Noah Lim
Research Subjects
Noah Lim has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alessandro Del Ponte
Global Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
2 shared publications - Keehyung Kim
CUHK Business School, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong
2 shared publications - Kevin Chung
Wisconsin School of Business, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706
2 shared publications - Aidas Masiliūnas
Global Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
1 shared publication - Bernard Ng
Division of Rheumatology, Department of Medicine, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States
1 shared publication - Diego F. Salazar
NUS Global Asia Institute, Singapore 117602, Singapore
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 45 (1) , 80-107
Job Security, Gender, and Sales Performance: Evidence from a Retail Sales Context
This paper investigates the impact of job stability on the performance of workers, specifically women.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 45 (1) , 80-107
Job Security, Gender, and Sales Performance: Evidence from a Retail Sales Context
This paper investigates the impact of job stability on the performance of workers, specifically women.
- 12 December 2025
- Published by American Chemical Society (ACS) in Environmental Science & Technology
- Vol. 59 (50) , 27069-27077
Global Populations Vulnerable to Air Pollution Know Less about Air Quality
Using a nationally representative quota sample of 10,618 participants from 1372 localities from the ten most populous countries in the world (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States), we assessed the association between fine particulate matter (PM2.5) exposure and air quality knowledge (AQ-IQ). Additionally, we evaluated which demographics are more vulnerable to PM2.5 exposure amid a low AQ-IQ. PM2.5 concentrations were estimated based on satellite observations and data from ground monitoring stations, while AQ-IQ was measured using ten items pertaining to general knowledge, knowledge specific to the air quality index, and knowledge of best practices about air quality. Annual average PM2.5 levels in these countries varied significantly, ranging from 7.58 μg/m3 in the US to 78.00 μg/m3 in Bangladesh. We found that AQ-IQ is the highest in Mexico and China and the lowest in Bangladesh and Nigeria. Moreover, women, as well as people who live in rural areas, are single, lack a college education, are politically conservative, and currently smoke know less about air quality (p < 0.05). Overall, the findings indicate that people who are most exposed to air pollution are significantly less knowledgeable about air quality.
- 12 December 2025
- Published by American Chemical Society (ACS) in Environmental Science & Technology
- Vol. 59 (50) , 27069-27077
Global Populations Vulnerable to Air Pollution Know Less about Air Quality
Using a nationally representative quota sample of 10,618 participants from 1372 localities from the ten most populous countries in the world (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States), we assessed the association between fine particulate matter (PM2.5) exposure and air quality knowledge (AQ-IQ). Additionally, we evaluated which demographics are more vulnerable to PM2.5 exposure amid a low AQ-IQ. PM2.5 concentrations were estimated based on satellite observations and data from ground monitoring stations, while AQ-IQ was measured using ten items pertaining to general knowledge, knowledge specific to the air quality index, and knowledge of best practices about air quality. Annual average PM2.5 levels in these countries varied significantly, ranging from 7.58 μg/m3 in the US to 78.00 μg/m3 in Bangladesh. We found that AQ-IQ is the highest in Mexico and China and the lowest in Bangladesh and Nigeria. Moreover, women, as well as people who live in rural areas, are single, lack a college education, are politically conservative, and currently smoke know less about air quality (p < 0.05). Overall, the findings indicate that people who are most exposed to air pollution are significantly less knowledgeable about air quality.
