreliance and underreliance on AI, which reduce the effectiveness of human-AI collaborative tools. Yet, empirical evidence is mixed, and the impact of explainable AI on the cognitive effort and fatigue of a decision maker (DM) is often overlooked. This paper offers a theoretical perspective on these issues. We develop an analytical model that incorporates the defining features of human and machine intelligence, capturing the limited but flexible nature of human cognition with imperfect machine recommendations. Crucially, we represent how AI-based explanations influence the DM’s belief in the algorithm’s predictive quality. Our results indicate that explainable AI has varying effects depending on the level of explainability provided. Although low explainability levels have no impact on decision accuracy and reliance behavior, they lessen the cognitive burden on the DM. In contrast, higher explainability levels enhance accuracy by improving overreliance but at the expense of increased underreliance. Further, the relative impact of explainability is higher when the DM is more cognitively constrained, when the decision task is sufficiently complex, or when the stakes are lower. Importantly, higher explainability levels can escalate the DM’s cognitive burden (and hence, overall processing time and fatigue) precisely when explanations are most needed (i.e., when the DM is pressed for time to complete a complex task and doubts the machine’s quality). Our study clarifies how explainability affects decision outcomes and cognitive effort, informing the design of effective human-AI systems across decision environments. This paper was accepted by Jeannette Song, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07450 .
- 21 March 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1142-1154
Persuading Skeptics and Fans in the Presence of Additional Information
We consider the information design problem of a demand-maximizing firm launching a product of unknown quality to a market consisting of customers who have heterogeneous prior beliefs about quality. The firm publicly discloses information about quality to all customers. These customers can subsequently opt to acquire additional information about the product at a cost from sources beyond the firm’s control. Our study is motivated by the common practice of firms conducting public pilot tests or soliciting reviews from opinion leaders before launching a new product to inform potential customers about its quality. To analyze this problem, we construct a game-theoretic model of Bayesian persuasion between the firm and its customers. We characterize the firm’s optimal information policy and show that it can range from fully disclosing quality to exaggerating or downplaying quality to not disclosing quality at all depending on market characteristics. We delineate the impact of market heterogeneity and access to additional information on the optimal information disclosure policy of the firm. Our analysis provides managerial guidance for firms in designing information provision strategies and operationalizing them for different market characteristics.
- 21 March 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1142-1154
Persuading Skeptics and Fans in the Presence of Additional Information
We consider the information design problem of a demand-maximizing firm launching a product of unknown quality to a market consisting of customers who have heterogeneous prior beliefs about quality. The firm publicly discloses information about quality to all customers. These customers can subsequently opt to acquire additional information about the product at a cost from sources beyond the firm’s control. Our study is motivated by the common practice of firms conducting public pilot tests or soliciting reviews from opinion leaders before launching a new product to inform potential customers about its quality. To analyze this problem, we construct a game-theoretic model of Bayesian persuasion between the firm and its customers. We characterize the firm’s optimal information policy and show that it can range from fully disclosing quality to exaggerating or downplaying quality to not disclosing quality at all depending on market characteristics. We delineate the impact of market heterogeneity and access to additional information on the optimal information disclosure policy of the firm. Our analysis provides managerial guidance for firms in designing information provision strategies and operationalizing them for different market characteristics.
- 23 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 72 (4) , 1536-1538
Erratum to “Consumer Choice Under Limited Attention When Alternatives Have Different Information Costs”
- 23 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 72 (4) , 1536-1538
Erratum to “Consumer Choice Under Limited Attention When Alternatives Have Different Information Costs”
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 1258-1275
Human and Machine: The Impact of Machine Input on Decision Making Under Cognitive Limitations
The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies by many organizations has recently raised concerns that AI may eventually replace humans in certain tasks. In fact, when used in collaboration, machines can significantly enhance the complementary strengths of humans. Indeed, because of their immense computing power, machines can perform specific tasks with incredible accuracy. In contrast, human decision makers (DMs) are flexible and adaptive but constrained by their limited cognitive capacity. This paper investigates how machine-based predictions may affect the decision process and outcomes of a human DM. We study the impact of these predictions on decision accuracy, the propensity and nature of decision errors, and the DM’s cognitive efforts. To account for both flexibility and limited cognitive capacity, we model the human decision-making process in a rational inattention framework. In this setup, the machine provides the DM with accurate but sometimes incomplete information at no cognitive cost. We fully characterize the impact of machine input on the human decision process in this framework. We show that machine input always improves the overall accuracy of human decisions but may nonetheless increase the propensity of certain types of errors (such as false positives). The machine can also induce the human to exert more cognitive efforts, although its input is highly accurate. Interestingly, this happens when the DM is most cognitively constrained, for instance, because of time pressure or multitasking. Synthesizing these results, we pinpoint the decision environments in which human-machine collaboration is likely to be most beneficial. This paper was accepted by Jeannette Song, operations management. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4744 .
