A signaling-based theory of contractual commitment to relationships
Open Access
- 1 April 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 93, 123-138
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common valuesJournal of Economic Theory, 2015
- Exclusive contracts foster relationship‐specific investmentThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2007
- Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilitiesThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2006
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic MotivationReview of Economic Studies, 2003
- Cooperative Investments and the Value of ContractingAmerican Economic Review, 1999
- Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable InformationEconometrica, 1994
- Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual RelationshipsEconometrica, 1993
- Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk SharingReview of Economic Studies, 1991
- Property Rights and the Nature of the FirmJournal of Political Economy, 1990
- The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral IntegrationJournal of Political Economy, 1986