Claudia Bianchi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Claudia Bianchi has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Matteo Motterlini
University of Milano-Bicocca Italy
3 shared publications Nicla Vassallo
University of Genova, Department of Philosophy, via Balbi 4, I-16126 Genova
2 shared publicationsSimone Mattavelli
2 shared publications- Bianca Cepollaro
Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy
1 shared publication - Federico Cella
LOGOS, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
1 shared publication - Kristan A. Marchak
University of Alberta, Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 December 2024
- Published by Helsinki University Press
- p. 27-54
Call me by my name: Hate speech and identity
The aim of this chapter is to examine social labels not only as tools of description of social identity but also as means of construction of our and other people’s identities. I will endorse an Austinian, performative perspective on social labels, and focus on a particularly hateful kind of labels, namely slurs. Rather than analysing what slurs mean or say, I will devote my attention to what speakers do with slurs—and to the different kinds of speech acts that they allow speakers to perform. Firstly, I will characterise how standard, derogatory uses of slurs contribute to shaping toxic and harmful identities for both their targets and their speakers, as well as their non-targeted addressees. Secondly, I will show how appropriated, non-derogatory uses of slurs can help to constitute positive identities for targets, setting the boundaries of groups and communities. While slurs reinforce oppressive social norms and hierarchies, and may even legitimate discriminatory actions against targets, appropriation is a way to disrupt such unfair norms and hierarchies, to subvert the subordinate position imposed on targets, and to reclaim strong, positive, proud identities. From this perspective, language is a powerful tool of exclusion, oppression, and discrimination—but, hopefully, also of inclusion, emancipation, and self-determination.
- 19 December 2024
- Published by Helsinki University Press
- p. 27-54
Open AccessCall me by my name: Hate speech and identity
The aim of this chapter is to examine social labels not only as tools of description of social identity but also as means of construction of our and other people’s identities. I will endorse an Austinian, performative perspective on social labels, and focus on a particularly hateful kind of labels, namely slurs. Rather than analysing what slurs mean or say, I will devote my attention to what speakers do with slurs—and to the different kinds of speech acts that they allow speakers to perform. Firstly, I will characterise how standard, derogatory uses of slurs contribute to shaping toxic and harmful identities for both their targets and their speakers, as well as their non-targeted addressees. Secondly, I will show how appropriated, non-derogatory uses of slurs can help to constitute positive identities for targets, setting the boundaries of groups and communities. While slurs reinforce oppressive social norms and hierarchies, and may even legitimate discriminatory actions against targets, appropriation is a way to disrupt such unfair norms and hierarchies, to subvert the subordinate position imposed on targets, and to reclaim strong, positive, proud identities. From this perspective, language is a powerful tool of exclusion, oppression, and discrimination—but, hopefully, also of inclusion, emancipation, and self-determination.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in International Review of Social Psychology
- Vol. 37 (1) , 14
True and Moral by Repetition: Unveiling the Impact of Exposure on Positive Stereotypes Perception
Despite their apparent benevolence, positive stereotypes have negative effects on person and group perception. However, little is known about how exposure can intensify these negative consequences. In two pre-registered experiments (total N = 240) we investigated the effect of exposure on believability and moral condemnation of positive stereotypes. In Experiment 1, participants rated the truth value of positive stereotypes, which were either previously encountered or not during an exposure phase. Repeated positive stereotypes were perceived as more true than unrepeated ones, indicating a truth effect. In Experiment 2, we replicated the truth effect and further found that exposure to stereotypes reduced their moral condemnation, indicating a moral-repetition effect. Extending the truth effect and moral-repetition effect research to positive stereotypes, our findings emphasize the need to raise awareness of the impact of exposure on reinforcing the believability and moral condemnation of stereotypical beliefs.
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in International Review of Social Psychology
- Vol. 37 (1) , 14
Open AccessTrue and Moral by Repetition: Unveiling the Impact of Exposure on Positive Stereotypes Perception
Despite their apparent benevolence, positive stereotypes have negative effects on person and group perception. However, little is known about how exposure can intensify these negative consequences. In two pre-registered experiments (total N = 240) we investigated the effect of exposure on believability and moral condemnation of positive stereotypes. In Experiment 1, participants rated the truth value of positive stereotypes, which were either previously encountered or not during an exposure phase. Repeated positive stereotypes were perceived as more true than unrepeated ones, indicating a truth effect. In Experiment 2, we replicated the truth effect and further found that exposure to stereotypes reduced their moral condemnation, indicating a moral-repetition effect. Extending the truth effect and moral-repetition effect research to positive stereotypes, our findings emphasize the need to raise awareness of the impact of exposure on reinforcing the believability and moral condemnation of stereotypical beliefs.
