Carl F. Craver
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Carl F. Craver has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mark Povich
University of Rochester
3 shared publications - Kenneth S. Kendler
Virginia Institute for Psychiatric and Behavioral Genetics, Department of Psychiatry Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond Virginia USA
2 shared publications - Mark Reimers
Quantitative Health Sciences and Engineering Michigan State University East Lansing Michigan USA
2 shared publications - Mikhail G. Dozmorov
Department of Biostatistics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, 23298, USA
2 shared publications - Stuart Glennan
Butler University, Indianapolis, USA
2 shared publications - David Michael Kaplan
School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (4) , 1-12
Defending levels by trading waves for trees
- 27 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (4) , 1-12
Defending levels by trading waves for trees
- Open Access
- 11 April 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (1) , 132-150
Phenomenological Laws and Mechanistic Explanations
In light of recent criticisms by Woodward (2017) and Rescorla (2018), we examine the relationship between mechanistic explanation and phenomenological laws. We disambiguate several uses of the phrase “phenomenological law” and show how a mechanistic theory of explanation sorts them into those that are and are not explanatory. We also distinguish the problem of phenomenological laws from arguments about the explanatory power of purely phenomenal models, showing that Woodward and Rescorla conflate these problems. Finally, we argue that the temptation to pit mechanistic and interventionist theories of explanation against one another occludes important and scientifically relevant research questions.
- 11 April 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (1) , 132-150
Open AccessPhenomenological Laws and Mechanistic Explanations
In light of recent criticisms by Woodward (2017) and Rescorla (2018), we examine the relationship between mechanistic explanation and phenomenological laws. We disambiguate several uses of the phrase “phenomenological law” and show how a mechanistic theory of explanation sorts them into those that are and are not explanatory. We also distinguish the problem of phenomenological laws from arguments about the explanatory power of purely phenomenal models, showing that Woodward and Rescorla conflate these problems. Finally, we argue that the temptation to pit mechanistic and interventionist theories of explanation against one another occludes important and scientifically relevant research questions.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (5) , 1-22
Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: three foundational problems
The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicit the same capacity. To address thisoperationalization problem, scientists often assess whether the tasks engage the same neural mechanisms. But to determine whether mechanisms are of the same or different kinds, we need to solve theabstraction problemby determining which mechanistic differences are and are not relevant, and also theboundary problemby distinguishing the mechanism from its background conditions. Solving these problems, in turn, requires understanding how cognitive capacities are elicited in tasks. These three problems, which have been noted and discussed elsewhere in the literature, together form a ‘cycle of kinds’ that frames the central problem-space of cognitive ontology. We describe this cycle to clarify the intellectual challenges facing the cognitive ontologist and to reveal the kind of iterative process by which ontological revision in cognitive neuroscience is likely to unfold.
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (5) , 1-22
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessCognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: three foundational problems
The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicit the same capacity. To address thisoperationalization problem, scientists often assess whether the tasks engage the same neural mechanisms. But to determine whether mechanisms are of the same or different kinds, we need to solve theabstraction problemby determining which mechanistic differences are and are not relevant, and also theboundary problemby distinguishing the mechanism from its background conditions. Solving these problems, in turn, requires understanding how cognitive capacities are elicited in tasks. These three problems, which have been noted and discussed elsewhere in the literature, together form a ‘cycle of kinds’ that frames the central problem-space of cognitive ontology. We describe this cycle to clarify the intellectual challenges facing the cognitive ontologist and to reveal the kind of iterative process by which ontological revision in cognitive neuroscience is likely to unfold.
- 9 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8829
Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 9 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8829
Correction to: Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- Top Cited Papers
- 7 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8807-8828
Constitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 7 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 8807-8828
Top Cited PapersConstitutive relevance & mutual manipulability revisited
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 87 (5) , 1084-1095
Gloomy Prospects and Roller Coasters: Finding Coherence in Genome-Wide Association Studies
We address Turkheimer’s argument that genome-wide association studies of behaviors and psychiatric traits will fail to produce coherent explanations. We distinguish two major sources of potential incoherence (heterogeneity and complexity), showing how they independently threaten coherence and considering how they are being and might better be addressed with protein and other databases and network tools.
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 87 (5) , 1084-1095
Gloomy Prospects and Roller Coasters: Finding Coherence in Genome-Wide Association Studies
We address Turkheimer’s argument that genome-wide association studies of behaviors and psychiatric traits will fail to produce coherent explanations. We distinguish two major sources of potential incoherence (heterogeneity and complexity), showing how they independently threaten coherence and considering how they are being and might better be addressed with protein and other databases and network tools.
