Arnab Mitra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Arnab Mitra has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Erin L. Krupka
School of Information, University of Michigan, 105 South State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
1 shared publication - Michael R. Moore
School for Environment and Sustainability, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
1 shared publication Quazi Shahriar
1 shared publication- Quazi Shahriar
Department of Economics, San Diego State University, 5500 Campanile Dr., San Diego, CA 92182, United States
1 shared publication - Ritwik Banerjee
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
1 shared publication - Robert Innes
University of California, Merced
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Credence Goods in Markets with Collective Reputation: Nature of Equilibria and the Value of Certification
Fraud can cause markets for credence goods to collapse, but collective reputation has been suggested as a potential solution, especially when buyer valuations for quality are high. We develop a discrete model of a market for label credence goods and provide conditions for no-fraud equilibria based on collective reputation. We identify conditions under which all equilibria may be asymmetric or involve mixed strategies and hence sellers may face coordination problems. Our analysis suggests such coordination problems are the greatest when the size of the high-quality market is approximately half of the overall market (that incorporates both high- and low-quality goods), in the absence of any focal point or coordination device. Concerning certification, we find that it may not be particularly useful when buyer valuations for credence attributes are high under a well-performing collective reputation regime and a relatively small-sized low-quality market. However, we also determine that certification may serve its purpose the most when buyer valuations for credence attributes are low (contrary to standard intuition) and/or the size of the high-quality market is around half of the overall market (i.e., the high- and low-quality markets are of approximately equal size). Finally, our results indirectly indicate that agencies/NGOs concerned about fraudulent behavior may focus their attention on markets where heterogenous firms enjoy collective reputation.
Open AccessCredence Goods in Markets with Collective Reputation: Nature of Equilibria and the Value of Certification
Fraud can cause markets for credence goods to collapse, but collective reputation has been suggested as a potential solution, especially when buyer valuations for quality are high. We develop a discrete model of a market for label credence goods and provide conditions for no-fraud equilibria based on collective reputation. We identify conditions under which all equilibria may be asymmetric or involve mixed strategies and hence sellers may face coordination problems. Our analysis suggests such coordination problems are the greatest when the size of the high-quality market is approximately half of the overall market (that incorporates both high- and low-quality goods), in the absence of any focal point or coordination device. Concerning certification, we find that it may not be particularly useful when buyer valuations for credence attributes are high under a well-performing collective reputation regime and a relatively small-sized low-quality market. However, we also determine that certification may serve its purpose the most when buyer valuations for credence attributes are low (contrary to standard intuition) and/or the size of the high-quality market is around half of the overall market (i.e., the high- and low-quality markets are of approximately equal size). Finally, our results indirectly indicate that agencies/NGOs concerned about fraudulent behavior may focus their attention on markets where heterogenous firms enjoy collective reputation.
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 80, 102292
Why is dishonesty difficult to mitigate? The interaction between descriptive norm and monetary incentive
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 80, 102292
Why is dishonesty difficult to mitigate? The interaction between descriptive norm and monetary incentive
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 114, 1-18
Deception: The role of uncertain consequences
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 114, 1-18
Deception: The role of uncertain consequences
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 149, 332-355
On monetary and non-monetary interventions to combat corruption
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 149, 332-355
On monetary and non-monetary interventions to combat corruption
- 25 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 71 (1) , 45-71
Green Electricity Markets as Mechanisms of Public-Goods Provision: Theory and Experimental Evidence
- 25 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 71 (1) , 45-71
Green Electricity Markets as Mechanisms of Public-Goods Provision: Theory and Experimental Evidence
- 8 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (3) , 1631-1647
BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS
This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)
- 8 March 2016
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (3) , 1631-1647
BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS
This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)
- 27 August 2014
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (1) , 522-539
PARTIES, POLITICS, AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT
Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility‐level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)
- 27 August 2014
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (1) , 522-539
PARTIES, POLITICS, AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT
Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility‐level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)