Valery Yungblyud
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Valery Yungblyud has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alexey I. Sennikov
Vyatka State University
2 shared publications - Artyom Viktorovich Zorin
Vyatka State University
2 shared publications Artyom Zboyev
2 shared publicationsArtyom Zorin
2 shared publications- D. Ilyin
Vyatka State University, 36, Moskovskaya Str., Kirov, 610000, Russian Federation
2 shared publications - Denis Andreevich Sadakov
Vyatka State University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 June 2025
- Published by Ural Federal University in Quaestio Rossica
- Vol. 13 (2) , 755–778
Trade and Scientific and Technical Co-operation with the USA on the Agenda of the USSR Leadership in the Years of Détente, 1969–1982
In the structure of the Soviet-American détente in the 1970s, issues of trade and cooperation in the field of science and technology occupied an important place. By the end of the 1960s, strategic parity had been achieved in the confrontation between the United States and the USSR. The arms race was perceived as a costly and unpromising venture. On the one hand, the temporary balance of military potential led to a decrease in direct confrontation and a reduction in the threat of war. On the other hand, it contributed to the spread of beliefs that intensified commercial ties, and the development of scientific and technological programmes would create a material basis for lasting peace. In Moscow, this idea acquired the status of a directive. In 1968, the director of the US Institute G. Arbatov drew the attention of the country’s leadership to the significant technological gap between the USSR and the United States, where the latest scientific discoveries were quickly introduced into the production of consumer goods, whereas in the USSR, the achievements of scientific and technological revolution were mainly available to the military-industrial complex. In 1971, the priority of introducing the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution into the production of consumer goods was fixed by the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. However, a year later, despite the opinions of experts from the academic community, this strategy began to be adjusted in favour of enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Based on the available historiographical heritage and documents of the Russian archives (Russian State Archive of Modern History, Russian State Archive of Economics), memoir sources, as well as documents of the American intelligence services, the State Department and the US Congress, the article shows how approaches to shaping policy towards the United States changed in Moscow during the 1970s, and what place was given in this policy to trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The conclusions substantiate the fact that initially, the focus on the scientific and technological revolution was important for L. Brezhnev and his supporters in the Soviet leadership. The achievement of the strategic goals of the USSR, namely, the improvement of the standards of living, consumer culture and people’s quality of life, creating a more attractive image of socialism – depended on how the country could technologically integrate into the new conditions. In this context, G. Arbatov, N. Inozemtsev, and their colleagues presented their recommendations. However, due to the “fading” of the superpowers’ détente between the late 1970s and early 1980s, their ideas were less in demand.
- 29 June 2025
- Published by Ural Federal University in Quaestio Rossica
- Vol. 13 (2) , 755–778
Open AccessTrade and Scientific and Technical Co-operation with the USA on the Agenda of the USSR Leadership in the Years of Détente, 1969–1982
In the structure of the Soviet-American détente in the 1970s, issues of trade and cooperation in the field of science and technology occupied an important place. By the end of the 1960s, strategic parity had been achieved in the confrontation between the United States and the USSR. The arms race was perceived as a costly and unpromising venture. On the one hand, the temporary balance of military potential led to a decrease in direct confrontation and a reduction in the threat of war. On the other hand, it contributed to the spread of beliefs that intensified commercial ties, and the development of scientific and technological programmes would create a material basis for lasting peace. In Moscow, this idea acquired the status of a directive. In 1968, the director of the US Institute G. Arbatov drew the attention of the country’s leadership to the significant technological gap between the USSR and the United States, where the latest scientific discoveries were quickly introduced into the production of consumer goods, whereas in the USSR, the achievements of scientific and technological revolution were mainly available to the military-industrial complex. In 1971, the priority of introducing the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution into the production of consumer goods was fixed by the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. However, a year later, despite the opinions of experts from the academic community, this strategy began to be adjusted in favour of enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Based on the available historiographical heritage and documents of the Russian archives (Russian State Archive of Modern History, Russian State Archive of Economics), memoir sources, as well as documents of the American intelligence services, the State Department and the US Congress, the article shows how approaches to shaping policy towards the United States changed in Moscow during the 1970s, and what place was given in this policy to trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The conclusions substantiate the fact that initially, the focus on the scientific and technological revolution was important for L. Brezhnev and his supporters in the Soviet leadership. The achievement of the strategic goals of the USSR, namely, the improvement of the standards of living, consumer culture and people’s quality of life, creating a more attractive image of socialism – depended on how the country could technologically integrate into the new conditions. In this context, G. Arbatov, N. Inozemtsev, and their colleagues presented their recommendations. However, due to the “fading” of the superpowers’ détente between the late 1970s and early 1980s, their ideas were less in demand.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by LLC Integration Education and Science in ISTORIYA
- Vol. 16 (12-1 (158))
The Turkish Political Crisis of 1977—1980 in American Intelligence Assessments
The article is devoted to the analysis of expert assessments of the Turkish political crisis of 1977—1980 by the American Intelligence services. The study briefly examines the factors that influenced the development of the American policy towards Turkey during the J. Carter administration. The Authors, based on the documents of the Electronic Reading Room of the Central Intelligence Agency, trace the dynamics of changes in topics, approaches, and tasks that were set for Intelligence by the American political leadership of the United States and were relevant in the context of the development of American-Turkish relations. The Research demonstrates the primary dominance of issues on the foreign policy agenda and the secondary importance of issues of the internal political process in Turkey for Washington. The Article examines a transition between a weak interest in studying domestic political problems in Turkey in 1977 — early 1978; drawing attention in connection with the imposition of martial law and the events in Iran (the Islamic Revolution of 1978—1979) to the problems of the Turkish crisis in December 1978 — November 1979; another decline — opposed to foreign policy topics — in attention to Turkish domestic problems on the background of the Iranian (November 1979) and Afghan (December 1979) crises. The Authors note that American intelligence has repeatedly mentioned the possibility, and since the summer of 1980 predicted a military coup in Turkey without specifying exact dates, but reassured the White House that it would be carried out by the military or nationalists supporters of a pro-Western course. The study concludes that, while secondary, domestic political issues in Turkey were also ranked by importance and changed priority depending on the international situation for the Carter administration.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by LLC Integration Education and Science in ISTORIYA
- Vol. 16 (12-1 (158))
The Turkish Political Crisis of 1977—1980 in American Intelligence Assessments
The article is devoted to the analysis of expert assessments of the Turkish political crisis of 1977—1980 by the American Intelligence services. The study briefly examines the factors that influenced the development of the American policy towards Turkey during the J. Carter administration. The Authors, based on the documents of the Electronic Reading Room of the Central Intelligence Agency, trace the dynamics of changes in topics, approaches, and tasks that were set for Intelligence by the American political leadership of the United States and were relevant in the context of the development of American-Turkish relations. The Research demonstrates the primary dominance of issues on the foreign policy agenda and the secondary importance of issues of the internal political process in Turkey for Washington. The Article examines a transition between a weak interest in studying domestic political problems in Turkey in 1977 — early 1978; drawing attention in connection with the imposition of martial law and the events in Iran (the Islamic Revolution of 1978—1979) to the problems of the Turkish crisis in December 1978 — November 1979; another decline — opposed to foreign policy topics — in attention to Turkish domestic problems on the background of the Iranian (November 1979) and Afghan (December 1979) crises. The Authors note that American intelligence has repeatedly mentioned the possibility, and since the summer of 1980 predicted a military coup in Turkey without specifying exact dates, but reassured the White House that it would be carried out by the military or nationalists supporters of a pro-Western course. The study concludes that, while secondary, domestic political issues in Turkey were also ranked by importance and changed priority depending on the international situation for the Carter administration.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by LLC Integration Education and Science in ISTORIYA
- Vol. 15 (12-2 (146))
The Islamic Revolution in Iran in the Light of Analytical Reports of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (March — December 1979)
The article is analyzing the estimates made by the Soviet scientific community about the Islamic revolution in 1979 and its consequences for Iran, its neighbors and superpowers. Central point of research is three analytical reports on Iranian issues prepared for the Soviet party leadership in March, June and December 1979. Estimates originated from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences under E. M. Primakov and cooperation with representatives of other academic structures. The Authors consider the academic analysis in the context of Soviet-Iranian relations and the Soviet-American bipolar confrontation of the second half of the 1970s. The Research demonstrate the key issues for the Soviet leadership during this period, in particular, the problems of Islamic fundamentalism, the role of the Shiite clergy in revolutionary events, the consequences of the Islamic Revolution for international relations and the position of the USSR in the Middle East. The Authors compare Soviet assessments with the synchronous Western analytical conclusions and take into account subsequent events and the evolution of Soviet expertize on the Iranian issue, and conclude that Soviet Orientalists adequately perceived the Iranian situation and to the validity of their forecasts and conclusions.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by LLC Integration Education and Science in ISTORIYA
- Vol. 15 (12-2 (146))
The Islamic Revolution in Iran in the Light of Analytical Reports of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (March — December 1979)
The article is analyzing the estimates made by the Soviet scientific community about the Islamic revolution in 1979 and its consequences for Iran, its neighbors and superpowers. Central point of research is three analytical reports on Iranian issues prepared for the Soviet party leadership in March, June and December 1979. Estimates originated from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences under E. M. Primakov and cooperation with representatives of other academic structures. The Authors consider the academic analysis in the context of Soviet-Iranian relations and the Soviet-American bipolar confrontation of the second half of the 1970s. The Research demonstrate the key issues for the Soviet leadership during this period, in particular, the problems of Islamic fundamentalism, the role of the Shiite clergy in revolutionary events, the consequences of the Islamic Revolution for international relations and the position of the USSR in the Middle East. The Authors compare Soviet assessments with the synchronous Western analytical conclusions and take into account subsequent events and the evolution of Soviet expertize on the Iranian issue, and conclude that Soviet Orientalists adequately perceived the Iranian situation and to the validity of their forecasts and conclusions.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Saint Petersburg State University in Modern History of Russia
- Vol. 14 (2) , 498-519
The Apollo-Soyuz Experimental Flight as a Political, Scientific and Technical Detente Project (On Materials from Russian Archives)
The Détente Era — as political defusing of international tensions in the 1960s and 1970s — represents an interesting period in World History. The study of this era has a special appeal in connection with the experience of positive political, scientific and technical interaction between two superpowers: the USSR and the United States, — an experience that lacks at present days. One of the brightest symbols of the Détente was the joint Soviet-American space experimental program “Apollo-Soyuz Test Project” (ASTP), within the framework of which joint docking of spacecraft in orbital space was carried out. Based on documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History and other published sources, including American ones, the article examines the history of the ASTP program as an important element of cooperation between superpowers in space during the years of detente. Special attention is paid to the factors that led to the beginning of cooperation, as well as the reasons why the docking of Soyuz and Apollo was not followed by projects comparable in scale and brightness. The authors come to two key conclusions. Firstly, the ASTP program, which arose as a purely scientific and technical project arising from the urgent tasks of developing manned space exploration, was inscribed in 1972 into the general agenda of bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington and became a politically significant project for both sides, the value of which was not directly related to its scientific and technical content. Secondly, the history of the ASTP clearly reflected the specifics of bilateral relations in the context of detente — both sides sought cooperation, but at the same time had clear limits of permissible actions and concessions, for which they did not go over.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Saint Petersburg State University in Modern History of Russia
- Vol. 14 (2) , 498-519
The Apollo-Soyuz Experimental Flight as a Political, Scientific and Technical Detente Project (On Materials from Russian Archives)
The Détente Era — as political defusing of international tensions in the 1960s and 1970s — represents an interesting period in World History. The study of this era has a special appeal in connection with the experience of positive political, scientific and technical interaction between two superpowers: the USSR and the United States, — an experience that lacks at present days. One of the brightest symbols of the Détente was the joint Soviet-American space experimental program “Apollo-Soyuz Test Project” (ASTP), within the framework of which joint docking of spacecraft in orbital space was carried out. Based on documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History and other published sources, including American ones, the article examines the history of the ASTP program as an important element of cooperation between superpowers in space during the years of detente. Special attention is paid to the factors that led to the beginning of cooperation, as well as the reasons why the docking of Soyuz and Apollo was not followed by projects comparable in scale and brightness. The authors come to two key conclusions. Firstly, the ASTP program, which arose as a purely scientific and technical project arising from the urgent tasks of developing manned space exploration, was inscribed in 1972 into the general agenda of bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington and became a politically significant project for both sides, the value of which was not directly related to its scientific and technical content. Secondly, the history of the ASTP clearly reflected the specifics of bilateral relations in the context of detente — both sides sought cooperation, but at the same time had clear limits of permissible actions and concessions, for which they did not go over.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by LLC Integration Education and Science in ISTORIYA
- Vol. 15 (4 (138))
The Problem of Revising of US Trade and Credit Legislation and Issues of Technology Transfer in Soviet-American Relations in the Second Half of 1970s
The article examines the fate of the Jackson — Vanik and Stevenson amendments to U. S. trade and credit legislation during the administrations of G. Ford and J. Carter in the context of the development of bilateral relations between the superpowers. Based on published American documents, personal sources, materials from the Russian State Archive of Economics and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the impact of the amendments on the interaction of the two states in the trade, economic and technological spheres, the positions and arguments of the parties on the issue of revising the amendments are identified, and the factors for maintaining restrictive provisions in American laws are determined. It is shown that part of the American political elite recognized the fallacy and ineffectiveness of the amendments already in 1975, however, representatives of the conservative establishment still saw the main precondition for revising the legislation as the liberalization of the Soviet approach to the departure of Jews from the country and the quantitative increase in emigration, while the Soviet leadership was disposed to dialogue, but was ready to make such significant concessions. During Carter’s presidency, the administration's approach was particularly contradictory, combining a willingness to continue dialogue to resolve the problem, an emphasis on the human rights situation in the USSR, and not very consistent attempts to link the issue of amendments with other issues in bilateral relations. In 1979, before the Vienna Summit, the Carter administration was ready to circumvent de facto the restrictive provisions of the amendments without their formal repeal, but the Soviet side continued to insist firmly on their complete abolition, which predetermined the ineffectiveness of the dialogue. The authors suggest that the uncompromising position of the Soviet leaders was associated not only with considerations of political prestige, but also with a restrained assessment of the prospects for further trade, economic and technological cooperation between the superpowers.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by LLC Integration Education and Science in ISTORIYA
- Vol. 15 (4 (138))
The Problem of Revising of US Trade and Credit Legislation and Issues of Technology Transfer in Soviet-American Relations in the Second Half of 1970s
The article examines the fate of the Jackson — Vanik and Stevenson amendments to U. S. trade and credit legislation during the administrations of G. Ford and J. Carter in the context of the development of bilateral relations between the superpowers. Based on published American documents, personal sources, materials from the Russian State Archive of Economics and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the impact of the amendments on the interaction of the two states in the trade, economic and technological spheres, the positions and arguments of the parties on the issue of revising the amendments are identified, and the factors for maintaining restrictive provisions in American laws are determined. It is shown that part of the American political elite recognized the fallacy and ineffectiveness of the amendments already in 1975, however, representatives of the conservative establishment still saw the main precondition for revising the legislation as the liberalization of the Soviet approach to the departure of Jews from the country and the quantitative increase in emigration, while the Soviet leadership was disposed to dialogue, but was ready to make such significant concessions. During Carter’s presidency, the administration's approach was particularly contradictory, combining a willingness to continue dialogue to resolve the problem, an emphasis on the human rights situation in the USSR, and not very consistent attempts to link the issue of amendments with other issues in bilateral relations. In 1979, before the Vienna Summit, the Carter administration was ready to circumvent de facto the restrictive provisions of the amendments without their formal repeal, but the Soviet side continued to insist firmly on their complete abolition, which predetermined the ineffectiveness of the dialogue. The authors suggest that the uncompromising position of the Soviet leaders was associated not only with considerations of political prestige, but also with a restrained assessment of the prospects for further trade, economic and technological cooperation between the superpowers.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in World Economy and International Relations
- Vol. 68 (5) , 125-141
Trade-Economic and Scientific-Technical Relations Between the USA and the USSR during the Years of Detente
The topic of cooperation between the USSR and the USA in the economic, scientific and technical fields during the years of detente in bilateral relations (1969–1979) has been developed by American and European historians, political scientists, economists and experts in international relations theory for 50 years. This review describes the main stages of evolution of the foreign historiography on this problem. The authors consider the development of trade relations, technological exchanges and cooperation in the field of science as a coherent whole due to their “multilayered nature” and cumulative impact on the overall dynamics and final results of the Cold War. It is noted that from the very beginning, the formation of investigative issues was greatly influenced by theoretical works, as well as memoirs and diaries of American statesmen, Presidents, Secretaries of State, Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, who were direct participants in the events. It is proved that in modern foreign studies, there is a tendency to belittle the significance of the experience of detente as a special model of relations between the East and the West. There is an attitude to the achievements of the exploratory programs implemented in those years as something situational and insignificant. Another conclusion concerns the difference in the emphasis of domestic and foreign authors regarding the choice of research issues. While the former tend to pay attention to the potential, implemented and missed opportunities of scientific and technical cooperation between the two superpowers during the period of relative thaw, the latter focus on studying the U.S. trade policy, but the transfer of technologies and high-tech products is considered in the context of discriminatory restrictions caused by the logic of the Cold War. While Russian authors, as a rule, emphasize the equal and mutually beneficial nature of cooperation in the scientific and technical sphere, American and European historians point to the USSR lagging behind in the development and introduction of new technologies into production by the mid‑1970s, a greater interest in cooperation and, as a result, a more vulnerable position in the negotiation and bargaining.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in World Economy and International Relations
- Vol. 68 (5) , 125-141
Trade-Economic and Scientific-Technical Relations Between the USA and the USSR during the Years of Detente
The topic of cooperation between the USSR and the USA in the economic, scientific and technical fields during the years of detente in bilateral relations (1969–1979) has been developed by American and European historians, political scientists, economists and experts in international relations theory for 50 years. This review describes the main stages of evolution of the foreign historiography on this problem. The authors consider the development of trade relations, technological exchanges and cooperation in the field of science as a coherent whole due to their “multilayered nature” and cumulative impact on the overall dynamics and final results of the Cold War. It is noted that from the very beginning, the formation of investigative issues was greatly influenced by theoretical works, as well as memoirs and diaries of American statesmen, Presidents, Secretaries of State, Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, who were direct participants in the events. It is proved that in modern foreign studies, there is a tendency to belittle the significance of the experience of detente as a special model of relations between the East and the West. There is an attitude to the achievements of the exploratory programs implemented in those years as something situational and insignificant. Another conclusion concerns the difference in the emphasis of domestic and foreign authors regarding the choice of research issues. While the former tend to pay attention to the potential, implemented and missed opportunities of scientific and technical cooperation between the two superpowers during the period of relative thaw, the latter focus on studying the U.S. trade policy, but the transfer of technologies and high-tech products is considered in the context of discriminatory restrictions caused by the logic of the Cold War. While Russian authors, as a rule, emphasize the equal and mutually beneficial nature of cooperation in the scientific and technical sphere, American and European historians point to the USSR lagging behind in the development and introduction of new technologies into production by the mid‑1970s, a greater interest in cooperation and, as a result, a more vulnerable position in the negotiation and bargaining.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2023
- Published by MGIMO University in MGIMO Review of International Relations
- Vol. 16 (5) , 28-57
The Kurdish Movement’s Factor in US Politics at the Peak of Iran and Afghanistan Crises, 1979 – January 1981
At the close of 1979, the United States encountered a critical need to realign its Middle East strategy in the wake of the capture of the American Embassy in Tehran by supporters of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah R. Khomeini on November 4, and the subsequent deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on December 25. Faced with the challenges presented by the Iranian and Afghan crises, the United States' analytical, intelligence, and military bodies navigated various resources in search of viable solutions.This study delves into the consideration of the Kurdish factor as a potential instrument in shaping the regional landscape. The National Security Council (NSC), State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the US Department of Defense all scrutinized the Kurdish movement, evaluating its prospects for advancing American interests. Drawing from documents obtained from the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA, this article tracks the evolution of US policy concerning the Kurdish movement and its utility in realizing Washington's strategic objectives during the most critical phases of the Iran and Afghanistan crises.The analysis underscores the fundamental flaw in the initial evaluation of events in Afghanistan and Iran, misinterpreting them as a calculated move within a Soviet strategy to extend influence into the Persian Gulf region. This misconception was the primary cause of the Carter administration's failure in utilizing the Kurds as a counterforce against the Khomeini regime and its erroneous perceptions of the Iranian political regime's vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in Washington's relationship with Tehran hindered the formulation of a coherent approach toward the Afghan-Iranian direction.
- 13 November 2023
- Published by MGIMO University in MGIMO Review of International Relations
- Vol. 16 (5) , 28-57
Open AccessThe Kurdish Movement’s Factor in US Politics at the Peak of Iran and Afghanistan Crises, 1979 – January 1981
At the close of 1979, the United States encountered a critical need to realign its Middle East strategy in the wake of the capture of the American Embassy in Tehran by supporters of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah R. Khomeini on November 4, and the subsequent deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on December 25. Faced with the challenges presented by the Iranian and Afghan crises, the United States' analytical, intelligence, and military bodies navigated various resources in search of viable solutions.This study delves into the consideration of the Kurdish factor as a potential instrument in shaping the regional landscape. The National Security Council (NSC), State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the US Department of Defense all scrutinized the Kurdish movement, evaluating its prospects for advancing American interests. Drawing from documents obtained from the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA, this article tracks the evolution of US policy concerning the Kurdish movement and its utility in realizing Washington's strategic objectives during the most critical phases of the Iran and Afghanistan crises.The analysis underscores the fundamental flaw in the initial evaluation of events in Afghanistan and Iran, misinterpreting them as a calculated move within a Soviet strategy to extend influence into the Persian Gulf region. This misconception was the primary cause of the Carter administration's failure in utilizing the Kurds as a counterforce against the Khomeini regime and its erroneous perceptions of the Iranian political regime's vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in Washington's relationship with Tehran hindered the formulation of a coherent approach toward the Afghan-Iranian direction.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2023
- Published by MGIMO University in MGIMO Review of International Relations
- Vol. 16 (3) , 298-314-314
"The fascinating world of high-grade historical analysis" (About V.O. Pechatnov's book History and Politics)
Рецензия на книгу: Печатнов В.О. 2022. История и политика. Москва: Издательство «Аспект Пресс». 542 с.
- 3 July 2023
- Published by MGIMO University in MGIMO Review of International Relations
- Vol. 16 (3) , 298-314-314
Open Access"The fascinating world of high-grade historical analysis" (About V.O. Pechatnov's book History and Politics)
Рецензия на книгу: Печатнов В.О. 2022. История и политика. Москва: Издательство «Аспект Пресс». 542 с.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Perm State University (PSU) in Вестник Пермского университета. История
- Vol. 61 (2 (61)) , 70–83
THE U.S. IN SEARCH OF AN ANSWER TO THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE: THE KURDISH CASE, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1979
As a result of the capture of the American embassy by supporters of the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah R. Khomeini, the U.S. lost the chances for a quick restoration of its positions in the Middle East. The events unfolding in Tehran demanded a serious and balanced response from the adminis-tration of John Carter. Under these conditions, the American government and its analytical structures began to look for tools to influence and put pressure on the Islamic regime. One of the potential levers of American policy could be the Kurdish issue, which was again openly put on the agenda after the Islamic revolution of 1978–1979. The potential of the Iranian Kurds in terms of countering the Khomeini regime, their controlla-bility and the conformity of their struggle with U.S. interests have become the subject of analytical work of the state services. The article examines the place and role of the Kurdish question in the search for U.S. res-ponses to the challenges of the Iranian crisis caused by the capture of the U.S. embassy in November 1979. Based on a wide range of documents from the U.S. National Archives, the John Carter Presidential Library, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Council of National U.S. security, the author traces the course of developing a policy towards Iran and a position regarding the national movement of Ira-nian Kurds. The context of regional policy and the influence of the Afghan issue on the Iranian course of Washington are also traced. As a result of the development of decisions, the line of Secretary of State S. Vance prevailed, demanding to refrain from active aggressive actions against Iran, to ignore the Kurdish movement. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan also had an impact, turning the entire political situa-tion in the Middle East upside down.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Perm State University (PSU) in Вестник Пермского университета. История
- Vol. 61 (2 (61)) , 70–83
Open AccessTHE U.S. IN SEARCH OF AN ANSWER TO THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE: THE KURDISH CASE, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1979