- Open Access
- 15 February 2022
- Published by American Medical Association (AMA) in JAMA Network Open
- Vol. 5 (2) , e2148593
Association of Use of Electronic Appointment Reminders With Waiting Times in the Veterans Affairs Health System
Electronic appointment reminder systems are increasingly being used across health systems in the US and around the world. Their prominence may be associated with their modest (and decreasing) costs of implementation, as well as their association with improvement in patient no-show rates.1-6
- 15 February 2022
- Published by American Medical Association (AMA) in JAMA Network Open
- Vol. 5 (2) , e2148593
Open AccessAssociation of Use of Electronic Appointment Reminders With Waiting Times in the Veterans Affairs Health System
Electronic appointment reminder systems are increasingly being used across health systems in the US and around the world. Their prominence may be associated with their modest (and decreasing) costs of implementation, as well as their association with improvement in patient no-show rates.1-6
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (12) , 7535-7559
Conflict of Interest in Third-Party Reviews: An Experimental Study
This paper experimentally examines a conflict of interest (COI) situation in which a third-party reviewer provides a product assessment for a firm but also potentially benefits economically from the assessed firm’s rival. We present a behavioral economics model to examine how reviewer competition and reciprocal relationships between firms and reviewers affect decision outcomes, followed by an experiment to investigate the model predictions. The experimental results are consistent with the behavioral model predictions. In particular, we empirically document a COI problem where the third-party reviewer’s report is biased, and consequently, the assessed firm underinvests in product quality. We find that this adverse result is driven by reciprocity between the third-party reviewer and the assessed firm’s rival. When we introduce an additional reviewer such that there is competition among the third-party reviewers, reporting biases are alleviated, and firms raise product quality levels. Interestingly, however, when informal agreements exist between the third-party reviewer and the assessed firm’s rival, reviewer competition exacerbates biases even more compared with the case without competition, further undermining the assessed firm’s incentive to invest in product quality. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing.
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (12) , 7535-7559
Conflict of Interest in Third-Party Reviews: An Experimental Study
This paper experimentally examines a conflict of interest (COI) situation in which a third-party reviewer provides a product assessment for a firm but also potentially benefits economically from the assessed firm’s rival. We present a behavioral economics model to examine how reviewer competition and reciprocal relationships between firms and reviewers affect decision outcomes, followed by an experiment to investigate the model predictions. The experimental results are consistent with the behavioral model predictions. In particular, we empirically document a COI problem where the third-party reviewer’s report is biased, and consequently, the assessed firm underinvests in product quality. We find that this adverse result is driven by reciprocity between the third-party reviewer and the assessed firm’s rival. When we introduce an additional reviewer such that there is competition among the third-party reviewers, reporting biases are alleviated, and firms raise product quality levels. Interestingly, however, when informal agreements exist between the third-party reviewer and the assessed firm’s rival, reviewer competition exacerbates biases even more compared with the case without competition, further undermining the assessed firm’s incentive to invest in product quality. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing.
- Open Access
- 29 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-9
One-way routes complicate cooperation in migrant crises
How can countries cooperate to shelter migrants? We use experimental economics to study the distinct challenges of cooperation in migrant crises. We designed an economic game, pass the buck, where participants are leaders of countries who decide whether to shelter migrants or pass them to the next country. We examine the difficulties posed by one-way migration and differences in wealth. We find that leaders sheltered migrants less often when they received them first on a one-way route, compared to when everyone received migrants at the same time. Moreover, the first leader became more likely to shelter migrants when the last country could return them to the first. When one country was wealthier, the wealthy leader sheltered more and the other leaders passed more. We discuss the implications for international cooperation in migrant crises.
- 29 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-9
Open AccessOne-way routes complicate cooperation in migrant crises
How can countries cooperate to shelter migrants? We use experimental economics to study the distinct challenges of cooperation in migrant crises. We designed an economic game, pass the buck, where participants are leaders of countries who decide whether to shelter migrants or pass them to the next country. We examine the difficulties posed by one-way migration and differences in wealth. We find that leaders sheltered migrants less often when they received them first on a one-way route, compared to when everyone received migrants at the same time. Moreover, the first leader became more likely to shelter migrants when the last country could return them to the first. When one country was wealthier, the wealthy leader sheltered more and the other leaders passed more. We discuss the implications for international cooperation in migrant crises.
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1122-1141
Examining Salesperson Effort Allocation in Teams: A Randomized Field Experiment
Using a field experiment, this paper examines how salespeople adjust their effort when coworker's ability changes, under different compensation contracts in a retailing context.
