Luís Vasconcelos
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Luís Vasconcelos has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Arijit Mukherjee
Michigan State University
2 shared publications - Luis Almeida Costa
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
2 shared publications - Adeline Delavande
Nova School of Business and Economics, Lisbon, Portugal; Economics Department, University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, New South Wales, Australia
1 shared publication - Afonso Almeida Costa
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
1 shared publication Arijit Mukherjee
Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48823
1 shared publicationGiovanni W. Puopolo
Bocconi University, CSEF University of Naples Federico II, and BaffiCarefin Centre, and
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 8 (3) , 349-367
Disentangling Reputational Effects in Alliances
An important consequence of an alliance is that partnering firms combine their reputations by associating them to jointly implemented projects. However, an often-overlooked aspect is that those reputations may themselves change due to both the announcement of the firms’ decision to form the alliance and the performance of joint projects. We develop a formal model that provides an integrated perspective of these reputational effects, while allowing us to isolate and characterize each of them. We find that the way in which the firms’ competence levels affect their decision to form an alliance determines how the firms’ reputations evolve following the announcement of the alliance and the performance of joint projects. This indicates that the analysis of the reputational effects of an alliance requires understanding the firms’ alliance formation decision in the first place. We show, for instance, that a firm’s reputation may decrease following the decision to form an alliance, and that the impact of project performance on the reputations of alliance partners can be very asymmetric. Among other things, our analysis implies that a firm’s desirability as an alliance partner does not necessarily increase with its reputation and level of competence.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 8 (3) , 349-367
Disentangling Reputational Effects in Alliances
An important consequence of an alliance is that partnering firms combine their reputations by associating them to jointly implemented projects. However, an often-overlooked aspect is that those reputations may themselves change due to both the announcement of the firms’ decision to form the alliance and the performance of joint projects. We develop a formal model that provides an integrated perspective of these reputational effects, while allowing us to isolate and characterize each of them. We find that the way in which the firms’ competence levels affect their decision to form an alliance determines how the firms’ reputations evolve following the announcement of the alliance and the performance of joint projects. This indicates that the analysis of the reputational effects of an alliance requires understanding the firms’ alliance formation decision in the first place. We show, for instance, that a firm’s reputation may decrease following the decision to form an alliance, and that the impact of project performance on the reputations of alliance partners can be very asymmetric. Among other things, our analysis implies that a firm’s desirability as an alliance partner does not necessarily increase with its reputation and level of competence.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (6) , 3578-3601
What Makes Agility Fragile? A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Rigidity
We present a novel explanation of why organizations tend to lose their agility over time despite their efforts to foster worker initiative in adapting to local information. Worker initiative ensures efficiency but requires strong incentives. When incentives are relational and the firm faces shocks to its credibility, it may adopt standardized work processes that ignore local information but yield satisfactory (though suboptimal) performance. The adoption of such standardized processes helps the firm survive the current shock but inflicts inefficiencies in the future. Although the firm may recover, it becomes more vulnerable to future shocks, and consequently, more reliant on the standardized work procedures. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (6) , 3578-3601
What Makes Agility Fragile? A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Rigidity
We present a novel explanation of why organizations tend to lose their agility over time despite their efforts to foster worker initiative in adapting to local information. Worker initiative ensures efficiency but requires strong incentives. When incentives are relational and the firm faces shocks to its credibility, it may adopt standardized work processes that ignore local information but yield satisfactory (though suboptimal) performance. The adoption of such standardized processes helps the firm survive the current shock but inflicts inefficiencies in the future. Although the firm may recover, it becomes more vulnerable to future shocks, and consequently, more reliant on the standardized work procedures. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 93, 123-138
A signaling-based theory of contractual commitment to relationships
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 93, 123-138
Open AccessA signaling-based theory of contractual commitment to relationships
- 27 November 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Finance
- Vol. 20 (6) , 2079-2123
Non-Exclusive Financial Advice
We propose a simple model of non-exclusive financial advice in which two households rely on a self-interested (common) expert to make their investment choices. There is only one source of risk, and the expert is privately informed about the risky asset’s volatility. When monetary transfers are unenforceable, we show that investors may delegate their investment decisions to the expert. When doing so, however, they impose restrictions on her choices which crucially depend on whether the expert perceives investors’ asset allocations as complements or as substitutes. Finally, we analyze the implications of non-exclusivity in financial advice on investment behavior and welfare, and highlight a set of novel testable implications.
