Stéphane Gonzalez
Research Subjects
Stéphane Gonzalez has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aymeric Lardon
UMR Université Jean Monnet GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne 5824
4 shared publications - Michel Grabisch
Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne
3 shared publications - Philippe Solal
Université de Saint-Etienne CNRS GATE Lyon-St-Etienne UMR 5824 F-42023 Saint-Etienne France
3 shared publications - Susumu Cato
The University of Tokyo
3 shared publications - Eric Rémila
Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, France
2 shared publications - Nikolaos Pnevmatikos
Laboratoire d’Économie Mathématique et de Microéconomie Appliquée, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 25 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Aggregation Consistency in collective decision-making under uncertainty
We consider a society where agents derive utility from social alternatives, and these utilities may vary across states. Each individual is endowed with their own aggregation operator, which aggregates their utilities across states for each alternative. Aggregation Consistency requires that, if the same set of alternatives is selected for the utility profile in each state, it remains selected for the aggregated utility profile. We combine this property with standard conditions on the social choice correspondence and on individual aggregation operators. We show that Aggregation Consistency forces all individuals to have the same aggregation operator and determines both the form of this function and that of the social choice correspondence. Aggregation operators are weighted quasi-arithmetic means, while the social choice correspondence selects the alternatives maximizing a sum of transformed utilities, where the same transformation determines the quasi-arithmetic means. When weights are interpreted as probabilities, this common transformation connects individual behavior under risk with social aggregation: it determines both individual attitudes toward risk and society’s attitude toward inequality.
- 25 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAggregation Consistency in collective decision-making under uncertainty
We consider a society where agents derive utility from social alternatives, and these utilities may vary across states. Each individual is endowed with their own aggregation operator, which aggregates their utilities across states for each alternative. Aggregation Consistency requires that, if the same set of alternatives is selected for the utility profile in each state, it remains selected for the aggregated utility profile. We combine this property with standard conditions on the social choice correspondence and on individual aggregation operators. We show that Aggregation Consistency forces all individuals to have the same aggregation operator and determines both the form of this function and that of the social choice correspondence. Aggregation operators are weighted quasi-arithmetic means, while the social choice correspondence selects the alternatives maximizing a sum of transformed utilities, where the same transformation determines the quasi-arithmetic means. When weights are interpreted as probabilities, this common transformation connects individual behavior under risk with social aggregation: it determines both individual attitudes toward risk and society’s attitude toward inequality.
- Open Access
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 142
Filters in abstract aggregation with infinite sequences of signals
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 142
Open AccessFilters in abstract aggregation with infinite sequences of signals
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Conservation de la rationalité coalitionnelle en jeux coopératifs à utilité transférable
Le premier chapitre, en français, présente les principaux outils mathématiques utilisés dans le manuscrit, les résultats classiques sur la rationalité coalitionnelle pour les jeux coopératifs à utilité transférable et notamment sur le cœur et ses extensions, quelques résultats nouveaux sur le cœur k-additif et l’implémentation en équilibre de Nash fort de solutions de jeux coopératifs. Il y est synthétisé, sans démonstrations, les résultats des trois articles ainsi que quelques résultats nouveaux ou complémentaires. Les trois chapitres suivants, en anglais, correspondent aux trois articles. L’annexe A donnera en anglais les démonstrations des résultats nouveaux et non contenus dans les articles.
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Conservation de la rationalité coalitionnelle en jeux coopératifs à utilité transférable
Le premier chapitre, en français, présente les principaux outils mathématiques utilisés dans le manuscrit, les résultats classiques sur la rationalité coalitionnelle pour les jeux coopératifs à utilité transférable et notamment sur le cœur et ses extensions, quelques résultats nouveaux sur le cœur k-additif et l’implémentation en équilibre de Nash fort de solutions de jeux coopératifs. Il y est synthétisé, sans démonstrations, les résultats des trois articles ainsi que quelques résultats nouveaux ou complémentaires. Les trois chapitres suivants, en anglais, correspondent aux trois articles. L’annexe A donnera en anglais les démonstrations des résultats nouveaux et non contenus dans les articles.
- Open Access
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 1-12
Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Michel Grabisch
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 1-12
Open AccessIntroduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Michel Grabisch
- 26 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 66 (3) , 619-645
An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach
- 26 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 66 (3) , 619-645
An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach
- 23 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 393-405
Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- 23 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 393-405
Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 203 (6) , 1-20
A story of consistency: bridging the gap between Bentham and Rawls foundations
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 203 (6) , 1-20
A story of consistency: bridging the gap between Bentham and Rawls foundations
- Open Access
A Story of Consistency: Bridging the Gap between Bentham and Rawls Foundations
The axiomatic foundations of Bentham and Rawls solutions are discussed within the broader domain of cardinal preferences. It is unveiled that both solution concepts share all four of the following axioms: Nonemptiness, Anonymity, Unanimity, and Continuity. In order to fully characterize the Bentham and Rawls solutions, three variations of a consistency criterion are introduced and their compatibility with the other axioms is assessed. Each expression of consistency can be interpreted as a property of decision-making in uncertain environments.
Open AccessA Story of Consistency: Bridging the Gap between Bentham and Rawls Foundations
The axiomatic foundations of Bentham and Rawls solutions are discussed within the broader domain of cardinal preferences. It is unveiled that both solution concepts share all four of the following axioms: Nonemptiness, Anonymity, Unanimity, and Continuity. In order to fully characterize the Bentham and Rawls solutions, three variations of a consistency criterion are introduced and their compatibility with the other axioms is assessed. Each expression of consistency can be interpreted as a property of decision-making in uncertain environments.
- 26 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 52 (3) , 687-701
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
- 26 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 52 (3) , 687-701
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency
- Open Access
Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near
This paper provides the first axiomatic characterization of a class of certification methods, dubbed proportional threshold methods, that builds on consistency properties across populations and profiles of binary opinions. We then compare proportional threshold methods with the approval voting method. We formally outline the similarities and differences of these two collective decision processes and provide an axiomatic characterization of the approval voting method that, perhaps surprisingly, is closely related to the one of the proportional threshold methods.
Open AccessApproval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near
This paper provides the first axiomatic characterization of a class of certification methods, dubbed proportional threshold methods, that builds on consistency properties across populations and profiles of binary opinions. We then compare proportional threshold methods with the approval voting method. We formally outline the similarities and differences of these two collective decision processes and provide an axiomatic characterization of the approval voting method that, perhaps surprisingly, is closely related to the one of the proportional threshold methods.