Fernando Penalva
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Fernando Penalva has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Beatriz García Osma
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
11 shared publications - Juan Manuel García Lara
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
10 shared publications Marc Badia
IESE Business School
3 shared publications- Miguel Duro
IESE Business School
3 shared publications - Alfred Wagenhofer
University of Graz, Graz, Austria
2 shared publications - Stephen A. Hillegeist
Arizona State University (ASU) - W. P. Carey School of Business, School of Accountancy
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 81 (1)
Mandatory investor disclosure, sustainability commitments, and portfolio decarbonization
- 19 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 81 (1)
Open AccessMandatory investor disclosure, sustainability commitments, and portfolio decarbonization
- 21 October 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Accounting Review
- Vol. 31 (2) , 311-343
Earnings Management to Avoid Debt Covenant Violations and Future Performance
In this study, we examine the trade-offs between earnings management (both accruals and real) and covenant violations by examining how they are associated with future accounting and stock market performance. We analyze a matched-pair sample of covenant violation firms with non-violation firms that have a similar risk of a covenant violation. We have three main findings. First, our evidence indicates that covenant violations are costly events for shareholders as lenders appear to use their control rights in ways that increase the likelihood of loan repayment but impose costs for shareholders. Second, there is limited evidence indicating covenant-related accrual-earnings management activities impose significant costs on shareholders, but we find shareholders are worse off following unsuccessful real earnings management. Third, our evidence indicates that, on average, shareholders at high violation risk firms are better off when their firms successfully engage in accruals earnings management to avoid a violation compared to shareholders at firms that violate a covenant but do not manage earnings. Thus, covenant-related earnings management may be in the best interests of shareholders and is not necessarily evidence of shareholder-manager agency conflicts.
- 21 October 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Accounting Review
- Vol. 31 (2) , 311-343
Earnings Management to Avoid Debt Covenant Violations and Future Performance
In this study, we examine the trade-offs between earnings management (both accruals and real) and covenant violations by examining how they are associated with future accounting and stock market performance. We analyze a matched-pair sample of covenant violation firms with non-violation firms that have a similar risk of a covenant violation. We have three main findings. First, our evidence indicates that covenant violations are costly events for shareholders as lenders appear to use their control rights in ways that increase the likelihood of loan repayment but impose costs for shareholders. Second, there is limited evidence indicating covenant-related accrual-earnings management activities impose significant costs on shareholders, but we find shareholders are worse off following unsuccessful real earnings management. Third, our evidence indicates that, on average, shareholders at high violation risk firms are better off when their firms successfully engage in accruals earnings management to avoid a violation compared to shareholders at firms that violate a covenant but do not manage earnings. Thus, covenant-related earnings management may be in the best interests of shareholders and is not necessarily evidence of shareholder-manager agency conflicts.
- Open Access
- 6 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Earnings Management to Avoid Debt Covenant Violations and Future Performance
In this study, we examine the trade-offs between earnings management (both accruals and real) and covenant violations by examining how they are associated with future accounting and stock market performance. We analyze a matched-pair sample of covenant violation firms with non-violation firms that have a similar risk of a covenant violation. We have three main findings. First, our evidence indicates that covenant violations are costly events for shareholders as lenders appear to use their control rights in ways that increase the likelihood of loan repayment but impose costs for shareholders. Second, there is limited evidence indicating covenant-related accrual-earnings management activities impose significant costs on shareholders, but we find shareholders are worse off following unsuccessful real earnings management. Third, our evidence indicates that, on average, shareholders at high violation risk firms are better off when their firms successfully engage in accruals earnings management to avoid a violation compared to shareholders at firms that violate a covenant but do not manage earnings. Thus, covenant-related earnings management may be in the best interests of shareholders and is not necessarily evidence of shareholder-manager agency conflicts.
- 6 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEarnings Management to Avoid Debt Covenant Violations and Future Performance
In this study, we examine the trade-offs between earnings management (both accruals and real) and covenant violations by examining how they are associated with future accounting and stock market performance. We analyze a matched-pair sample of covenant violation firms with non-violation firms that have a similar risk of a covenant violation. We have three main findings. First, our evidence indicates that covenant violations are costly events for shareholders as lenders appear to use their control rights in ways that increase the likelihood of loan repayment but impose costs for shareholders. Second, there is limited evidence indicating covenant-related accrual-earnings management activities impose significant costs on shareholders, but we find shareholders are worse off following unsuccessful real earnings management. Third, our evidence indicates that, on average, shareholders at high violation risk firms are better off when their firms successfully engage in accruals earnings management to avoid a violation compared to shareholders at firms that violate a covenant but do not manage earnings. Thus, covenant-related earnings management may be in the best interests of shareholders and is not necessarily evidence of shareholder-manager agency conflicts.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 39 (4)
Conditional conservatism and the limits to earnings management
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 39 (4)
Conditional conservatism and the limits to earnings management
- Open Access
- 18 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Debiasing the Measurement of Conditional Conservatism
Basu’s (1997) measurement of conditional conservatism as the timelier response of earnings to bad news than to good news underlies hundreds of studies on the determinants and effects of this form of conservatism. However, numerous subsequent studies cast doubt on the extent to which Basu’s measure captures conditional conservatism as opposed to statistical biases or alternative constructs (collectively, “biases”), and thereby question the validity of the inferences that empirical researchers draw from their analyses using the measure. We analyze the primary biases identified by these studies and modify Basu’s measure in two simple ways to remove these biases. Our key modification is the inclusion of interactive controls for return variance, a scale proxy motivated by Patatoukas and Thomas’ (2011) return variance effect that also captures economic optionality and adjustment costs. The inclusion of these interactive controls captures scale-related effects on both the level of earnings and the sensitivity of earnings to returns, and it allows the magnitudes of these effects to vary with the sign of returns. Using placebo tests, synthetic returns, alternative measures of conservatism, and other approaches, we show that our modified asymmetric timeliness measure is largely free of bias and associated with contracting-related variables as predicted by theory. We conclude that, after necessary surgical intervention, the news about the death of Basu’s measure has been greatly exaggerated.
