Deborah Brown
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Deborah Brown has a total of 39 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brian Key
University of Queensland
9 shared publications - Peter Ellerton
Critical Thinking Project, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, University of Queensland, Brisbane 4072, Australia
6 shared publications - Yael M. Leibovitch
The University of Queensland Critical Thinking Project, University of Queensland
3 shared publications - Claudio Mazzola
The University of Queensland
2 shared publications Oressia Zalucki
School of Biomedical Sciences, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld, Australia
2 shared publicationsAlison J. Thomson
The Roslin Institute, The University of Edinburgh, Easter Bush EH25 9RG, United Kingdom
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 65-84
Critical Thinking and Collaboration: Exploring the Ecosystems of ‘Thinking Classrooms’
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 65-84
Critical Thinking and Collaboration: Exploring the Ecosystems of ‘Thinking Classrooms’
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Police Practice and Research
- Vol. 27 (5) , 1-27
The impact of education in critical thinking on leadership in police and emergency services
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Police Practice and Research
- Vol. 27 (5) , 1-27
The impact of education in critical thinking on leadership in police and emergency services
- Open Access
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Vol. 177, 106317
How pain fools everyone: An inference to the best explanation
- 6 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Vol. 177, 106317
Open AccessHow pain fools everyone: An inference to the best explanation
- 23 January 2025
- Published by Wolters Kluwer Health in Pain
- Vol. 166 (4) , 960
Thoughts explain but do not cause pain
- 23 January 2025
- Published by Wolters Kluwer Health in Pain
- Vol. 166 (4) , 960
Thoughts explain but do not cause pain
- 4 October 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 244-256
Critical thinking
This chapter examines the importance of developing critical thinking (CT) in middle years students. The authors discuss the core principles and characteristics of CT pedagogy and explain that CT is best understood as metacognitive evaluation. The chapter introduces the schema Thinking for Thinking (T4T), a discipline-agnostic pedagogical approach that places student cognition at the centre of learning design. The authors use a non-hierarchical cognitive web model to articulate and explore the cognitive needs of middle years students. In this model, cognitions are viewed as having a more organic relationship that is context-dependent and task-specific rather than one involving sub and superordinate levels. The Golden Tetrad of cognitive skills and the Values of Inquiry (VOI) are explained and offered as planning and assessment tools for teachers and mechanisms for collaboration between students. The chapter demonstrates that middle years student benefit from engaging in cognitively rich and explicit tasks. The authors argue that a focus on critical thinking encourages teachers to construct cognitively substantive tasks and promotes collaboration and engagement in middle years students.
- 4 October 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 244-256
Critical thinking
This chapter examines the importance of developing critical thinking (CT) in middle years students. The authors discuss the core principles and characteristics of CT pedagogy and explain that CT is best understood as metacognitive evaluation. The chapter introduces the schema Thinking for Thinking (T4T), a discipline-agnostic pedagogical approach that places student cognition at the centre of learning design. The authors use a non-hierarchical cognitive web model to articulate and explore the cognitive needs of middle years students. In this model, cognitions are viewed as having a more organic relationship that is context-dependent and task-specific rather than one involving sub and superordinate levels. The Golden Tetrad of cognitive skills and the Values of Inquiry (VOI) are explained and offered as planning and assessment tools for teachers and mechanisms for collaboration between students. The chapter demonstrates that middle years student benefit from engaging in cognitively rich and explicit tasks. The authors argue that a focus on critical thinking encourages teachers to construct cognitively substantive tasks and promotes collaboration and engagement in middle years students.
- 24 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 24-37
Assessing in the Age of AI
Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has created significant challenges for education, including in primary and secondary schooling. Much of the discussion about adapting to the emergence of GenAI has been towards increasing emphasis on critical thinking. Education has long espoused the value of critical thinking. A review of the literature reveals a range of definitions and approaches that leave uncertainties about how emphasis on critical thinking will work as a means for assessing students who can use AI. This chapter explores the possibilities for the assessment of critical thinking beyond the capabilities of GenAI. We argue that some components of critical thinking are easily simulated by GenAI, particularly large language models. As such, secondary education needs to consider which components of critical thinking are important to develop as students learn to adapt to the age of AI.
- 24 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 24-37
Assessing in the Age of AI
Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has created significant challenges for education, including in primary and secondary schooling. Much of the discussion about adapting to the emergence of GenAI has been towards increasing emphasis on critical thinking. Education has long espoused the value of critical thinking. A review of the literature reveals a range of definitions and approaches that leave uncertainties about how emphasis on critical thinking will work as a means for assessing students who can use AI. This chapter explores the possibilities for the assessment of critical thinking beyond the capabilities of GenAI. We argue that some components of critical thinking are easily simulated by GenAI, particularly large language models. As such, secondary education needs to consider which components of critical thinking are important to develop as students learn to adapt to the age of AI.
