YAYalçın Akçay

Yalçın Akçay

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Yalçın Akçay has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Customers know best: Pricing policies for products with heterogeneous quality

    by Yalçın Akçay, Fikri Karaesmen

    This article studies the pricing problem of a seller given an initial inventory of products with heterogeneous quality, facing uncertain customer arrivals over a finite selling season. We consider various regimes depending on whether the seller inspects the inventory to assess the quality levels of the products, and whether customers examine the inventory themselves and pick their specific item of choice among the available products. We formulate the problem under each regime as a stochastic optimization model which maximizes the seller's expected profits, capturing the salient problem features such as stochastic customer arrivals, customers' choice behavior, and uncertain product qualities. As obtaining closed‐form solutions or structural properties for the optimal prices is quite difficult, we explore the full information solution to the problem as an upper bound, as well as solution approaches that approximate some key problem characteristics. Finally, we substantiate our results through an extensive numerical study, focusing on the performance of the proposed pricing policies and approximations.


  • A Transaction Utility Approach for Bidding in Second-Price Auctions

    by Serdar Sayman, Yalçın Akçay

    In both the Vickrey and eBay auctions, bidding the reservation price is the optimal strategy within the conventional utility framework. However, in practice, buyers tend to bid less than their reservation prices, and bid multiple times, thus increase their bids, in the course of an auction. In this paper, we show that both underbidding and multiple bidding behaviors can be consistent with utility maximization, if buyer's utility incorporates a transaction utility (reference price dependent) component. Transaction utility is based on the difference between the buyer's reference price and actual price paid; it captures the perceived value of the deal. More specifically, we show that the optimal bid is lower than the reservation price, but higher than the reference price. Furthermore, buyer may re-bid (above the prior optimal level) if the reference price is revised upon observing a higher current price.


  • Open Access

    The Customer Knows Best: Pricing Policies for Random Quality Products

    by Yalcin Akcay, Fikri Karaesmen

    The growing adoption of electronic shelf-edge labels has created a new business opportunity for firms in the retail grocery industry – adjusting produce prices in real time. In addition to the well-known challenges in typical revenue management applications, selling products at the right time and at the right price, these firms also face customers who tend to pick and choose better quality (fresher looking, without visual/cosmetic imperfections and blemishes) fruit or vegetables upon arrival. Therefore, the main challenge emerges as the interpretation of managers about how much they will need to vary prices without knowing the exact quality of the remaining inventory. In this paper, we formulate the problem as a stochastic optimization model which maximizes the seller’s expected profits over a finite selling season, and captures salient problem features such as stochastic demand, customers’ choice behaviour, and uncertain product qualities. We propose static pricing and price updating strategies, which rely on multiple order statistics and manipulations of their joint distribution functions. Since obtaining closed-form solutions or structural properties for the optimal prices is quite difficult, we explore the full information solution to the problem as well as solution approaches which approximate some key problem characteristics. Finally, we substantiate our results through an extensive numerical study, focusing on the performance of the proposed pricing policies and approximations.

  • Consumer Choice Under Limited Attention When Alternatives Have Different Information Costs

    by Frank Huettner, Tamer Boyacı, Yalçın Akçay

    Consumers often do not have complete information about the choices they face and, therefore, have to spend time and effort acquiring information. Because information acquisition is costly, consumers trade off the value of better information against its cost and make their final product choices based on imperfect information. We model this decision using the rational inattention approach and describe the rationally inattentive consumer’s choice behavior when the consumer faces alternatives with different information costs. To this end, we introduce an information cost function that distinguishes between direct and implied information. We then analytically characterize the optimal choice probabilities. We find that nonuniform information costs can have a strong impact on product choice, which gets particularly conspicuous when the product alternatives are otherwise very similar. There are significant implications on how a seller should provide information about its products and how changes to the product set impacts consumer choice. For example, nonuniform information costs can lead to situations in which it is disadvantageous for the seller to provide easier access to information for a particular product and to situations in which the addition of an inferior (never chosen) product increases the market share of another existing product (i.e., failure of regularity). We also provide an algorithm to compute the optimal choice probabilities and discuss how our framework can be empirically estimated from suitable choice data.


  • Pricing When Customers Have Limited Attention

    by Tamer Boyacı, Yalçın Akçay

    We study the optimal pricing problem of a monopolistic firm facing customers with limited attention and capability to process information about the value (quality) of a single offered product. We model customer choice based on the theory of rational inattention in the economics literature, which enables us to capture not only the impact of true quality and price, but also the intricate effects of customer’s prior beliefs and cost of information acquisition and processing. We formulate the firm’s price optimization problem assuming that the firm can also use the price to signal the quality of the product to customers. To delineate the economic incentives of the firm, we first characterize the pricing and revenue implications of customer’s limited attention without signaling, and then use these results to explore perfect Bayesian equilibria of the strategic pricing signaling game. As an extension, we consider heterogeneous customers with different information costs as well as prior beliefs. We discuss the managerial implications of our key findings and prescribe insights regarding information provision and product positioning. This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.