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 1258-1275
Top Cited PapersHuman and Machine: The Impact of Machine Input on Decision Making Under Cognitive Limitations
The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies by many organizations has recently raised concerns that AI may eventually replace humans in certain tasks. In fact, when used in collaboration, machines can significantly enhance the complementary strengths of humans. Indeed, because of their immense computing power, machines can perform specific tasks with incredible accuracy. In contrast, human decision makers (DMs) are flexible and adaptive but constrained by their limited cognitive capacity. This paper investigates how machine-based predictions may affect the decision process and outcomes of a human DM. We study the impact of these predictions on decision accuracy, the propensity and nature of decision errors, and the DM’s cognitive efforts. To account for both flexibility and limited cognitive capacity, we model the human decision-making process in a rational inattention framework. In this setup, the machine provides the DM with accurate but sometimes incomplete information at no cognitive cost. We fully characterize the impact of machine input on the human decision process in this framework. We show that machine input always improves the overall accuracy of human decisions but may nonetheless increase the propensity of certain types of errors (such as false positives). The machine can also induce the human to exert more cognitive efforts, although its input is highly accurate. Interestingly, this happens when the DM is most cognitively constrained, for instance, because of time pressure or multitasking. Synthesizing these results, we pinpoint the decision environments in which human-machine collaboration is likely to be most beneficial. This paper was accepted by Jeannette Song, operations management. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4744 .
- Open Access
- 18 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Sustainability Analytics and Modeling
- Vol. 3
Design for reusability and product reuse under radical innovation
- 18 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Sustainability Analytics and Modeling
- Vol. 3
Open AccessDesign for reusability and product reuse under radical innovation
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (1) , 266-287
Queueing Systems with Rationally Inattentive Customers
Problem definition: Classical models of queueing systems with rational and strategic customers assume queues to be either fully visible or invisible, while service parameters are known with certainty. In practice, however, people only have “partial information” on the service environment, in the sense that they are not able to fully discern prevalent uncertainties. This is because assessing possible delays and rewards is costly, as it requires time, attention, and cognitive capacity, which are all limited. On the other hand, people are also adaptive and endogenously respond to information frictions. Methodology: We develop an equilibrium model for a single-server queueing system with customers having limited attention. Following the theory of rational inattention, we assume that customers optimize their learning strategies by deciding the type and amount of information to acquire and act accordingly while internalizing the associated costs. Results: We establish the existence and uniqueness of a customer equilibrium when customers allocate their attention to learn uncertain queue lengths and delineate the impact of service characteristics. We provide a complete spectrum of the impact of information costs on throughput and show numerically that throughput might be nonmonotone. This is also reflected in social welfare if the firm’s profit margin is high enough, although customer welfare always suffers from information costs. Managerial implications: We identify service settings where service firms and social planners should be most cautious for customers’ limited attention and translate our results to advisable strategies for information provision and service design. For example, we recommend firms to avoid partial hindrance of queue-length information when a low-demand service is not highly valued by customers. For a popular service that customers value reasonably highly, however, partial hindrance of information is particularly advisable. Academic/practical relevance: We propose a microfounded framework for strategic customer behavior in queues that links beliefs, rewards, and information costs. It offers a holistic perspective on the impact of information prevalence (and information frictions) on operational performance and can be extended to analyze richer customer behavior and complex queue structures, rendering it a valuable tool for service design. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1032 .
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (1) , 266-287
Queueing Systems with Rationally Inattentive Customers
Problem definition: Classical models of queueing systems with rational and strategic customers assume queues to be either fully visible or invisible, while service parameters are known with certainty. In practice, however, people only have “partial information” on the service environment, in the sense that they are not able to fully discern prevalent uncertainties. This is because assessing possible delays and rewards is costly, as it requires time, attention, and cognitive capacity, which are all limited. On the other hand, people are also adaptive and endogenously respond to information frictions. Methodology: We develop an equilibrium model for a single-server queueing system with customers having limited attention. Following the theory of rational inattention, we assume that customers optimize their learning strategies by deciding the type and amount of information to acquire and act accordingly while internalizing the associated costs. Results: We establish the existence and uniqueness of a customer equilibrium when customers allocate their attention to learn uncertain queue lengths and delineate the impact of service characteristics. We provide a complete spectrum of the impact of information costs on throughput and show numerically that throughput might be nonmonotone. This is also reflected in social welfare if the firm’s profit margin is high enough, although customer welfare always suffers from information costs. Managerial implications: We identify service settings where service firms and social planners should be most cautious for customers’ limited attention and translate our results to advisable strategies for information provision and service design. For example, we recommend firms to avoid partial hindrance of queue-length information when a low-demand service is not highly valued by customers. For a popular service that customers value reasonably highly, however, partial hindrance of information is particularly advisable. Academic/practical relevance: We propose a microfounded framework for strategic customer behavior in queues that links beliefs, rewards, and information costs. It offers a holistic perspective on the impact of information prevalence (and information frictions) on operational performance and can be extended to analyze richer customer behavior and complex queue structures, rendering it a valuable tool for service design. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1032 .
