Peter DeScioli
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Peter DeScioli has a total of 48 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Robert Kurzban
14 shared publications- Alessandro Del Ponte
Global Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
4 shared publications Alex Shaw
4 shared publications- Julian De Freitas
Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA
4 shared publications - Kyle A. Thomas
MotiveMetrics Inc., Palo Alto, CA 94306
3 shared publications - Lawrence Ian Reed
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, United States
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 10 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Society
- Vol. 55 (4) , 71
Evolutionary psychology did not make people blame the victim: comment on Persson and Hostler (2026)
- 10 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Society
- Vol. 55 (4) , 71
Evolutionary psychology did not make people blame the victim: comment on Persson and Hostler (2026)
- Open Access
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-19
Do Voters Understand the Benefits of Taxes?
We use economic experiments to study a fundamental question in political economy: Do voters understand the benefits of taxes? Participants play an economic game as members of a virtual society composed of computer players. In each round, the players earn low or high income, see the distribution of income, and then vote for low or high taxes. We test whether participants vote rationally for high taxes when poor and low taxes when rich, following a classic model in political economy, or whether they focus on the burden of taxes more than the benefits. Across three experiments, poor players voted against high taxes 30% to 50% of the time, and they were more opposed when the same policy was labeled “taxes” than when it was labeled “sharing.” In Experiment 2, Singaporean participants opposed taxes at about the same rate as those of Americans in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, participants’ opposition to taxes persisted when they received low income every round. These results support the burden hypothesis: voters focus more on the burden of paying taxes than on the benefits they provide. We reflect on what the results imply for the politics of taxes.
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-19
Open AccessDo Voters Understand the Benefits of Taxes?
We use economic experiments to study a fundamental question in political economy: Do voters understand the benefits of taxes? Participants play an economic game as members of a virtual society composed of computer players. In each round, the players earn low or high income, see the distribution of income, and then vote for low or high taxes. We test whether participants vote rationally for high taxes when poor and low taxes when rich, following a classic model in political economy, or whether they focus on the burden of taxes more than the benefits. Across three experiments, poor players voted against high taxes 30% to 50% of the time, and they were more opposed when the same policy was labeled “taxes” than when it was labeled “sharing.” In Experiment 2, Singaporean participants opposed taxes at about the same rate as those of Americans in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, participants’ opposition to taxes persisted when they received low income every round. These results support the burden hypothesis: voters focus more on the burden of paying taxes than on the benefits they provide. We reflect on what the results imply for the politics of taxes.
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 1553 (1) , 21-33
The Moral Sword
Why do we hurt people in the name of morality? Here we elaborate on the theory that moral judgment is an evolutionary strategy for choosing sides in conflicts. Hurting wrongdoers is part of the strategy. Morality may seem like a guiding light for cooperation, but it is actually closely tied to aggression. As a result, moral condemnation is not always good: It is a gamble that risks punishing the innocent and inflaming hostilities between factions. These dangers are obscured by confusing morality with benevolence. Thus, we examine how moral judgment fundamentally differs from benevolence and goodness. The argument appeals to evolutionary psychology, moral psychology, and what we will call the method of natural language. Accordingly, we will minimize jargon and scholarly accounting to address a general audience across the many disciplines concerned with morality. The final section provides a concise review of the essential literatures for further reading.
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 1553 (1) , 21-33
The Moral Sword
Why do we hurt people in the name of morality? Here we elaborate on the theory that moral judgment is an evolutionary strategy for choosing sides in conflicts. Hurting wrongdoers is part of the strategy. Morality may seem like a guiding light for cooperation, but it is actually closely tied to aggression. As a result, moral condemnation is not always good: It is a gamble that risks punishing the innocent and inflaming hostilities between factions. These dangers are obscured by confusing morality with benevolence. Thus, we examine how moral judgment fundamentally differs from benevolence and goodness. The argument appeals to evolutionary psychology, moral psychology, and what we will call the method of natural language. Accordingly, we will minimize jargon and scholarly accounting to address a general audience across the many disciplines concerned with morality. The final section provides a concise review of the essential literatures for further reading.
- 10 October 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e332
Computational theories should be made with natural language instead of meaningless code
The target article claims that we should speak in code to understand property, because natural language is too ambiguous. Yet the best computer programmers tell us the opposite: Arbitrary code is too ambiguous, so we should use natural language for variables, functions, and classes. I discuss how meaningless code makes Boyer's theory too enigmatic to properly debate.
- 10 October 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e332
Computational theories should be made with natural language instead of meaningless code
The target article claims that we should speak in code to understand property, because natural language is too ambiguous. Yet the best computer programmers tell us the opposite: Arbitrary code is too ambiguous, so we should use natural language for variables, functions, and classes. I discuss how meaningless code makes Boyer's theory too enigmatic to properly debate.
- 4 October 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e301-35
Moralistic punishment is not for cooperation
The theory proposed by Fitouchi et al. misses the core of puritanical morality: Cruel punishment for harmless actions. Punishment is mutually harmful, unlike cooperation which is mutually beneficial. Theories of moral judgment should not obscure this fundamental distinction.
