AZArtyom Viktorovich Zorin

Artyom Viktorovich Zorin

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Artyom Viktorovich Zorin has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The Image of the USSR in the Czechoslovak-American Diplomatic Discourse During the Second World War

    by Artem Zorin

    The article provides analysis of various primary sources (diplomatic correspondence, public speeches, interviews and articles in American media, memoirs) about the visits of Czechoslovak politicians in exile E. Benes and J. Masaryk to the US during World War II. Their negotiations with American diplomats and government officials, as well as interviews and public speeches in the US were often devoted to relations with the USSR. The author highlights the main aspects of their perception of Russia and concludes that it was multifaceted and contradictory. On the one hand, the USSR was perceived as a partner and an important ally, on the other hand, as a potential threat and a source of problems. Czechoslovak politicians emphasized the need to maintain and deepen close relations with Moscow, to overcome its hostility, and to stimulate the development of democratic tendencies in the USSR. At the same time, they were not entirely confident in J. Stalin's intentions and remained wary of his plans. In general, the perception of the USSR broadcasted by Czechoslovak politicians in the United States was complementary, their opinion contributed to strengthening the positive image of Russia in America. This was a consequence of their pragmatic approach, as well as Moscow's cautious policy. American politicians and foreign policy experts perceived these opinions and recommendations as an important source of information. The obtained results supplement and expand our understanding of the perception of the USSR by the leaders of the Czechoslovak emigration during the Second World War and to highlight some ways for promoting a positive image of Russia.

  • Edvard Beneš in American Diplomatic Correspondence, 1945–1948

    by A. V. Zorin, Зорин А. В.

    The second president ofCzechoslovakiaEdvardBeneš was one of the most prominent but ambiguous politicians of the first half of the twentieth century.His name is associated with theSudetenCrisis and theMunichAgreement of 1938, the struggle forCzechoslovak independence during theSecondWorldWar, alliance withMoscow and the communist’s takeover in 1948.The purpose of the article is to look atBeneš in a new way, the perception of him byAmerican diplomats in the last years of his life, during the period of acute internal political struggle inCzechoslovakia and the emerging geopolitical confrontation betweenMoscow andWashington.The study is based on diplomatic correspondence and papers of theAmerican ambassador toPragueLaurenceSteinhardt, which reveal some new aspects ofBeneš’ personality, the history ofCzechoslovakia, andUSforeign policy in 1945-1948.It is concluded that there was a close and frank relationship between theAmerican diplomats andBeneš.TheCzechoslovak president had a reputation as a experienced politician, pragmatist, supporter ofWestern orientation and an opponent of communism.However, his vision of political issues and forecasts of further development often turned out to be erroneous.His support of closer relations with theUSSRand radical reforms caused discontent from theUSdiplomacy.Nevertheless,Beneš was associated with democratic traditions and the desire to maintain good relations with theUnitedStates.The embassy hoped that his authority and popularity would help to prevent theCommunists from seizing power inCzechoslovakia.The crisis that broke out inFebruary 1948 and the indecisive actions ofBeneš came as a surprise to theStateDepartment.They caused misunderstanding and dissatisfaction ofAmbassadorSteinhardt.American diplomats consideredBeneš’ actions to be explained by his poor health and enormous pressure from the communistPrimeMinisterKlementGottwald.

  • Open Access

    The February 1948 Crisis in Czechoslovakia: Reaction, Assessments And Consequenses for the USA Foreign Policy

    by А. В. Зорин

    Introduction. The article examines the reaction of American diplomatic, political and media circles, who were involved in the development of the US political course and the formation of mass sentiments, to the crisis in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. It reveals connections between the perceptions of political processes in Eastern Europe by various segments of the American political elite and the nature of political decisions made by the US government. Methods. The research is based on archival documents and articles of leading American papers. Their analysis allows us to consider the transformation of the image of Czechoslovakia, perceptions of its domestic and foreign policy, the evolution of assessments of Czechoslovak realities in the US, depending on the domestic and international situation and changing world situation. Analysis. In February 1948, during the tense political crisis, a communist regime was established in Czechoslovakia. This event completed the creation of the Soviet bloc in Europe, and influenced the development of the US containment policy towards the USSR and the escalation of the Cold War. The February crisis caused a tangible reaction in the United States. It was considered in American media, diplomatic and political circles in general context of growing international tension and Soviet-American controversies. Results. The author concludes that the US government was convinced that the communists’ coup d’état was inspired by the Kremlin. The Americans were shocked by its suddenness and speed, the lack of resistance from democratic forces. This effect was used by the US government to whip up anti-Soviet sentiments and to adopt the Marshall Plan.