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 67 (3) , 671-699
Consumer Choice Under Limited Attention When Alternatives Have Different Information Costs
Consumers often do not have complete information about the choices they face and, therefore, have to spend time and effort acquiring information. Because information acquisition is costly, consumers trade off the value of better information against its cost and make their final product choices based on imperfect information. We model this decision using the rational inattention approach and describe the rationally inattentive consumer’s choice behavior when the consumer faces alternatives with different information costs. To this end, we introduce an information cost function that distinguishes between direct and implied information. We then analytically characterize the optimal choice probabilities. We find that nonuniform information costs can have a strong impact on product choice, which gets particularly conspicuous when the product alternatives are otherwise very similar. There are significant implications on how a seller should provide information about its products and how changes to the product set impacts consumer choice. For example, nonuniform information costs can lead to situations in which it is disadvantageous for the seller to provide easier access to information for a particular product and to situations in which the addition of an inferior (never chosen) product increases the market share of another existing product (i.e., failure of regularity). We also provide an algorithm to compute the optimal choice probabilities and discuss how our framework can be empirically estimated from suitable choice data.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 67 (3) , 671-699
Consumer Choice Under Limited Attention When Alternatives Have Different Information Costs
Consumers often do not have complete information about the choices they face and, therefore, have to spend time and effort acquiring information. Because information acquisition is costly, consumers trade off the value of better information against its cost and make their final product choices based on imperfect information. We model this decision using the rational inattention approach and describe the rationally inattentive consumer’s choice behavior when the consumer faces alternatives with different information costs. To this end, we introduce an information cost function that distinguishes between direct and implied information. We then analytically characterize the optimal choice probabilities. We find that nonuniform information costs can have a strong impact on product choice, which gets particularly conspicuous when the product alternatives are otherwise very similar. There are significant implications on how a seller should provide information about its products and how changes to the product set impacts consumer choice. For example, nonuniform information costs can lead to situations in which it is disadvantageous for the seller to provide easier access to information for a particular product and to situations in which the addition of an inferior (never chosen) product increases the market share of another existing product (i.e., failure of regularity). We also provide an algorithm to compute the optimal choice probabilities and discuss how our framework can be empirically estimated from suitable choice data.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (7) , 2995-3014
Pricing When Customers Have Limited Attention
We study the optimal pricing problem of a monopolistic firm facing customers with limited attention and capability to process information about the value (quality) of a single offered product. We model customer choice based on the theory of rational inattention in the economics literature, which enables us to capture not only the impact of true quality and price, but also the intricate effects of customer’s prior beliefs and cost of information acquisition and processing. We formulate the firm’s price optimization problem assuming that the firm can also use the price to signal the quality of the product to customers. To delineate the economic incentives of the firm, we first characterize the pricing and revenue implications of customer’s limited attention without signaling, and then use these results to explore perfect Bayesian equilibria of the strategic pricing signaling game. As an extension, we consider heterogeneous customers with different information costs as well as prior beliefs. We discuss the managerial implications of our key findings and prescribe insights regarding information provision and product positioning. This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (7) , 2995-3014
Pricing When Customers Have Limited Attention
We study the optimal pricing problem of a monopolistic firm facing customers with limited attention and capability to process information about the value (quality) of a single offered product. We model customer choice based on the theory of rational inattention in the economics literature, which enables us to capture not only the impact of true quality and price, but also the intricate effects of customer’s prior beliefs and cost of information acquisition and processing. We formulate the firm’s price optimization problem assuming that the firm can also use the price to signal the quality of the product to customers. To delineate the economic incentives of the firm, we first characterize the pricing and revenue implications of customer’s limited attention without signaling, and then use these results to explore perfect Bayesian equilibria of the strategic pricing signaling game. As an extension, we consider heterogeneous customers with different information costs as well as prior beliefs. We discuss the managerial implications of our key findings and prescribe insights regarding information provision and product positioning. This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.
- 11 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 8 (3) , 275-300
Competitive price-matching guarantees under imperfect store availability
- 11 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 8 (3) , 275-300
Competitive price-matching guarantees under imperfect store availability