Federico Cella
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Federico Cella has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kristan A. Marchak
University of Alberta, Canada
2 shared publications - Camilla Borgna
University of Turin
1 shared publication Claudia Bianchi
1 shared publication- Claudia Bianchi
University Vita-Salute San Raffaele
1 shared publication - Mara Floris
Facoltà Di Filosofia, Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy
1 shared publication Susan A. Gelman
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 17 (1) , 275-299
Who’s the Surgeon? Cognitive Implications of Gendered Language
- 7 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 17 (1) , 275-299
Open AccessWho’s the Surgeon? Cognitive Implications of Gendered Language
- Open Access
- 31 October 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Commentary: The role of impact on the meaning of generic sentences
Mirabile et al. (2024) provide evidence that property valence—i.e., the perceived dangerousness of the ascribed properties—affects the endorsement of generics, an effect we did not observe (Cella et al., 2022). To address this difference, Mirabile et al. re-analyzed our Study 3a data, including the responses from a sample of participants we excluded, questioning the rationale for their exclusion. They further used a Bayesian framework and suggested that the frequentist models we used cannot provide stable estimates for the parameters. This commentary addresses Mirabile et al.’s concerns regarding our methodology. We first discuss our recruitment for Study 3a; we then focus on concerns about our statistical models.
- 31 October 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessCommentary: The role of impact on the meaning of generic sentences
Mirabile et al. (2024) provide evidence that property valence—i.e., the perceived dangerousness of the ascribed properties—affects the endorsement of generics, an effect we did not observe (Cella et al., 2022). To address this difference, Mirabile et al. re-analyzed our Study 3a data, including the responses from a sample of participants we excluded, questioning the rationale for their exclusion. They further used a Bayesian framework and suggested that the frequentist models we used cannot provide stable estimates for the parameters. This commentary addresses Mirabile et al.’s concerns regarding our methodology. We first discuss our recruitment for Study 3a; we then focus on concerns about our statistical models.
- Open Access
- 8 December 2022
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 46 (12)
Generic Language for Social and Animal Kinds: An Examination of the Asymmetry Between Acceptance and Inferences
Generics (e.g., “Ravens are black”) express generalizations about categories or their members. Previous research found that generics about animals are interpreted as broadly true of members of a kind, yet also accepted based on minimal evidence. This asymmetry is important for suggesting a mechanism by which unfounded generalizations may flourish; yet, little is known whether this finding extends to generics about groups of people (heretofore, “social generics”). Accordingly, in four preregistered studies (n = 665), we tested for an inferential asymmetry for generics regarding novel groups of animals versus people. Participants were randomly assigned to either an Implied Prevalence task (given a generic, asked to estimate the prevalence of a property) or a Truth‐Conditions task (given prevalence information, asked whether a generic was true or false). A generic asymmetry was found in both domains, at equivalent levels. The asymmetry also extended to properties varying in valence (dangerous and neutral). Finally, there were differences as a function of property valence in the Implied Prevalence task and a small but consistent interaction between domain and prevalence in the Truth‐Conditions task. We discuss the implications of these results for the semantics of generics, theoretical accounts of the asymmetry, and the relation between generics and stereotyping.
- 8 December 2022
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 46 (12)
Open AccessGeneric Language for Social and Animal Kinds: An Examination of the Asymmetry Between Acceptance and Inferences
Generics (e.g., “Ravens are black”) express generalizations about categories or their members. Previous research found that generics about animals are interpreted as broadly true of members of a kind, yet also accepted based on minimal evidence. This asymmetry is important for suggesting a mechanism by which unfounded generalizations may flourish; yet, little is known whether this finding extends to generics about groups of people (heretofore, “social generics”). Accordingly, in four preregistered studies (n = 665), we tested for an inferential asymmetry for generics regarding novel groups of animals versus people. Participants were randomly assigned to either an Implied Prevalence task (given a generic, asked to estimate the prevalence of a property) or a Truth‐Conditions task (given prevalence information, asked whether a generic was true or false). A generic asymmetry was found in both domains, at equivalent levels. The asymmetry also extended to properties varying in valence (dangerous and neutral). Finally, there were differences as a function of property valence in the Implied Prevalence task and a small but consistent interaction between domain and prevalence in the Truth‐Conditions task. We discuss the implications of these results for the semantics of generics, theoretical accounts of the asymmetry, and the relation between generics and stereotyping.