- 27 November 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Finance
- Vol. 20 (6) , 2079-2123
Non-Exclusive Financial Advice
We propose a simple model of non-exclusive financial advice in which two households rely on a self-interested (common) expert to make their investment choices. There is only one source of risk, and the expert is privately informed about the risky asset’s volatility. When monetary transfers are unenforceable, we show that investors may delegate their investment decisions to the expert. When doing so, however, they impose restrictions on her choices which crucially depend on whether the expert perceives investors’ asset allocations as complements or as substitutes. Finally, we analyze the implications of non-exclusivity in financial advice on investment behavior and welfare, and highlight a set of novel testable implications.
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 87, 19-33
Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 87, 19-33
Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
- 10 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 23 (3) , 527-547
Platform Pricing Structure and Moral Hazard
We study pricing by a two‐sided platform when it faces moral hazard on the sellers' side. In doing so, we introduce an equilibrium notion of platform reputation in an infinite horizon model. We find that with transaction fees only, the platform cannot eliminate the loss of reputation induced by moral hazard. If registration fees can be levied, moral hazard can be overcome. The registration fee determines the participation threshold of sellers and extracts them, whereas (lower) transaction fees provide incentives for good behavior. This provides a motivation for platforms to use registration fees in addition to transaction fees.
- 10 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 23 (3) , 527-547
Platform Pricing Structure and Moral Hazard
We study pricing by a two‐sided platform when it faces moral hazard on the sellers' side. In doing so, we introduce an equilibrium notion of platform reputation in an infinite horizon model. We find that with transaction fees only, the platform cannot eliminate the loss of reputation induced by moral hazard. If registration fees can be levied, moral hazard can be overcome. The registration fee determines the participation threshold of sellers and extracts them, whereas (lower) transaction fees provide incentives for good behavior. This provides a motivation for platforms to use registration fees in addition to transaction fees.
- 1 July 2011
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- Vol. 3 (3) , 124-157
Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching
We assemble a novel dataset to study the impact of male scarcity on marital assortative matching and other marriage market outcomes using the large shock that WWI caused to the number of French men. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that postwar in regions with higher mortality rates: men were less likely to marry women of lower social classes; men were more likely and women less likely to marry; out-of-wedlock births increased; divorce rates decreased; and the age gap decreased. These findings are consistent with men improving their position in the marriage market as they become scarcer. (JEL J12, J16, N34)
- 1 July 2011
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- Vol. 3 (3) , 124-157
Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching
We assemble a novel dataset to study the impact of male scarcity on marital assortative matching and other marriage market outcomes using the large shock that WWI caused to the number of French men. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that postwar in regions with higher mortality rates: men were less likely to marry women of lower social classes; men were more likely and women less likely to marry; out-of-wedlock births increased; divorce rates decreased; and the age gap decreased. These findings are consistent with men improving their position in the marriage market as they become scarcer. (JEL J12, J16, N34)
- 15 February 2011
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 42 (1) , 44-69
Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts
We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.
- 15 February 2011
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 42 (1) , 44-69
Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts
We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.
- 29 January 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 28 (4) , 754-782
Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets
Exclusive employment contracts and collusion on wages are alternative mechanisms that firms may use to extract surplus from highly productive workers (“stars”). Exclusive employment contracts (i.e., “covenant not to compete”) are common in many industries, but the Courts often refrain from enforcing them, citing harm to workers due to restricted turnover. We analyze the interaction between these two channels of surplus extraction and argue that in the presence of collusion, enforcement of exclusive contracts can, in fact, benefit the workers: Although a strong enforcement of exclusivity restricts labor turnover, it can also hinder the firms' ability to sustain collusion in the labor market. We characterize the optimal level of enforcement and find that both perfect enforcement and no enforcement can be socially suboptimal. Moreover, a stronger enforcement can improve matching efficiency by rendering collusion unsustainable and may lead to a more equitable surplus distribution between the firms and the workers. (JEL J4, K21, L42, L14, M5).
- 29 January 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 28 (4) , 754-782
Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets
Exclusive employment contracts and collusion on wages are alternative mechanisms that firms may use to extract surplus from highly productive workers (“stars”). Exclusive employment contracts (i.e., “covenant not to compete”) are common in many industries, but the Courts often refrain from enforcing them, citing harm to workers due to restricted turnover. We analyze the interaction between these two channels of surplus extraction and argue that in the presence of collusion, enforcement of exclusive contracts can, in fact, benefit the workers: Although a strong enforcement of exclusivity restricts labor turnover, it can also hinder the firms' ability to sustain collusion in the labor market. We characterize the optimal level of enforcement and find that both perfect enforcement and no enforcement can be socially suboptimal. Moreover, a stronger enforcement can improve matching efficiency by rendering collusion unsustainable and may lead to a more equitable surplus distribution between the firms and the workers. (JEL J4, K21, L42, L14, M5).
- 13 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 19 (2) , 259-301
Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships
- 13 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 19 (2) , 259-301
Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships