One-way routes complicate cooperation in migrant crises
Open Access
- 29 June 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-9
Abstract
How can countries cooperate to shelter migrants? We use experimental economics to study the distinct challenges of cooperation in migrant crises. We designed an economic game, pass the buck, where participants are leaders of countries who decide whether to shelter migrants or pass them to the next country. We examine the difficulties posed by one-way migration and differences in wealth. We find that leaders sheltered migrants less often when they received them first on a one-way route, compared to when everyone received migrants at the same time. Moreover, the first leader became more likely to shelter migrants when the last country could return them to the first. When one country was wealthier, the wealthy leader sheltered more and the other leaders passed more. We discuss the implications for international cooperation in migrant crises.Keywords
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