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1122-1141
Examining Salesperson Effort Allocation in Teams: A Randomized Field Experiment
Using a field experiment, this paper examines how salespeople adjust their effort when coworker's ability changes, under different compensation contracts in a retailing context.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 66 (7) , 3249-3276
Social Structures and Reputation in Expert Review Systems
We model an expert review system where two producers competing for market share each are evaluated by two raters. Employing economics experiments, the paper examines how the rater’s incentive to provide objective feedback can be distorted in the presence of social ties and different penalty structures for assigning unobjective ratings. The results reject the self-interested model. We find that raters assign more biased ratings to help the producer they know compete, and this distortion is exacerbated when the reputation cost for rating unobjectively is lowered. Counterintuitively, when both of the raters know the same producer, the likelihood of biased ratings drops significantly. To explain the empirical regularities, we develop a behavioral economics model and show that the rater’s utility function should account not only for social preferences toward the producer, but also the rater’s psychological aversion toward favoring a producer more than the other rater. Our findings demonstrate that it is critical for policymakers to be cognizant of the nonpecuniary factors that can influence behavior in expert review systems. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 66 (7) , 3249-3276
Social Structures and Reputation in Expert Review Systems
We model an expert review system where two producers competing for market share each are evaluated by two raters. Employing economics experiments, the paper examines how the rater’s incentive to provide objective feedback can be distorted in the presence of social ties and different penalty structures for assigning unobjective ratings. The results reject the self-interested model. We find that raters assign more biased ratings to help the producer they know compete, and this distortion is exacerbated when the reputation cost for rating unobjectively is lowered. Counterintuitively, when both of the raters know the same producer, the likelihood of biased ratings drops significantly. To explain the empirical regularities, we develop a behavioral economics model and show that the rater’s utility function should account not only for social preferences toward the producer, but also the rater’s psychological aversion toward favoring a producer more than the other rater. Our findings demonstrate that it is critical for policymakers to be cognizant of the nonpecuniary factors that can influence behavior in expert review systems. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (6) , 2695-2716
Third-Party Reviews and Quality Provision
This paper seeks to understand the relational factors that may affect the decisions of both third-party raters and service providers in a setting where service providers compete with one another. We employ laboratory economics experiments to examine how removing anonymity and allowing for repeated interactions between the rater and the service provider impact both the ratings assigned by the rater and the quality levels expended by the service provider. Our methodology enables us to observe the true quality level chosen by a service provider, which allows us to accurately detect any bias in the assessment of the third-party rater. The experimental results show that the decisions of both the rater and the service provider are very sensitive to the relational factors that govern their interaction. When the rater and the service provider know each other’s identities, we observe a high proportion of overrating even though raters earn less monetary rewards for doing so, and the propensity to overrate is even stronger with repeated interactions. Furthermore, the service provider chooses low quality levels. We develop and estimate a model that captures the rater’s psychological trade-off between remaining objective and helping the service provider compete in the marketplace, and the evolution of the service provider’s beliefs about the rater’s preferences. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3082 . This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (6) , 2695-2716
Third-Party Reviews and Quality Provision
This paper seeks to understand the relational factors that may affect the decisions of both third-party raters and service providers in a setting where service providers compete with one another. We employ laboratory economics experiments to examine how removing anonymity and allowing for repeated interactions between the rater and the service provider impact both the ratings assigned by the rater and the quality levels expended by the service provider. Our methodology enables us to observe the true quality level chosen by a service provider, which allows us to accurately detect any bias in the assessment of the third-party rater. The experimental results show that the decisions of both the rater and the service provider are very sensitive to the relational factors that govern their interaction. When the rater and the service provider know each other’s identities, we observe a high proportion of overrating even though raters earn less monetary rewards for doing so, and the propensity to overrate is even stronger with repeated interactions. Furthermore, the service provider chooses low quality levels. We develop and estimate a model that captures the rater’s psychological trade-off between remaining objective and helping the service provider compete in the marketplace, and the evolution of the service provider’s beliefs about the rater’s preferences. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3082 . This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.