- Open Access
- 19 September 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2024 (1) , niae034
Making sense of feelings
Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the ‘causal assumption’. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of motor action in neuroscience. While there is a well-known explanatory gap between neural activity and feelings, there is also a disjuncture in the reverse direction—what role, if any, do feelings play in animals if not to cause behaviour? To deny that feelings cause behaviours might thus seem to presage epiphenomenalism—the idea that subjective experiences, including feelings, are inert, emergent and, on some views, non-physical properties of brain processes. Since epiphenomenalism is antagonistic to fundamental commitments of evolutionary biology, the view developed here challenges the standard view about the function of feelings without denying that feelings have a function. Instead, we introduce the ‘sense making sense’ hypothesis—the idea that the function of subjective experience is not to cause behaviour, but to explain, in a restricted but still useful sense of ‘explanation’. A plausible framework is derived that integrates commonly accepted neural computations to blend motor control, feelings, and explanatory processes to make sense of the way feelings are integrated into our sense of how and why we do and what we do.
- 19 September 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2024 (1) , niae034
Open AccessMaking sense of feelings
Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the ‘causal assumption’. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of motor action in neuroscience. While there is a well-known explanatory gap between neural activity and feelings, there is also a disjuncture in the reverse direction—what role, if any, do feelings play in animals if not to cause behaviour? To deny that feelings cause behaviours might thus seem to presage epiphenomenalism—the idea that subjective experiences, including feelings, are inert, emergent and, on some views, non-physical properties of brain processes. Since epiphenomenalism is antagonistic to fundamental commitments of evolutionary biology, the view developed here challenges the standard view about the function of feelings without denying that feelings have a function. Instead, we introduce the ‘sense making sense’ hypothesis—the idea that the function of subjective experience is not to cause behaviour, but to explain, in a restricted but still useful sense of ‘explanation’. A plausible framework is derived that integrates commonly accepted neural computations to blend motor control, feelings, and explanatory processes to make sense of the way feelings are integrated into our sense of how and why we do and what we do.
- Open Access
- 14 September 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 8 (5) , 85
Nature, Artifice, and Discovery in Descartes’ Mechanical Philosophy
It is often assumed that in the collapse of the Aristotelian distinction between art and nature that results from the rise of mechanical philosophies in the early modern period, the collapse falls on the side of art. That is, all of the diversity among natures that was explained previously as differences among substantial forms came to be seen simply as differences in arrangements of matter according to laws instituted by the “divine artificer”, God. This paper argues that, for René Descartes, the collapse occurs on both sides. Natures are artefacts of God, and human artefacts, under some conditions, can be classified as natures or, at least, continuous within nature. Drawing on developments across both horticulture and engineering in the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as Descartes’ mechanical philosophy, this paper explores challenges to the Aristotelian nature/art distinction. The question then is what, in the advent of this collapse, are human artificers doing when they construct artefacts? Are they replicating God’s powers by creating new natures, or are they doing something else, and if so, what might that be? It is argued that we should view human invention for Descartes not as creating new natures so much as discovering them. These findings have consequences for how we interpret Descartes’ use of the term “nature” in relation to automata and other artefacts produced by human hands.
- 14 September 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 8 (5) , 85
Open AccessNature, Artifice, and Discovery in Descartes’ Mechanical Philosophy
It is often assumed that in the collapse of the Aristotelian distinction between art and nature that results from the rise of mechanical philosophies in the early modern period, the collapse falls on the side of art. That is, all of the diversity among natures that was explained previously as differences among substantial forms came to be seen simply as differences in arrangements of matter according to laws instituted by the “divine artificer”, God. This paper argues that, for René Descartes, the collapse occurs on both sides. Natures are artefacts of God, and human artefacts, under some conditions, can be classified as natures or, at least, continuous within nature. Drawing on developments across both horticulture and engineering in the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as Descartes’ mechanical philosophy, this paper explores challenges to the Aristotelian nature/art distinction. The question then is what, in the advent of this collapse, are human artificers doing when they construct artefacts? Are they replicating God’s powers by creating new natures, or are they doing something else, and if so, what might that be? It is argued that we should view human invention for Descartes not as creating new natures so much as discovering them. These findings have consequences for how we interpret Descartes’ use of the term “nature” in relation to automata and other artefacts produced by human hands.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Firenze University Press
- p. 81-99
Foundations of Human and Animal Sensory Awareness: Descartes and Willis
In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Firenze University Press
- p. 81-99
Open AccessFoundations of Human and Animal Sensory Awareness: Descartes and Willis
In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today.