  • Post-War Czechoslovakia in the Reflection of the United States’ Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt

    by Artem Zorin

    After the World War II, a tense struggle took place in Czechoslovakia between democratic and communist political forces. It ended with the Communists’ victory in February 1948. The article is devoted to the perception of these process by the US Ambassador in Prague, L. Steinhardt. Exploring his letters, messages and speeches, the author analyzes Steinhardt’s views and political stereotypes, attitude to the Czechoslovak communists and their opponents, to their tactics. He also pays attention to ambassador’s perception of the February crisis of 1948 and its results, his characteristics of Czechoslovak leading political figures. The article is based on the US State Department documents and Steinhardt’s personal archive. The archive’s materials demonstrate that Steingardt perceived the Communists rise to power in Czechoslovakia as a major defeat, a defeat in the battle for democracy, a loss of this country for the West. Unable to predict the imminent onset of such outcome, he preferred to blame the Czechoslovak population’s indecisiveness and the Washington ineffective Foreign Policy for such event. The article substantiates that such perception, which did not allow alternatives and compromises, was typical for representatives of the US diplomatic and political circles in the second half of the 1940s and contributed to the escalation of the Cold War.

  • The Soviet Union and the Post-World War II Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia as Assessed by American Diplomacy

    by Artem Zorin

    This article examines how American diplomats and international relations experts perceived Czechoslovak foreign policy priorities between the end of World War II and the consolidation of communist power in the ČSR in 1948. The purpose of the work is to identify the Soviet factor in US policy towards Czechoslovakia, the peculiarities of the perception of the country in the general context of Soviet-American relations and the genesis of the Cold War. The research is based on documentary sources from different archives: the US National Archives, the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, and the archive of Ambassador L. A. Steinhardt at the Library of Congress. Archival documents are supplemented by articles from the American press. The author concludes that during this period, the perception of Czechoslovakia by the Americans was ambivalent and controversial. On the one hand, the existence of a democratic multi-party system made it possible to consider the ČSR part of the West, but, on the other hand, its pro-Soviet foreign policy forced the Americans to regard it as being behind the Iron Curtain. The real foreign activities of the Czechoslovak government led by communist K. Gottwald directly demonstrated Czechoslovakia’s orientation toward close relations with the USSR and its loyalty to the Kremlin. Because of this, the degree of Prague’s dependence on Moscow was a subject of serious discussion and reflection among American experts in international relations. Some of them unconditionally placed the ČSR among the Soviet satellites, while others considered it the last outpost of democracy in Eastern Europe. A turning point in the perception of Czechoslovakia was its refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan under the direct pressure of the Soviet government. After that, Prague’s inability to resist Soviet pressure and its dependence on Moscow became apparent to the Americans.

  • Open Access

    The problem of American Loans and Credits for Czechoslovakia in 1945–1948

    by A. V. Zorin

    The article is devoted to one of the aspects of the US European policy after World War II: the issue of loans and credits to affected countries. Using the example of Czechoslovakia, the author tries to answer a number of important questions: did Washington have a sound financial and economic policy towards this country, what goals did it pursue, what were its results? The study is based on the US Department of State archive documents and papers of the American ambassador to Czechoslovakia L.A. Steinhardt. The US financial policy towards Czechoslovakia in the early post-war years was the subject of intense debate in the United States. The author reveals evidence of serious disagreement between economic and political divisions of the State Department about providing of financial assistance to Prague, its size and terms of lending. Particular attention is paid to Steingardt’s position and his attempts to determine American loans and credits to Prague by upholding the property interests of American citizens. These disagreements hindered the development of a single thoughtful course regarding the Czechoslovak Republic and complicated diplomatic relations with Prague; negotiations on the allocation of large loans for the economic recovery of the Czechoslovak Republic dragged on. A fundamental role in the establishment of a new US political course had Secretary of State James Byrnes’ decision, made in the fall of 1946, on the inadmissibility of providing assistance to countries that have taken anti-American positions. This approach was finally entrenched after the Communists coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, when the country entered the Soviet sphere of influence. The article concludes that the post-war US policy was not distinguished by integrity and thoughtfulness.


