Aymeric Lardon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Aymeric Lardon has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stéphane Gonzalez
University of Paris I
4 shared publications Dongshuang Hou
Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, People’s Republic of China
3 shared publications- Dongshuang Hou
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, China
2 shared publications Hao Sun
Department of Applied Mathematics Northwestern Polytechnical University
2 shared publications- Michela Chessa
Université Côte d'Azur GREDEG
2 shared publications - Nobuyuki Hanaki
Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, Osaka, Japan
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 23 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 393-405
Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- 23 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 393-405
Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- Open Access
An Endogenous Approach to the Polluted River Problem
Polluting agents situated along a river must collectively clean it to meet a minimum water quality standard. Since cleaning operations are costly, it is crucial to allocate these expenses fairly. This paper introduces the Upstream Prorata Sharing method, which endogenously assigns responsibility to each agent based on the potential costs their pollution imposes on downstream river segments. We present three distinct axiomatic characterizations grounded in different principles. First, we explore fairness properties, which address scenarios where some agents reduce their cleanup costs. Next, we examine merging properties, analyzing the implications of two agents combining into a single entity. Finally, we propose a redistribution property, which quantifies how much an agent should contribute to cleaning downstream segments.
Open AccessAn Endogenous Approach to the Polluted River Problem
Polluting agents situated along a river must collectively clean it to meet a minimum water quality standard. Since cleaning operations are costly, it is crucial to allocate these expenses fairly. This paper introduces the Upstream Prorata Sharing method, which endogenously assigns responsibility to each agent based on the potential costs their pollution imposes on downstream river segments. We present three distinct axiomatic characterizations grounded in different principles. First, we explore fairness properties, which address scenarios where some agents reduce their cleanup costs. Next, we examine merging properties, analyzing the implications of two agents combining into a single entity. Finally, we propose a redistribution property, which quantifies how much an agent should contribute to cleaning downstream segments.
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 98 (4) , 519-536
Convexity and the Shapley value of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in $\beta$-characteristic function form- 22 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 98 (4) , 519-536
Convexity and the Shapley value of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in $\beta$-characteristic function form- 29 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 93
The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value
- 29 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 93
The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 13 (2) , 589-609
An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 13 (2) , 589-609
An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 114, 28-38
Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 114, 28-38
Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Open Access
On the Internal and External Stability of Coalitions and Application to Group Purchasing Organizations
Two new notions of stability of coalitions, based on the idea of exclusion or integration of players depending on how they affect allocations, are introduced for cooperative transferable utility games. The first one, called internal stability, requires that no coalition member would find that her departure from the coalition would improve her allocation or those of all her partners. The second one, called external stability, requires that coalitions members do not wish to recruit a new partner willing to join the coalition, since her arrival would hurt some of them. As an application of these two notions, we study the stability of Group Purchasing Organizations using the Shapley value to allocate costs between buyers. Our main results suggest that, when all buyers are initially alone, while small buyers will form internally and externally stable Group Purchasing Organizations to benefit from the best price discount, big buyers will be mutually exclusive and may cooperate with only small buyers.
Open AccessOn the Internal and External Stability of Coalitions and Application to Group Purchasing Organizations
Two new notions of stability of coalitions, based on the idea of exclusion or integration of players depending on how they affect allocations, are introduced for cooperative transferable utility games. The first one, called internal stability, requires that no coalition member would find that her departure from the coalition would improve her allocation or those of all her partners. The second one, called external stability, requires that coalitions members do not wish to recruit a new partner willing to join the coalition, since her arrival would hurt some of them. As an application of these two notions, we study the stability of Group Purchasing Organizations using the Shapley value to allocate costs between buyers. Our main results suggest that, when all buyers are initially alone, while small buyers will form internally and externally stable Group Purchasing Organizations to benefit from the best price discount, big buyers will be mutually exclusive and may cooperate with only small buyers.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 186
An Optimization Characterization of the upper optimal complaint value
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 186
An Optimization Characterization of the upper optimal complaint value
- 17 September 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 87 (4) , 421-449
On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
- 17 September 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 87 (4) , 421-449
On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 287 (1) , 285-302
Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 287 (1) , 285-302
Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products