- Open Access
- 19 August 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
True and Moral by Repetition: Unveiling the impact of prior exposure on positive stereotypes perception
Despite their apparent benevolence, positive stereotypes have been shown to have negative effects in person and group perception. However, little is known about how exposure can exacerbate these negative consequences. In two pre-registered experiments (total N = 240) we investigated the effect of exposure on believability and moral condemnation of positive stereotypes. In Experiment 1, participants rated the truth value of positive stereotypes, which were either previously encountered or not during an exposure phase. Repeated positive stereotypes were perceived as more true than unrepeated ones, indicating a truth effect. In Experiment 2 we replicated the truth effect and further found that exposure to stereotypes reduced their moral condemnation, indicating a moral-repetition effect. Extending the truth effect and moral-repetition effect research to positive stereotypes, our findings emphasize the need to raise awareness of the impact of exposure on reinforcing the believability and moral condemnation of stereotypical beliefs.
- 19 August 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessTrue and Moral by Repetition: Unveiling the impact of prior exposure on positive stereotypes perception
Despite their apparent benevolence, positive stereotypes have been shown to have negative effects in person and group perception. However, little is known about how exposure can exacerbate these negative consequences. In two pre-registered experiments (total N = 240) we investigated the effect of exposure on believability and moral condemnation of positive stereotypes. In Experiment 1, participants rated the truth value of positive stereotypes, which were either previously encountered or not during an exposure phase. Repeated positive stereotypes were perceived as more true than unrepeated ones, indicating a truth effect. In Experiment 2 we replicated the truth effect and further found that exposure to stereotypes reduced their moral condemnation, indicating a moral-repetition effect. Extending the truth effect and moral-repetition effect research to positive stereotypes, our findings emphasize the need to raise awareness of the impact of exposure on reinforcing the believability and moral condemnation of stereotypical beliefs.
- Open Access
- 16 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
“Questioning” the Truth Effect: Processing information in interrogative form reduces (but does not cancel) repetition-induced truth
People attribute higher truth to statements they have previously been exposed to, as compared to new ones. This “truth effect” is pervasive and resistant to many interventions aimed to reduce it. In two pre-registered experiments, we explored whether processing unknown information in an interrogative form can contrast repetition-induced truth. In Experiment 1 (N=100), participants judged the truth value of both repeated and unrepeated sentences. For half of the participants, sentences appeared in a declarative form; for the other half, sentences appeared in an interrogative form, both at exposure and at judgment. Whereas in the declarative condition participants showed the classic truth effect, the effect was not significant in the interrogative condition. In Experiment 2 (N=325), an additional interrogative condition was introduced whereby sentences were presented to participants as questions at exposure, but not at judgment. Compared to the declarative condition, the truth effect was reduced, but still significant, in the two interrogative conditions. Moreover, comparing the two interrogative conditions showed that the truth effect was smaller when sentences were presented as questions only in the exposure phase. We discuss the potential explanations for the impact of questioning on the truth effect, as well as the implications for debiasing strategies.
- 16 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open Access“Questioning” the Truth Effect: Processing information in interrogative form reduces (but does not cancel) repetition-induced truth
People attribute higher truth to statements they have previously been exposed to, as compared to new ones. This “truth effect” is pervasive and resistant to many interventions aimed to reduce it. In two pre-registered experiments, we explored whether processing unknown information in an interrogative form can contrast repetition-induced truth. In Experiment 1 (N=100), participants judged the truth value of both repeated and unrepeated sentences. For half of the participants, sentences appeared in a declarative form; for the other half, sentences appeared in an interrogative form, both at exposure and at judgment. Whereas in the declarative condition participants showed the classic truth effect, the effect was not significant in the interrogative condition. In Experiment 2 (N=325), an additional interrogative condition was introduced whereby sentences were presented to participants as questions at exposure, but not at judgment. Compared to the declarative condition, the truth effect was reduced, but still significant, in the two interrogative conditions. Moreover, comparing the two interrogative conditions showed that the truth effect was smaller when sentences were presented as questions only in the exposure phase. We discuss the potential explanations for the impact of questioning on the truth effect, as well as the implications for debiasing strategies.
- Open Access
- 8 December 2022
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 46 (12)
Generic Language for Social and Animal Kinds: An Examination of the Asymmetry Between Acceptance and Inferences
Generics (e.g., “Ravens are black”) express generalizations about categories or their members. Previous research found that generics about animals are interpreted as broadly true of members of a kind, yet also accepted based on minimal evidence. This asymmetry is important for suggesting a mechanism by which unfounded generalizations may flourish; yet, little is known whether this finding extends to generics about groups of people (heretofore, “social generics”). Accordingly, in four preregistered studies (n = 665), we tested for an inferential asymmetry for generics regarding novel groups of animals versus people. Participants were randomly assigned to either an Implied Prevalence task (given a generic, asked to estimate the prevalence of a property) or a Truth‐Conditions task (given prevalence information, asked whether a generic was true or false). A generic asymmetry was found in both domains, at equivalent levels. The asymmetry also extended to properties varying in valence (dangerous and neutral). Finally, there were differences as a function of property valence in the Implied Prevalence task and a small but consistent interaction between domain and prevalence in the Truth‐Conditions task. We discuss the implications of these results for the semantics of generics, theoretical accounts of the asymmetry, and the relation between generics and stereotyping.
