Rüdiger Pethig
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Rüdiger Pethig has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Thomas Eichner
FernUniversität in Hagen
23 shared publications- Thomas Eichner
Department of Economics, University of Hagen, Hagen, Germany
14 shared publications - Thomas Eichner
University of Siegen
5 shared publications Thomas Christiaans
4 shared publications- Thomas Eichner
University of Siegen Department of Economics Hoelderlinstr. 3 D‐57068 Siegen, Germany
4 shared publications Andreas Wagener
Leibniz Universität Hannover - Economics and Business Administration Area; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 89 (3) , 18
How Important are IEAs for Mitigation if Countries are of the Homo Moralis Type?
We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull, Econometrica 81, 2013, Alger and Weibull, Games Econom Behav 98, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material welfare obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined probability. They are assumed to act morally w.r.t. both membership and emissions. We investigate the interaction and impact of that moral behavior on coalition formation and material welfare. The membership morality tends to increase while the emissions morality tends to decrease the coalition size, but the outcome is not smoothly determined by these opposite forces.
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 89 (3) , 18
Open AccessHow Important are IEAs for Mitigation if Countries are of the Homo Moralis Type?
We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull, Econometrica 81, 2013, Alger and Weibull, Games Econom Behav 98, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material welfare obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined probability. They are assumed to act morally w.r.t. both membership and emissions. We investigate the interaction and impact of that moral behavior on coalition formation and material welfare. The membership morality tends to increase while the emissions morality tends to decrease the coalition size, but the outcome is not smoothly determined by these opposite forces.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Mohr Siebeck
Zur Theorie der Transaktionen
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Mohr Siebeck
Umweltökonomische Allokatıon mit Emissionssteuern
- Open Access
- 24 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 80 (2) , 379-407
Unilateral Phase-Out of Coal to Power in an Emissions Trading Scheme
We investigate the displacement effects of unilateral phase-out-of-coal policies in a stylized two-country model with coal- and gas-fired electricity generation in an international emissions trading scheme. In the basic policy scenario, electricity markets are national and one country bans coal while the emissions cap remains unchanged. The allocative displacement effects are strongly asymmetric: the coal-banning country suffers a welfare loss, the other country is better off, and aggregate welfare declines. Furthermore, the permit price decreases, while the electricity price rises in the unilaterally acting country and declines in the other country. If all countries would phase out coal, the effects would be symmetric and all countries would lose. We then extend the analysis to the cases (i) when the unilateral coal ban is combined with a moderate cut of the emissions cap (as recently suggested in an EU Directive) and (ii) when we allow for international trade in electricity. Compared to the basic unilateral policy, in these cases, the total welfare costs tend to be smaller and some tend to be shifted from the unilaterally acting country to the other one.
- 24 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 80 (2) , 379-407
Open AccessUnilateral Phase-Out of Coal to Power in an Emissions Trading Scheme
We investigate the displacement effects of unilateral phase-out-of-coal policies in a stylized two-country model with coal- and gas-fired electricity generation in an international emissions trading scheme. In the basic policy scenario, electricity markets are national and one country bans coal while the emissions cap remains unchanged. The allocative displacement effects are strongly asymmetric: the coal-banning country suffers a welfare loss, the other country is better off, and aggregate welfare declines. Furthermore, the permit price decreases, while the electricity price rises in the unilaterally acting country and declines in the other country. If all countries would phase out coal, the effects would be symmetric and all countries would lose. We then extend the analysis to the cases (i) when the unilateral coal ban is combined with a moderate cut of the emissions cap (as recently suggested in an EU Directive) and (ii) when we allow for international trade in electricity. Compared to the basic unilateral policy, in these cases, the total welfare costs tend to be smaller and some tend to be shifted from the unilaterally acting country to the other one.
- 24 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 27 (5) , 1108-1147
Kant–Nash tax competition
- 24 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 27 (5) , 1108-1147
Kant–Nash tax competition
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Kantians Defy the Economists’ Mantra of Uniform Pigovian Emissions Taxes
This paper analyzes the efficient emissions taxation in economies with individuals who are morally motivated to reduce their emissions footprint. They are heterogenous with respect to their morality and their consumption preferences. We distinguish between the concepts of moral and conventional utilitarian (= material) welfare. The materially efficient tax rates turn out to be consumer-type specific; they are smaller than the Pigovian tax rate; and the smaller, the higher the individuals’ propensity to act morally. Finally, we briefly characterize the second-best uniform emissions tax.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessKantians Defy the Economists’ Mantra of Uniform Pigovian Emissions Taxes
This paper analyzes the efficient emissions taxation in economies with individuals who are morally motivated to reduce their emissions footprint. They are heterogenous with respect to their morality and their consumption preferences. We distinguish between the concepts of moral and conventional utilitarian (= material) welfare. The materially efficient tax rates turn out to be consumer-type specific; they are smaller than the Pigovian tax rate; and the smaller, the higher the individuals’ propensity to act morally. Finally, we briefly characterize the second-best uniform emissions tax.
- 25 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 74 (1) , 397-420
Supply-Side Climate Policy: On the Role of Exploration and Asymmetric Information
- 25 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 74 (1) , 397-420
Supply-Side Climate Policy: On the Role of Exploration and Asymmetric Information
- 7 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 153, 43-55
Self-enforcing Biodiversity Agreements with Financial Support from North to South
- 7 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 153, 43-55
Self-enforcing Biodiversity Agreements with Financial Support from North to South
- 20 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences
- Vol. 11 (2) , 157-166
Environmental standards in a large open economy revisited
- 20 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences
- Vol. 11 (2) , 157-166
Environmental standards in a large open economy revisited
- 5 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 72 (3) , 875-876
Correction to: Coaseian Biodiversity Conservation and Market Power
- 5 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 72 (3) , 875-876
Correction to: Coaseian Biodiversity Conservation and Market Power