Robert Innes
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Robert Innes has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Glynis Gawn
Economics, School of Social Sciences, Humanities & Arts, University of California, Merced 5200 N. Lake Rd., Merced, CA 95343, United States
2 shared publications - Alexandra Mavroeidi
Department of Allied Health Professions, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, United Kingdom
1 shared publication - Anand Murugesan
Central European University
1 shared publication - Arnab Mitra
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics Portland State University Portland OR 97201
1 shared publication D. Pennington
Department of Computer and Information Sciences, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
1 shared publication- Esperanza Miyake
University of Strathclyde
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Markets For Children: International Adoptions, IVF, and U.S. Foster Care
The likelihood that a child in U.S. foster care is adopted depends upon alternatives available to parents. We analyzed a child-level panel from 1998 to 2004, when international adoptions peaked in the US, to estimate the effect of international adoptions and assisted reproductive technologies (ART) on adoption probabilities for foster children, focusing on infants and toddlers. Using granular data on the adopted children's country of origin and placement state, we identify the impact of international adoptions with a shift-share instrument. We find that international adoptions have significant and robust negative effects on foster adoptions, while the estimated effects of ART births are smaller and sensitive to model specification. JEL Classifications: I38, J13, J18
- 6 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessMarkets For Children: International Adoptions, IVF, and U.S. Foster Care
The likelihood that a child in U.S. foster care is adopted depends upon alternatives available to parents. We analyzed a child-level panel from 1998 to 2004, when international adoptions peaked in the US, to estimate the effect of international adoptions and assisted reproductive technologies (ART) on adoption probabilities for foster children, focusing on infants and toddlers. Using granular data on the adopted children's country of origin and placement state, we identify the impact of international adoptions with a shift-share instrument. We find that international adoptions have significant and robust negative effects on foster adoptions, while the estimated effects of ART births are smaller and sensitive to model specification. JEL Classifications: I38, J13, J18
- Open Access
- 21 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Proceedings of the Nutrition Society
- Vol. 81 (OCE3)
A year in the public life of COVID-19 and vitamin D: representation in UK news and social media and implications for future health communications
- 21 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Proceedings of the Nutrition Society
- Vol. 81 (OCE3)
Open AccessA year in the public life of COVID-19 and vitamin D: representation in UK news and social media and implications for future health communications
- 29 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 71, 59-73
Lying through others: Does delegation promote deception?
- 29 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 71, 59-73
Lying through others: Does delegation promote deception?
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 74, 167-176
Language and lies
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 74, 167-176
Language and lies
- 28 November 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 59 (1) , 137-161
DO LIES ERODE TRUST?
Does honesty promote trust and trustworthiness? We investigate how being lied to (versus told the truth) in a Gneezy deception game affects behavior in a subsequent trust game with different players. Using a design that controls for potential treatment effects on payoffs, mood, and beliefs about the overall propensity for honesty in the experiment, we find that the specific experience of being lied to significantly erodes trust and trustworthiness.
- 28 November 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 59 (1) , 137-161
DO LIES ERODE TRUST?
Does honesty promote trust and trustworthiness? We investigate how being lied to (versus told the truth) in a Gneezy deception game affects behavior in a subsequent trust game with different players. Using a design that controls for potential treatment effects on payoffs, mood, and beliefs about the overall propensity for honesty in the experiment, we find that the specific experience of being lied to significantly erodes trust and trustworthiness.
- 6 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 52 (2) , 107-131
Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement
- 6 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 52 (2) , 107-131
Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement
- 27 August 2014
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (1) , 522-539
PARTIES, POLITICS, AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT
Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility‐level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)
- 27 August 2014
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (1) , 522-539
PARTIES, POLITICS, AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT
Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility‐level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)
- 23 July 2013
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 95 (5) , 1216-1222
Slotting Allowances under Supermarket Oligopoly
- 23 July 2013
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 95 (5) , 1216-1222
Slotting Allowances under Supermarket Oligopoly
- 22 November 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 95 (1) , 42-69
Income and the Environment in Rural India: Is There a Poverty Trap?
We study the relationships between rural income distributions and changes in environmental conditions in southern, western and central India between 1994–95 and 2000–01. Other than the relatively rich, we find that all income strata benefit from an improved environment, and intermediate expenditure households benefit more than the very poor in absolute terms. Higher median consumption expenditures and “richness” are estimated to increase environmental decline, but we do not find a significant impact of income poverty on local environmental health. The results do not support the “poverty trap” conjecture, with environmental degradation driving expenditure reductions that promote offsetting aforestation (which benefits the poor).
- 22 November 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 95 (1) , 42-69
Income and the Environment in Rural India: Is There a Poverty Trap?
We study the relationships between rural income distributions and changes in environmental conditions in southern, western and central India between 1994–95 and 2000–01. Other than the relatively rich, we find that all income strata benefit from an improved environment, and intermediate expenditure households benefit more than the very poor in absolute terms. Higher median consumption expenditures and “richness” are estimated to increase environmental decline, but we do not find a significant impact of income poverty on local environmental health. The results do not support the “poverty trap” conjecture, with environmental degradation driving expenditure reductions that promote offsetting aforestation (which benefits the poor).
- 31 May 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (1) , 722-734
IS DISHONESTY CONTAGIOUS?
When an individual believes that peers are predominantly untruthful in a given situation, is he/she more likely to be untruthful in that situation? We study this question in deception experiments patterned after Gneezy [Gneezy U. “Deception: The Role of Consequences.” American Economic Review, 95, 2005, 384–94] and conducted in Arizona, California, and India. We find evidence that dishonesty is indeed contagious.(JELD03)
- 31 May 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (1) , 722-734
IS DISHONESTY CONTAGIOUS?
When an individual believes that peers are predominantly untruthful in a given situation, is he/she more likely to be untruthful in that situation? We study this question in deception experiments patterned after Gneezy [Gneezy U. “Deception: The Role of Consequences.” American Economic Review, 95, 2005, 384–94] and conducted in Arizona, California, and India. We find evidence that dishonesty is indeed contagious.(JELD03)