NKNazim Keven

Nazim Keven

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Nazim Keven has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    What is narrativity?

    by Nazim Keven

    In recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained increasing attention. It is widely accepted that humans are storytelling creatures, that stories shape our self‐conception, and that we fail to be agents without a narrative framework. While there is less agreement on what constitutes a narrative, it is generally understood to be more than a chronological listing of life events; it is also an account of the explanatory relationships among these events—a story of how events lead to other events. However, specifying the nature of this explanatory relationship has proven difficult. As critics have pointed out, narrativists often resort to simplistic notions of narrative when faced with criticism. The concept of narrative explanation needs to be elaborated in a way that is both substantive enough to exclude trivial behaviours from being considered narratives and nonrestrictive enough to accommodate ordinary lives that may not be particularly story‐like. In this paper, I review existing accounts of narrative explanation and propose a teleological account, according to which narratives consist of goal‐directed explanations of a sequence of events. I argue that a teleological account of narrative explanation can be a fruitful way to clarify the concept of “narrative” in the context of the narrative self by addressing the most common objections.


  • Open Access

    Can episodic memory deter cheating and promote altruism?

    by Nazim Keven

    Episodic memory gives us the ability to mentally travel back in time to revisit and relive past experiences. In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the function of episodic memory. According to the orthodox view, episodic memory should be considered a part of a constructive system that simulates the future for sophisticated foresight and flexible planning. In this paper, I offer a novel alternative view. I argue that episodic memory provides invaluable information about the past behavior of others, allowing us to identify reliable and trustworthy partners while avoiding dealing with cheaters. Theoretical models demonstrate that cooperation in groups can be maintained if potential partners use information about an individual’s past behavior to guide their behavior toward that individual. In these reputation-based models of human cooperation, individuals with a history of cheating are ostracized, whereas those with a history of cooperative behavior flourish. Against this theoretical background, it is possible to see a function of episodic memory in facilitating information exchange about others, helping group members make effective partner choices, and avoiding the risk of interacting with cheaters. If correct, episodic memory may have played a significant role in the evolution of human cooperation.


  • Thought Experiments Naturalized

    by Nazim Keven

    Thought experiments have long been utilized in science and philosophy. They come in various forms, from Schrödinger's cat in physics to the Chinese room argument in philosophy. Although thought experiments are used widely, scant attention has been paid to how thought experiments actually work. In philosophy literature, it has been argued that thought experiments are a disguised form of meaning analysis. Thought experiments rely on the notion of analyticity on their basis, and therefore they should be abandoned. In this paper, I argue that if we distinguish conceivability type thought experiments commonly found in philosophy from factive thought experiments widely used in science, a viable methodological alternative can be found. I propose a set of criteria to define factive thought experiments precisely. I show how factive thought experiments can be successfully used in philosophical reasoning by giving examples, mainly from Wittgenstein's work. In this way, I argue, it is possible to naturalize thought experimentation.


  • Let's call a memory a memory, but what kind?

    by Nazim Keven

    Hoerl & McCormack argue that animals cannot represent past situations and subsume animals’ memory-like representations within a model of the world. I suggest calling these memory-like representations as what they are without beating around the bush. I refer to them as event memories and explain how they are different from episodic memory and how they can guide action in animal cognition.


  • Narrative construction is intact in episodic amnesia

    by Nazim Keven, Jake Kurczek, R. Shayna Rosenbaum, Carl F. Craver


  • Carving event and episodic memory at their joints

    by Nazim Keven

    Mahr & Csibra (M&C) argue that event and episodic memories share the same scenario construction process. I think this way of carving up the distinction throws the baby out with the bathwater. If there is a substantive difference between event and episodic memory, it is based on a difference in the construction process and how they are organized, respectively.


  • Beyond neonatal imitation: Aerodigestive stereotypies, speech development, and social interaction in the extended perinatal period

    by Nazim Keven, Kathleen A. Akins

    In our target article, we argued that the positive results of neonatal imitation are likely to be by-products of normal aerodigestive development. Our hypothesis elicited various responses on the role of social interaction in infancy, the methodological issues about imitation experiments, and the relation between the aerodigestive theory and the development of speech. Here we respond to the commentaries.


  • Neonatal imitation in context: Sensorimotor development in the perinatal period

    by Nazim Keven, Kathleen A. Akins

    More than 35 years ago, Meltzoff and Moore (1977) published their famous article, “Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates.” Their central conclusion, that neonates can imitate, was and continues to be controversial. Here, we focus on an often-neglected aspect of this debate, namely, neonatal spontaneous behaviors themselves. We present a case study of a paradigmatic orofacial “gesture,” namely tongue protrusion and retraction (TP/R). Against the background of new research on mammalian aerodigestive development, we ask: How does the human aerodigestive system develop, and what role does TP/R play in the neonate's emerging system of aerodigestion? We show that mammalian aerodigestion develops in two phases: (1) from the onset of isolated orofacial movementsin uteroto the postnatal mastery of suckling at 4 months after birth; and (2) thereafter, from preparation to the mastery of mastication and deglutition of solid foods. Like other orofacial stereotypies, TP/R emerges in the first phase and vanishes prior to the second. Based upon recent advances in activity-driven early neural development, we suggest a sequence of three developmental events in which TP/R might participate: the acquisition of tongue control, the integration of the central pattern generator (CPG) for TP/R with other aerodigestive CPGs, and the formation of connections within the cortical maps of S1 and M1. If correct, orofacial stereotypies are crucial to the maturation of aerodigestion in the neonatal period but also unlikely to co-occur with imitative behavior.


  • Moral judgment in episodic amnesia

    by Carl F. Craver, Nazim Keven, Donna Kwan, Jake Kurczek, Melissa C. Duff, R. Shayna Rosenbaum

    To investigate the role of episodic thought about the past and future in moral judgment, we administered a well‐established moral judgment battery to individuals with hippocampal damage and deficits in episodic thought (insert Greene et al. 2001). Healthy controls select deontological answers in high‐conflict moral scenarios more frequently when they vividly imagine themselves in the scenarios than when they imagine scenarios abstractly, at some personal remove. If this bias is mediated by episodic thought, individuals with deficits in episodic thought should not exhibit this effect. We report that individuals with deficits in episodic memory and future thought make moral judgments and exhibit the biasing effect of vivid, personal imaginings on moral judgment. These results strongly suggest that the biasing effect of vivid personal imagining on moral judgment is not due to episodic thought about the past and future.


  • Events, narratives and memory

    by Nazim Keven