- 18 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDebiasing the Measurement of Conditional Conservatism
Basu’s (1997) measurement of conditional conservatism as the timelier response of earnings to bad news than to good news underlies hundreds of studies on the determinants and effects of this form of conservatism. However, numerous subsequent studies cast doubt on the extent to which Basu’s measure captures conditional conservatism as opposed to statistical biases or alternative constructs (collectively, “biases”), and thereby question the validity of the inferences that empirical researchers draw from their analyses using the measure. We analyze the primary biases identified by these studies and modify Basu’s measure in two simple ways to remove these biases. Our key modification is the inclusion of interactive controls for return variance, a scale proxy motivated by Patatoukas and Thomas’ (2011) return variance effect that also captures economic optionality and adjustment costs. The inclusion of these interactive controls captures scale-related effects on both the level of earnings and the sensitivity of earnings to returns, and it allows the magnitudes of these effects to vary with the sign of returns. Using placebo tests, synthetic returns, alternative measures of conservatism, and other approaches, we show that our modified asymmetric timeliness measure is largely free of bias and associated with contracting-related variables as predicted by theory. We conclude that, after necessary surgical intervention, the news about the death of Basu’s measure has been greatly exaggerated.
- Open Access
- 3 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Conservatism in Debt Contracting: Theory and Empirical Evidence
This paper surveys both the theoretical and the empirical archival literature on conservatism when accounting information is used for debt contracting. The theoretical literature shows mixed results whether conservative accounting is desirable, which depends on the underlying agency problem, the information available, and the contracting space. The empirical literature takes a more holistic view in measuring the degree of conservatism. It studies a broad array of possible effects of conservatism in debt financing, but also beyond. The results overwhelmingly support the view that conservatism plays a useful role in debt contracting, although there are also some mixed results. We describe key results and empirical designs, and we provide suggestions for future research.
- 3 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessConservatism in Debt Contracting: Theory and Empirical Evidence
This paper surveys both the theoretical and the empirical archival literature on conservatism when accounting information is used for debt contracting. The theoretical literature shows mixed results whether conservative accounting is desirable, which depends on the underlying agency problem, the information available, and the contracting space. The empirical literature takes a more holistic view in measuring the degree of conservatism. It studies a broad array of possible effects of conservatism in debt financing, but also beyond. The results overwhelmingly support the view that conservatism plays a useful role in debt contracting, although there are also some mixed results. We describe key results and empirical designs, and we provide suggestions for future research.
- 16 July 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting and Business Research
- Vol. 49 (6) , 619-647
Conservatism in debt contracting: theory and empirical evidence
This paper surveys both the theoretical and the empirical archival literature on conservatism when accounting information is used for debt contracting. The theoretical literature shows mixed results whether conservative accounting is desirable, which depends on the underlying agency problem, the information available, and the contracting space. The empirical literature takes a more holistic view in measuring the degree of conservatism. It studies a broad array of possible effects of conservatism in debt financing, but also beyond. The results overwhelmingly support the view that conservatism plays a useful role in debt contracting, although there are also some mixed results. We describe key results and empirical designs, and we provide suggestions for future research.
- 16 July 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting and Business Research
- Vol. 49 (6) , 619-647
Conservatism in debt contracting: theory and empirical evidence
This paper surveys both the theoretical and the empirical archival literature on conservatism when accounting information is used for debt contracting. The theoretical literature shows mixed results whether conservative accounting is desirable, which depends on the underlying agency problem, the information available, and the contracting space. The empirical literature takes a more holistic view in measuring the degree of conservatism. It studies a broad array of possible effects of conservatism in debt financing, but also beyond. The results overwhelmingly support the view that conservatism plays a useful role in debt contracting, although there are also some mixed results. We describe key results and empirical designs, and we provide suggestions for future research.
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 63 (1) , 75-98
Conditionally conservative fair value measurements
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 63 (1) , 75-98
Conditionally conservative fair value measurements
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 61 (1) , 221-238
Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 61 (1) , 221-238
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAccounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency
- 21 January 2015
- Published by Wiley
- p. 1-8
Conservatism and Accounting Earnings