AMAlessandro Minichilli

Alessandro Minichilli

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Alessandro Minichilli has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • What’s in a Name? Eponymous Private Firms and Financial Reporting Quality

    by Alessandro Minichilli, Annalisa Prencipe, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Gianfranco Siciliano

    This study examines the relation between financial reporting quality (FRQ) and eponymy, that is, naming a firm after the founder. We hypothesize that compared with noneponymous firms, eponymous firms have higher FRQ because of reputation concerns. Using a sample of 2,271 large Italian private firms, we document that eponymy is positively associated with accrual-based FRQ measures, a Benford’s law–based FRQ measure, and a tax-related misstatement–based FRQ measure. Consistent with the reputation concern rationale, we find that the positive association between eponymy and FRQ is attributable to eponymous firms that have rarer names or receive more press coverage. Furthermore, the positive association between FRQ and eponymy is similar whether the top executives/board members belong to the founding family’s first or later generations. We also find that eponymous firms are more conditionally conservative. Collectively, the results suggest that reputation concerns act as a disciplining mechanism for FRQ in private firms. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.


  • Open Access

    La centralità della governance aziendale

    by Alessandro Minichilli, Francesco Perrini, Paola Casati

  • Open Access

    Le condizioni per la crescita delle imprese italiane

    by Alessandro Minichilli, Daniela Montemerlo

  • Figureheads or potentates? CEO power and board oversight in the context of Sarbanes Oxley

    by Katalin Takacs Haynes, Alessandro Zattoni, Brian K. Boyd, Alessandro Minichilli

    Research question/issue: We depart from studies that separately explore chief executive officers' (CEOs') and boards' effects on firm performance. Instead, we examine the direct relationship between CEO power and firm performance, and how board monitoring, and most importantly, a change in the regulatory environment alter the relationship. As such, our study jointly examines the role of both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between CEO power and firm performance.Research findings/insights: Our findings indicate that the negative main effect of a powerful CEO on firm performance is reduced by board monitoring and that the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) legislation amplifies board monitoring and reduces the negative effects of CEO power.Theoretical/academic implications: Our study shows that agency relationships are grounded in social and institutional contexts. More precisely, our results suggest that CEO power is a function of CEO's relationship with the board, as CEO power and board monitoring interactions affect firm performance. Furthermore, they indicate that the CEO‐board relationship is constructed within the legal institutional context, as the shock of SOX alters the effects that different combinations of CEO power and board monitoring have on firm performance.Practitioner/policy implications: Our results highlight to investors and directors that corporate boards should be designed in relation to the power of CEOs. In addition, they provide valuable guidance for policy‐makers, suggesting that tight regulations may represent effective deterrents for some CEOs' misbehaviors and favor the alignment of interests with those of company owners.https://capture.udel.edu/media/Katalin+Takacs+Haynes+-+Video+Abstract/1_ihl7pmhf


  • Improving corporate governance practices

    by Morten Huse, Jonas Gabrielsson, Alessandro Minichilli