- Open Access
- 21 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Bioinformatics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 1-19
A method for estimating coherence of molecular mechanisms in major human disease and traits
Background: Phenotypes such as height and intelligence, are thought to be a product of the collective effects of multiple phenotype-associated genes and interactions among their protein products. High/low degree of interactions is suggestive of coherent/random molecular mechanisms, respectively. Comparing the degree of interactions may help to better understand the coherence of phenotype-specific molecular mechanisms and the potential for therapeutic intervention. However, direct comparison of the degree of interactions is difficult due to different sizes and configurations of phenotype-associated gene networks. Methods: We introduce a metric for measuring coherence of molecular-interaction networks as a slope of internal versus external distributions of the degree of interactions. The internal degree distribution is defined by interaction counts within a phenotype-specific gene network, while the external degree distribution counts interactions with other genes in the whole protein–protein interaction (PPI) network. We present a novel method for normalizing the coherence estimates, making them directly comparable. Results: Using STRING and BioGrid PPI databases, we compared the coherence of 116 phenotype-associated gene sets from GWAScatalog against size-matched KEGG pathways (the reference for high coherence) and random networks (the lower limit of coherence). We observed a range of coherence estimates for each category of phenotypes. Metabolic traits and diseases were the most coherent, while psychiatric disorders and intelligence-related traits were the least coherent. We demonstrate that coherence and modularity measures capture distinct network properties. Conclusions: We present a general-purpose method for estimating and comparing the coherence of molecular-interaction gene networks that accounts for the network size and shape differences. Our results highlight gaps in our current knowledge of genetics and molecular mechanisms of complex phenotypes and suggest priorities for future GWASs.
- 21 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Bioinformatics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 1-19
Open AccessA method for estimating coherence of molecular mechanisms in major human disease and traits
Background: Phenotypes such as height and intelligence, are thought to be a product of the collective effects of multiple phenotype-associated genes and interactions among their protein products. High/low degree of interactions is suggestive of coherent/random molecular mechanisms, respectively. Comparing the degree of interactions may help to better understand the coherence of phenotype-specific molecular mechanisms and the potential for therapeutic intervention. However, direct comparison of the degree of interactions is difficult due to different sizes and configurations of phenotype-associated gene networks. Methods: We introduce a metric for measuring coherence of molecular-interaction networks as a slope of internal versus external distributions of the degree of interactions. The internal degree distribution is defined by interaction counts within a phenotype-specific gene network, while the external degree distribution counts interactions with other genes in the whole protein–protein interaction (PPI) network. We present a novel method for normalizing the coherence estimates, making them directly comparable. Results: Using STRING and BioGrid PPI databases, we compared the coherence of 116 phenotype-associated gene sets from GWAScatalog against size-matched KEGG pathways (the reference for high coherence) and random networks (the lower limit of coherence). We observed a range of coherence estimates for each category of phenotypes. Metabolic traits and diseases were the most coherent, while psychiatric disorders and intelligence-related traits were the least coherent. We demonstrate that coherence and modularity measures capture distinct network properties. Conclusions: We present a general-purpose method for estimating and comparing the coherence of molecular-interaction gene networks that accounts for the network size and shape differences. Our results highlight gaps in our current knowledge of genetics and molecular mechanisms of complex phenotypes and suggest priorities for future GWASs.
- 11 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 11 (2) , 261-281
Remembering: Epistemic and Empirical
- 11 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 11 (2) , 261-281
Remembering: Epistemic and Empirical
- Open Access
- 19 February 2018
- Published by Front Matter
Stuart Glennan, The New Mechanical Philosophy
Next Home Previous The New Mechanical Philosophy Stuart Glennan Reviewed by Carl F. Craver The New Mechanical Philosophy Stuart Glennan Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, £30.00 ISBN 9780198779711 The New Mechanical Philosophy is Stuart Glennan's most comprehensive treatment of the philosophical worldview he championed well before his audacious title had a
- 19 February 2018
- Published by Front Matter
Open AccessStuart Glennan, The New Mechanical Philosophy
Next Home Previous The New Mechanical Philosophy Stuart Glennan Reviewed by Carl F. Craver The New Mechanical Philosophy Stuart Glennan Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, £30.00 ISBN 9780198779711 The New Mechanical Philosophy is Stuart Glennan's most comprehensive treatment of the philosophical worldview he championed well before his audacious title had a