- 8 December 2022
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 46 (12)
Open AccessGeneric Language for Social and Animal Kinds: An Examination of the Asymmetry Between Acceptance and Inferences
Generics (e.g., “Ravens are black”) express generalizations about categories or their members. Previous research found that generics about animals are interpreted as broadly true of members of a kind, yet also accepted based on minimal evidence. This asymmetry is important for suggesting a mechanism by which unfounded generalizations may flourish; yet, little is known whether this finding extends to generics about groups of people (heretofore, “social generics”). Accordingly, in four preregistered studies (n = 665), we tested for an inferential asymmetry for generics regarding novel groups of animals versus people. Participants were randomly assigned to either an Implied Prevalence task (given a generic, asked to estimate the prevalence of a property) or a Truth‐Conditions task (given prevalence information, asked whether a generic was true or false). A generic asymmetry was found in both domains, at equivalent levels. The asymmetry also extended to properties varying in valence (dangerous and neutral). Finally, there were differences as a function of property valence in the Implied Prevalence task and a small but consistent interaction between domain and prevalence in the Truth‐Conditions task. We discuss the implications of these results for the semantics of generics, theoretical accounts of the asymmetry, and the relation between generics and stereotyping.
- 5 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 40 (1) , 181-190
Discursive Injustice: The Role of Uptake
- 5 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 40 (1) , 181-190
Discursive Injustice: The Role of Uptake
- 12 September 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Grazer Philosophische Studien
- Vol. 96 (3) , 401-418
Asymmetrical Conversations
According to Mitchell Green, speech act theory traditionally idealizes away from crucial aspects of conversational contexts, including those in which the speaker’s social position affects the possibility of her performing certain speech acts. In recent times, asymmetries in communicative situations have become a lively object of study for linguists, philosophers of language and moral philosophers: several scholars view hate speech itself in terms of speech acts, namely acts of subordination (acts establishing or reinforcing unfair hierarchies). The aim of this paper is to address one of the main objections to accounts of hate speech in terms of illocutionary speech acts, that is the Authority Problem. While the social role of the speaker is the focus of several approaches (Langton 2018a, 2018b; Maitra 2012; Kukla 2014; Green 2014, 2017a, 2017b), the social role of the audience has too often been neglected. The author will show that not only must the speaker have a certain kind of standing or social position in order to perform speech acts of subordination, but also the audience must typically have a certain kind of standing or social position in order to either license or object to the speaker’s authority, and her acts of subordination.
- 12 September 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Grazer Philosophische Studien
- Vol. 96 (3) , 401-418
Asymmetrical Conversations
According to Mitchell Green, speech act theory traditionally idealizes away from crucial aspects of conversational contexts, including those in which the speaker’s social position affects the possibility of her performing certain speech acts. In recent times, asymmetries in communicative situations have become a lively object of study for linguists, philosophers of language and moral philosophers: several scholars view hate speech itself in terms of speech acts, namely acts of subordination (acts establishing or reinforcing unfair hierarchies). The aim of this paper is to address one of the main objections to accounts of hate speech in terms of illocutionary speech acts, that is the Authority Problem. While the social role of the speaker is the focus of several approaches (Langton 2018a, 2018b; Maitra 2012; Kukla 2014; Green 2014, 2017a, 2017b), the social role of the audience has too often been neglected. The author will show that not only must the speaker have a certain kind of standing or social position in order to perform speech acts of subordination, but also the audience must typically have a certain kind of standing or social position in order to either license or object to the speaker’s authority, and her acts of subordination.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Pragmatics
- Vol. 146, 32-42
How bad is it to report a slur? An empirical investigation
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Pragmatics
- Vol. 146, 32-42
How bad is it to report a slur? An empirical investigation
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Perspectives and Slurs
In discussing figurative speech, Lepore and Stone argue that metaphorical interpretation involves a process of perspective taking: metaphor invites us to organize our thinking about something through an analogical correspondence with something it is not. According to them, the same applies to slurs: some words come with an invitation to take a certain perspective, and uses of slurs are associated with ways of thinking about their targets that can harm people. My aim is to critically evaluate such a proposal, within a speech-acts framework. In the recent literature on hate speech, utterances containing slurs are conceived as speech acts in two distinct senses: 1. as perlocutionary acts that cause harm to their targets; 2. as illocutionary acts that constitute harm towards their targets. I will claim that Lepore and Stone’s proposal can be understood both in perlocutionary and illocutionary terms, and argue in favor of an illocutionary approach.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Perspectives and Slurs
In discussing figurative speech, Lepore and Stone argue that metaphorical interpretation involves a process of perspective taking: metaphor invites us to organize our thinking about something through an analogical correspondence with something it is not. According to them, the same applies to slurs: some words come with an invitation to take a certain perspective, and uses of slurs are associated with ways of thinking about their targets that can harm people. My aim is to critically evaluate such a proposal, within a speech-acts framework. In the recent literature on hate speech, utterances containing slurs are conceived as speech acts in two distinct senses: 1. as perlocutionary acts that cause harm to their targets; 2. as illocutionary acts that constitute harm towards their targets. I will claim that Lepore and Stone’s proposal can be understood both in perlocutionary and illocutionary terms, and argue in favor of an illocutionary approach.