- 4 October 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e301-35
Moralistic punishment is not for cooperation
The theory proposed by Fitouchi et al. misses the core of puritanical morality: Cruel punishment for harmless actions. Punishment is mutually harmful, unlike cooperation which is mutually beneficial. Theories of moral judgment should not obscure this fundamental distinction.
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 55 (1) , 123-128
Piled Modifiers, Buried Verbs, and Other Turgid Prose in the American Political Science Review
Academic writing is notoriously difficult to read. Can political science do better? To assess the state of prose in political science, we examined a recent issue of the American Political Science Review. We evaluated the articles according to the basic principles of style endorsed by writing experts. We find that the writing suffers most from heavy noun phrases in forms such as noun noun noun and adjective adjective noun noun. Further, we describe five contributors that swell noun phrases: piled modifiers, needless words, nebulous nouns, missing prepositions, and buried verbs. We document more than a thousand examples and demonstrate how to revise each one with principles of style. We also draw on research in cognitive science to explain why these constructions confuse, mislead, and distract readers.
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 55 (1) , 123-128
Piled Modifiers, Buried Verbs, and Other Turgid Prose in the American Political Science Review
Academic writing is notoriously difficult to read. Can political science do better? To assess the state of prose in political science, we examined a recent issue of the American Political Science Review. We evaluated the articles according to the basic principles of style endorsed by writing experts. We find that the writing suffers most from heavy noun phrases in forms such as noun noun noun and adjective adjective noun noun. Further, we describe five contributors that swell noun phrases: piled modifiers, needless words, nebulous nouns, missing prepositions, and buried verbs. We document more than a thousand examples and demonstrate how to revise each one with principles of style. We also draw on research in cognitive science to explain why these constructions confuse, mislead, and distract readers.
- Open Access
- 29 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-9
One-way routes complicate cooperation in migrant crises
How can countries cooperate to shelter migrants? We use experimental economics to study the distinct challenges of cooperation in migrant crises. We designed an economic game, pass the buck, where participants are leaders of countries who decide whether to shelter migrants or pass them to the next country. We examine the difficulties posed by one-way migration and differences in wealth. We find that leaders sheltered migrants less often when they received them first on a one-way route, compared to when everyone received migrants at the same time. Moreover, the first leader became more likely to shelter migrants when the last country could return them to the first. When one country was wealthier, the wealthy leader sheltered more and the other leaders passed more. We discuss the implications for international cooperation in migrant crises.
- 29 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-9
Open AccessOne-way routes complicate cooperation in migrant crises
How can countries cooperate to shelter migrants? We use experimental economics to study the distinct challenges of cooperation in migrant crises. We designed an economic game, pass the buck, where participants are leaders of countries who decide whether to shelter migrants or pass them to the next country. We examine the difficulties posed by one-way migration and differences in wealth. We find that leaders sheltered migrants less often when they received them first on a one-way route, compared to when everyone received migrants at the same time. Moreover, the first leader became more likely to shelter migrants when the last country could return them to the first. When one country was wealthier, the wealthy leader sheltered more and the other leaders passed more. We discuss the implications for international cooperation in migrant crises.
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 44 (4) , 1657-1680
Pay Your Debts: Moral Dilemmas of International Debt
Should a government repay its international debts even if this imposes severe hardships on its citizens? Drawing on moral psychology, we investigate when people think a government is morally obligated to pay its debts. Participants read about a government that has to decide whether to default on its debt payments or cut vital programs. Across conditions, we varied the number of jobs at stake and whether a full or partial default is required to save them. Overall, most participants judged that a government should pay its debt even when the damage to the debtor is greater than the benefit to the lender. As the damage to the debtor became extreme, participants increasingly said the government should default, but they still judged that defaulting is morally wrong. In Experiment 2, we find in a national sample of Americans that political conservatives were more opposed to default than liberals. We discuss implications for policy, public opinion, and public welfare during economic downturns.
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 44 (4) , 1657-1680
Pay Your Debts: Moral Dilemmas of International Debt
Should a government repay its international debts even if this imposes severe hardships on its citizens? Drawing on moral psychology, we investigate when people think a government is morally obligated to pay its debts. Participants read about a government that has to decide whether to default on its debt payments or cut vital programs. Across conditions, we varied the number of jobs at stake and whether a full or partial default is required to save them. Overall, most participants judged that a government should pay its debt even when the damage to the debtor is greater than the benefit to the lender. As the damage to the debtor became extreme, participants increasingly said the government should default, but they still judged that defaulting is morally wrong. In Experiment 2, we find in a national sample of Americans that political conservatives were more opposed to default than liberals. We discuss implications for policy, public opinion, and public welfare during economic downturns.
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Psychological Science
- Vol. 7 (2) , 97-105
Pulling for the Team: Competition Between Political Partisans
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Psychological Science
- Vol. 7 (2) , 97-105
Pulling for the Team: Competition Between Political Partisans
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 43 (3) , 1289-1310
Altruism and Spite in Politics: How the Mind Makes Welfare Tradeoffs About Political Parties
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 43 (3) , 1289-1310
Altruism and Spite in Politics: How the Mind Makes Welfare Tradeoffs About Political Parties