As a result of the capture of the American embassy by supporters of the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah R. Khomeini, the U.S. lost the chances for a quick restoration of its positions in the Middle East. The events unfolding in Tehran demanded a serious and balanced response from the adminis-tration of John Carter. Under these conditions, the American government and its analytical structures began to look for tools to influence and put pressure on the Islamic regime. One of the potential levers of American policy could be the Kurdish issue, which was again openly put on the agenda after the Islamic revolution of 1978–1979. The potential of the Iranian Kurds in terms of countering the Khomeini regime, their controlla-bility and the conformity of their struggle with U.S. interests have become the subject of analytical work of the state services. The article examines the place and role of the Kurdish question in the search for U.S. res-ponses to the challenges of the Iranian crisis caused by the capture of the U.S. embassy in November 1979. Based on a wide range of documents from the U.S. National Archives, the John Carter Presidential Library, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Council of National U.S. security, the author traces the course of developing a policy towards Iran and a position regarding the national movement of Ira-nian Kurds. The context of regional policy and the influence of the Afghan issue on the Iranian course of Washington are also traced. As a result of the development of decisions, the line of Secretary of State S. Vance prevailed, demanding to refrain from active aggressive actions against Iran, to ignore the Kurdish movement. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan also had an impact, turning the entire political situa-tion in the Middle East upside down.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by LLC Integration Education and Science in ISTORIYA
- Vol. 14 (5 (127))
“Negotiations with the USSR May Acquire a Broader Scope than We Can Foresee at Present”. Inclusion of Scientific and Technological Cooperation in the Agenda of the American-Soviet Detente, 1968—1972
The interaction of the USA and the USSR in the field of scientific research and technological exchanges was an important meaningful aspect in the history of their relations in the 1970s. The article discusses the main milestones of the superpowers’ rapprochement at the stage of forming the agenda of the American-Soviet detente. Based on the study of American and Russian documents, including the funds of the Russian State Archive of Modern History and the Russian State Archive of Economics, the goals and motives of the Nixon administration in the process of constructing the American-Soviet dialogue and the place of scientific and technological issues in this process are clarified. The differences in the approaches of Washington and Moscow to establishing a constructive dialogue are studied. There are presented materials indicating the expansion of contacts between representatives of American big business involved in the fields of high-tech and innovative production with the State Committee for Science and Technology under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, interested ministries, institutes of the Academy of Sciences, individual scientific laboratories and enterprises. Notice is given to the role of the national academies of sciences in bringing bilateral relations to a normal track. The Moscow Summit of 1972 is regarded as one of the most important events of the American-Soviet detente, which created a real basis for the formation of long-term intellectual and infrastructural ties in the world entering the era of globalization. It is concluded that in the course of negotiations American diplomacy failed to implement its plan to reach bilateral agreements based on the use of “linking” tactics, which assumed that the extension of the most-favored-nation regime in trade and access to high technologies to the USSR were conditioned by political concessions. It is noted that at all stages of the negotiations Moscow consistently defended its technological sovereignty guided by the principles of equality and equal benefits. The data of American analytical services are presented indicating the high concern of US scientists in developing cooperation with representatives of Soviet science.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by LLC Integration Education and Science in ISTORIYA
- Vol. 14 (5 (127))
“Negotiations with the USSR May Acquire a Broader Scope than We Can Foresee at Present”. Inclusion of Scientific and Technological Cooperation in the Agenda of the American-Soviet Detente, 1968—1972
The interaction of the USA and the USSR in the field of scientific research and technological exchanges was an important meaningful aspect in the history of their relations in the 1970s. The article discusses the main milestones of the superpowers’ rapprochement at the stage of forming the agenda of the American-Soviet detente. Based on the study of American and Russian documents, including the funds of the Russian State Archive of Modern History and the Russian State Archive of Economics, the goals and motives of the Nixon administration in the process of constructing the American-Soviet dialogue and the place of scientific and technological issues in this process are clarified. The differences in the approaches of Washington and Moscow to establishing a constructive dialogue are studied. There are presented materials indicating the expansion of contacts between representatives of American big business involved in the fields of high-tech and innovative production with the State Committee for Science and Technology under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, interested ministries, institutes of the Academy of Sciences, individual scientific laboratories and enterprises. Notice is given to the role of the national academies of sciences in bringing bilateral relations to a normal track. The Moscow Summit of 1972 is regarded as one of the most important events of the American-Soviet detente, which created a real basis for the formation of long-term intellectual and infrastructural ties in the world entering the era of globalization. It is concluded that in the course of negotiations American diplomacy failed to implement its plan to reach bilateral agreements based on the use of “linking” tactics, which assumed that the extension of the most-favored-nation regime in trade and access to high technologies to the USSR were conditioned by political concessions. It is noted that at all stages of the negotiations Moscow consistently defended its technological sovereignty guided by the principles of equality and equal benefits. The data of American analytical services are presented indicating the high concern of US scientists in developing cooperation with representatives of Soviet science.