  • Cross-Selling Investment Products with a Win-Win Perspective in Portfolio Optimization

    by Özden Gür Ali, Yalçın Akçay, Serdar Sayman, Emrah Yılmaz, M. Hamdi Özçelik

    We propose a novel approach to cross-selling investment products that considers both the customers’ and the bank’s interests. Our goal is to improve the risk–return profile of the customer’s portfolio and the bank’s profitability concurrently, essentially creating a win-win situation, while deepening the relationship with an acceptable product. Our cross-selling approach takes the customer’s status quo bias into account by starting from the existing customer portfolio, rather than forming an efficient portfolio from scratch. We estimate a customer’s probability of accepting a product offer with a predictive model using readily available data. Then, we model the investment product cross-selling problem as a nonlinear mixed-integer program that maximizes a customer’s expected return from the proposed portfolio, while ensuring that the bank’s profitability improves by a certain factor. We implemented our methodology at the private banking division of Yapı Kredi, the fourth-largest private bank in Turkey. Empirical results from this application illustrate that (1) a traditional mean-variance portfolio optimization approach does not increase portfolio returns and reduces overall bank profits, (2) a standard cross-selling approach increases bank profits at the expense of the customers’ portfolio returns, and (3) our win-win approach increases the expected portfolio returns of customers without increasing their variances, while simultaneously improving bank profits substantially.


  • Revenue Management for Intermodal Transportation: The Role of Dynamic Forecasting

    by Ting Luo, Long Gao, Yalçın Akçay

    We study a joint capacity leasing and demand acceptance problem in intermodal transportation. The model features multiple sources of evolving supply and demand, and endogenizes the interplay of three levers—forecasting, leasing, and demand acceptance. We characterize the optimal policy, and show how dynamic forecasting coordinates leasing and acceptance. We find (i) the value of dynamic forecasting depends critically on scarcity, stochasticity, and volatility; (ii) traditional mean‐value equivalence approach performs poorly in volatile intermodal context; (iii) mean‐value‐based forecast may outperform stationary distribution‐based forecast. Our work enriches revenue management models and applications. It advances our understanding on when and how to use dynamic forecasting in intermodal revenue management.


  • Assortment-based cooperation between two make-to-stock firms

    by Bariş Tan, Yalçin Akçay

    Cooperation can potentially improve competitiveness and profitability of firms with limited resources and production capacities. This article presents a continuous-time Markov chain model to study an assortment-based cooperation between two independent firms with limited capacity. An assortment-based cooperation is an agreement to combine the product assortments of two firms and offer the combined assortment to each firm's customers. Both centralized and decentralized cooperations are studied. In a centralized cooperation, firms jointly make replenishment decisions, whereas in the decentralized case, firms operate under independent base stock policies and manage product exchanges through a discount-based contract where each firm supplies its own product to the other firm at a discounted price and at an agreed-upon fill rate. Under this scheme, assortment-based cooperation also mandates each firm to effectively ration their inventories since they have to deal with two different demand streams. The discount-based contract yields the results of the centralized operation by using specific values of the contract parameters. It is shown that assortment-based cooperation is always beneficial for two symmetrical firms in both centralized and decentralized cooperation. Numerical experiments reveal that assortment-based cooperation is not always beneficial if the firms are not symmetrical. [Supplementary materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of IIE Transactions for Proofs of all Propositions.]


  • Selling with Money‐Back Guarantees: The Impact on Prices, Quantities, and Retail Profitability

    by Yalçın Akçay, Tamer Boyacı, Dan Zhang

    In this paper, we consider a retailer adopting a “money‐back‐guaranteed” (MBG) sales policy, which allows customers to return products that do not meet their expectations to the retailer for a full or partial refund. The retailer either salvages returned products or resells them as open‐box items at a discount. We develop a model in which the retailer decides on the quantity to procure, the price for new products, the refund amount, as well as the price of returned products when they are sold as open‐box. Our model captures important features of MBG sales including demand uncertainty, consumer valuation uncertainty, consumer returns, the sale of returned products as open‐box items, and consumer choice between new and returned products and possibility of exchanges when restocking is considered. We show that selling with MBGs increases retail sales and profit. Furthermore, the second‐sale opportunity created by restocking returned products enables the retailer to generate additional revenues. Our analysis identifies the ideal conditions under which this practice is most beneficial to the retailer. Offering an MBG without restocking increases the new product price. We show that if the retailer decides to resell the returned items as open‐box, the price of the new product further increases, while open‐box items are sold at a discount. On the other hand, customers enjoy more generous refunds along with lower restocking fees. The opportunity to resell returned products also generally decreases the initial stocking levels of the retailer. Our extensive numerical study substantiates the analytical results and sharpens our insights into the drivers of performance of MBG policies and their impact on retail decisions.