Alessandro Minichilli
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Alessandro Minichilli has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alessandro Zattoni
Department of Business and Management, LUISS University and Business School, Rome, Italy
1 shared publication - Annalisa Prencipe
Bocconi University - Department of Accounting
1 shared publication - Brian Keane Boyd
W. P. Carey School of Business
1 shared publication Daniela Montemerlo
1 shared publication- Francesco Perrini
Bocconi University
1 shared publication - Gianfranco Siciliano
China Europe International Business School
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (3) , 2330-2348
What’s in a Name? Eponymous Private Firms and Financial Reporting Quality
This study examines the relation between financial reporting quality (FRQ) and eponymy, that is, naming a firm after the founder. We hypothesize that compared with noneponymous firms, eponymous firms have higher FRQ because of reputation concerns. Using a sample of 2,271 large Italian private firms, we document that eponymy is positively associated with accrual-based FRQ measures, a Benford’s law–based FRQ measure, and a tax-related misstatement–based FRQ measure. Consistent with the reputation concern rationale, we find that the positive association between eponymy and FRQ is attributable to eponymous firms that have rarer names or receive more press coverage. Furthermore, the positive association between FRQ and eponymy is similar whether the top executives/board members belong to the founding family’s first or later generations. We also find that eponymous firms are more conditionally conservative. Collectively, the results suggest that reputation concerns act as a disciplining mechanism for FRQ in private firms. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (3) , 2330-2348
What’s in a Name? Eponymous Private Firms and Financial Reporting Quality
This study examines the relation between financial reporting quality (FRQ) and eponymy, that is, naming a firm after the founder. We hypothesize that compared with noneponymous firms, eponymous firms have higher FRQ because of reputation concerns. Using a sample of 2,271 large Italian private firms, we document that eponymy is positively associated with accrual-based FRQ measures, a Benford’s law–based FRQ measure, and a tax-related misstatement–based FRQ measure. Consistent with the reputation concern rationale, we find that the positive association between eponymy and FRQ is attributable to eponymous firms that have rarer names or receive more press coverage. Furthermore, the positive association between FRQ and eponymy is similar whether the top executives/board members belong to the founding family’s first or later generations. We also find that eponymous firms are more conditionally conservative. Collectively, the results suggest that reputation concerns act as a disciplining mechanism for FRQ in private firms. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- Open Access
- 15 January 2021
- Published by Egea Spa in ECONOMIA & MANAGEMENT
- Vol. 1 (1) , 14
La centralità della governance aziendale
- 15 January 2021
- Published by Egea Spa in ECONOMIA & MANAGEMENT
- Vol. 1 (1) , 14
Open AccessLa centralità della governance aziendale
- Open Access
- 28 January 2020
- Published by Egea Spa in ECONOMIA & MANAGEMENT
- No. 1,p. 57-62
Le condizioni per la crescita delle imprese italiane
- 28 January 2020
- Published by Egea Spa in ECONOMIA & MANAGEMENT
- No. 1,p. 57-62
Open AccessLe condizioni per la crescita delle imprese italiane
- 23 May 2019
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 27 (6) , 402-426
Figureheads or potentates? CEO power and board oversight in the context of Sarbanes Oxley
Research question/issue: We depart from studies that separately explore chief executive officers' (CEOs') and boards' effects on firm performance. Instead, we examine the direct relationship between CEO power and firm performance, and how board monitoring, and most importantly, a change in the regulatory environment alter the relationship. As such, our study jointly examines the role of both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between CEO power and firm performance.Research findings/insights: Our findings indicate that the negative main effect of a powerful CEO on firm performance is reduced by board monitoring and that the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) legislation amplifies board monitoring and reduces the negative effects of CEO power.Theoretical/academic implications: Our study shows that agency relationships are grounded in social and institutional contexts. More precisely, our results suggest that CEO power is a function of CEO's relationship with the board, as CEO power and board monitoring interactions affect firm performance. Furthermore, they indicate that the CEO‐board relationship is constructed within the legal institutional context, as the shock of SOX alters the effects that different combinations of CEO power and board monitoring have on firm performance.Practitioner/policy implications: Our results highlight to investors and directors that corporate boards should be designed in relation to the power of CEOs. In addition, they provide valuable guidance for policy‐makers, suggesting that tight regulations may represent effective deterrents for some CEOs' misbehaviors and favor the alignment of interests with those of company owners.https://capture.udel.edu/media/Katalin+Takacs+Haynes+-+Video+Abstract/1_ihl7pmhf
- 23 May 2019
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 27 (6) , 402-426
Figureheads or potentates? CEO power and board oversight in the context of Sarbanes Oxley
Research question/issue: We depart from studies that separately explore chief executive officers' (CEOs') and boards' effects on firm performance. Instead, we examine the direct relationship between CEO power and firm performance, and how board monitoring, and most importantly, a change in the regulatory environment alter the relationship. As such, our study jointly examines the role of both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between CEO power and firm performance.Research findings/insights: Our findings indicate that the negative main effect of a powerful CEO on firm performance is reduced by board monitoring and that the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) legislation amplifies board monitoring and reduces the negative effects of CEO power.Theoretical/academic implications: Our study shows that agency relationships are grounded in social and institutional contexts. More precisely, our results suggest that CEO power is a function of CEO's relationship with the board, as CEO power and board monitoring interactions affect firm performance. Furthermore, they indicate that the CEO‐board relationship is constructed within the legal institutional context, as the shock of SOX alters the effects that different combinations of CEO power and board monitoring have on firm performance.Practitioner/policy implications: Our results highlight to investors and directors that corporate boards should be designed in relation to the power of CEOs. In addition, they provide valuable guidance for policy‐makers, suggesting that tight regulations may represent effective deterrents for some CEOs' misbehaviors and favor the alignment of interests with those of company owners.https://capture.udel.edu/media/Katalin+Takacs+Haynes+-+Video+Abstract/1_ihl7pmhf
- 26 November 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 364-383
Improving corporate governance practices