  • Open Access

    Problem of Compensation for American Property in Czechoslovakia in 1945–1948

    by Artyom Viktorovich Zorin, Vyatka State University

    В статье рассматривается один из аспектов политики США в Европе в 1945–1948 гг. Возросшее после Второй мировой войны влияние Вашингтона требовало выработки новых механизмов и моделей поведения. Дипломатия США оказалась перед необходимостью сочетать традиционный курс защиты американских интересов со стремлением расширить свое влияние и поддержать укрепление демократических систем в освобожденных государствах. Однако, данная политика сопровождалась появлением серьезных проблем и противоречий, в частности в сфере отношений с Чехословацкой республикой по вопросу о компенсации за национализированную и реквизированную собственность американских граждан. Проведенные в рамках социалистических реформ с целью оздоровления чехословацкой экономики, эти мероприятия были восприняты в США как свидетельство усиления коммунистического и советского влияния. Неспособность правительства ЧСР выплатить компенсацию и затягивание переговоров поставило американских дипломатов перед выбором между защитой имущественных интересов своих граждан и стремлением оказать поддержку прозападным силам в ЧСР в укреплении демократического режима. Слабость экономики ЧСР и ограниченность ее финансовых ресурсов не были восприняты американцами в качестве оснований для уступок. Вашингтон занял принципиальную позицию, заявив о необходимости получения справедливой и полной компенсации как условия развития отношений в иных сферах, использовал финансовое давление — блокировку кредитов, в которых остро нуждалась чехословацкая экономика. Это привело к ухудшению двусторонних отношений и повлияло на падение популярности прозападных политических сил в ЧСР, закончившееся приходом к власти коммунистов, что затянуло решение вопроса о выплате компенсации на несколько десятилетий.

  • The United States, the UNRRA and the problem of economic recovery of Czechoslovakia in 1945–1947

    by А.в. Зорин

    Одной из проблем, с которыми столкнулись страны Европы после окончания Второй мировой войны, была необходимость экономического восстановления. Главную роль в ее решении в первые послевоенные годы сыграла Администрация Объединенных Наций по оказанию помощи и реабилитации (UNRRA ЮНРРА), внесшая большой вклад в восстановление многих государств, включая Чехословацкую республику. Однако в условиях зарождавшейся холодной войны ее экономическая деятельность оказалась тесно переплетенной с политическими отношениями. Поскольку главным спонсором организации являлись США, а Чехословакия постепенно входила в сферу влияния СССР, безвозмездная помощь со стороны ЮНРРА вызывала серьезные нарекания и опасения американских дипломатов в Праге. Посол США в ЧСР Л. Штейнгардт полагал, что чехословацкое отделение ЮНРРА во главе с гражданином СССР П. Алексеевым способствовало не столько восстановлению чехословацкой экономики, сколько усилению влияния левых сил и проведению социалистических преобразований. Штейнгардт воспринимал работу организации прежде всего в политическом ключе, как одно из проявлений борьбы между просоветскими и прозападными силами. Масштабы оказываемой ЮНРРА помощи и ее освещение в прессе встречали серьезное недовольство американцев. Таким образом, экономические цели данной организации приходили в противоречие с политическими интересами США. Несмотря на настойчивые и категоричные заявления со стороны Штейнгардта, чехословацкое отделение ЮНРРА сохраняло независимость до окончания работы организации, оказав значительную помощь в восстановлении экономики данной страны. Однако противоречивый характер ее деятельности привел к прекращению финансирования данной программы со стороны Вашингтона и переходу в 1947 г. к Плану Маршалла. One of the challenges that Europe faced after the end of the Second World War was the need for economic recovery. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) played a major role in its decision in the first postwar years, making a great contribution to the reconstruction of many states, including the Czechoslovak Republic. However, in the context of the emerging cold war, its economic activities were closely intertwined with political relations. As the main sponsor of the organization was the USA, and Czechoslovakia gradually entered the sphere of influence of the USSR, gratuitous help from the UNRRA caused serious complaints and fears of the American diplomats in Prague. U.S. Ambassador to the CHSR L. Steingardt believed that the Czechoslovak branch of the UNRRA headed by a citizen of the USSR P. Alekseev contributed not so much to the restoration of the Czechoslovak economy, how to strengthen the influence of the left forces and the socialist reforms. Steingardt perceived the work of the organization primarily in a political way, as one of the manifestations of the struggle between ProSoviet and ProWestern forces. The scale of the assistance provided by the UNRRA and its press coverage met with serious discontent among Americans. Thus, the economic goals of this organization came into conflict with the political interests of the United States. Despite strong and categorical statements by Steingardt, the Czechoslovak branch of the UNRRA maintained its independence until the end of the organizations work, providing significant assistance in the economic recovery of the country. However, the contradictory nature of its activities led to the termination of funding for this program by Washington and the transition in 1947 to the Marshall Plan.