Thomas Eichner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Thomas Eichner has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rüdiger Pethig
Department of Economics, University of Siegen, Siegen, Germany
14 shared publications Rüdiger Pethig
University of Siegen DE‐57072 Siegen Germany
5 shared publications- Andreas Wagener
University of Hannover
3 shared publications - Mark Schopf
Department of Economics, University of Hagen, Hagen, Germany
2 shared publications - Daniel Weinreich
University of Hagen
1 shared publication - Marco Runkel
Faculty of Economics and Management, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- p. 1-32
Moral behavior and polarization
An individual that follows partial Kantian universalization polarizes and overdraws its strategy in order to compensate for those individuals that she thinks do not choose the same strategy as she does. Within a generalized Alger-Weibull approach with heterogenous homo moralis individuals, the present paper is the first to formalize this polarization incentive. We show that the polarization incentive can be drawn back to an implicit and so far unknown ’preference for dominance’. Applying our new insights to a public good game it turns out that total public good provision may be reduced by an increase in the degree of morality.
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- p. 1-32
Open AccessMoral behavior and polarization
An individual that follows partial Kantian universalization polarizes and overdraws its strategy in order to compensate for those individuals that she thinks do not choose the same strategy as she does. Within a generalized Alger-Weibull approach with heterogenous homo moralis individuals, the present paper is the first to formalize this polarization incentive. We show that the polarization incentive can be drawn back to an implicit and so far unknown ’preference for dominance’. Applying our new insights to a public good game it turns out that total public good provision may be reduced by an increase in the degree of morality.
- Open Access
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 89 (3) , 18
How Important are IEAs for Mitigation if Countries are of the Homo Moralis Type?
We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull, Econometrica 81, 2013, Alger and Weibull, Games Econom Behav 98, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material welfare obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined probability. They are assumed to act morally w.r.t. both membership and emissions. We investigate the interaction and impact of that moral behavior on coalition formation and material welfare. The membership morality tends to increase while the emissions morality tends to decrease the coalition size, but the outcome is not smoothly determined by these opposite forces.
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 89 (3) , 18
Open AccessHow Important are IEAs for Mitigation if Countries are of the Homo Moralis Type?
We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull, Econometrica 81, 2013, Alger and Weibull, Games Econom Behav 98, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material welfare obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined probability. They are assumed to act morally w.r.t. both membership and emissions. We investigate the interaction and impact of that moral behavior on coalition formation and material welfare. The membership morality tends to increase while the emissions morality tends to decrease the coalition size, but the outcome is not smoothly determined by these opposite forces.
- Open Access
- 9 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 88 (2) , 249-278
Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements with the Optimal Intensity of Cooperation
This paper analyzes international environmental agreements in three-stage games consisting of a membership subgame, the signatories’ decision on the intensity of cooperation, and an emissions subgame. Signatories may act as Stackelberg leaders or play Nash. In the Stackelberg game, the highest intensity of cooperation between signatories is optimal. In the Nash game, a moderate or the highest intensity of cooperation is optimal if emissions are strategic substitutes. In this case the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Nash game with optimal cooperation intensity are identical to the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Stackelberg game with the highest cooperation intensity. Finally, we apply our results to coalition formation games of the literature. In the applied Nash games, optimizing with respect to the cooperation intensity may enlarge the stable coalition up to the grand coalition which implements the first best.
- 9 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 88 (2) , 249-278
Open AccessSelf-Enforcing Environmental Agreements with the Optimal Intensity of Cooperation
This paper analyzes international environmental agreements in three-stage games consisting of a membership subgame, the signatories’ decision on the intensity of cooperation, and an emissions subgame. Signatories may act as Stackelberg leaders or play Nash. In the Stackelberg game, the highest intensity of cooperation between signatories is optimal. In the Nash game, a moderate or the highest intensity of cooperation is optimal if emissions are strategic substitutes. In this case the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Nash game with optimal cooperation intensity are identical to the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Stackelberg game with the highest cooperation intensity. Finally, we apply our results to coalition formation games of the literature. In the applied Nash games, optimizing with respect to the cooperation intensity may enlarge the stable coalition up to the grand coalition which implements the first best.
- Open Access
- 27 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 125
On breadth and depth of climate agreements with pledge-and-review bargaining
- 27 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 125
Open AccessOn breadth and depth of climate agreements with pledge-and-review bargaining
- Open Access
- 24 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 80 (2) , 379-407
Unilateral Phase-Out of Coal to Power in an Emissions Trading Scheme
We investigate the displacement effects of unilateral phase-out-of-coal policies in a stylized two-country model with coal- and gas-fired electricity generation in an international emissions trading scheme. In the basic policy scenario, electricity markets are national and one country bans coal while the emissions cap remains unchanged. The allocative displacement effects are strongly asymmetric: the coal-banning country suffers a welfare loss, the other country is better off, and aggregate welfare declines. Furthermore, the permit price decreases, while the electricity price rises in the unilaterally acting country and declines in the other country. If all countries would phase out coal, the effects would be symmetric and all countries would lose. We then extend the analysis to the cases (i) when the unilateral coal ban is combined with a moderate cut of the emissions cap (as recently suggested in an EU Directive) and (ii) when we allow for international trade in electricity. Compared to the basic unilateral policy, in these cases, the total welfare costs tend to be smaller and some tend to be shifted from the unilaterally acting country to the other one.
- 24 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 80 (2) , 379-407
Open AccessUnilateral Phase-Out of Coal to Power in an Emissions Trading Scheme
We investigate the displacement effects of unilateral phase-out-of-coal policies in a stylized two-country model with coal- and gas-fired electricity generation in an international emissions trading scheme. In the basic policy scenario, electricity markets are national and one country bans coal while the emissions cap remains unchanged. The allocative displacement effects are strongly asymmetric: the coal-banning country suffers a welfare loss, the other country is better off, and aggregate welfare declines. Furthermore, the permit price decreases, while the electricity price rises in the unilaterally acting country and declines in the other country. If all countries would phase out coal, the effects would be symmetric and all countries would lose. We then extend the analysis to the cases (i) when the unilateral coal ban is combined with a moderate cut of the emissions cap (as recently suggested in an EU Directive) and (ii) when we allow for international trade in electricity. Compared to the basic unilateral policy, in these cases, the total welfare costs tend to be smaller and some tend to be shifted from the unilaterally acting country to the other one.
- Open Access
- 14 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 123 (4) , 1190-1226
Climate Policy and Moral Consumers*
This paper analyzes climate policy (in the form of emissions caps) in a multi‐country game when consumers have preferences with different degrees of morality. In the absence of climate policy, the larger the consumers’ degree of morality, the lower the energy consumption and climate damage. Moral consumer‐voters elect either emissions caps (direct democracy) under majority rule, or policymakers who then choose emissions caps (representative democracy). If voters take prices as given, then election‐winning emissions caps are tighter, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. If voters seek to influence prices in their favor, then strong strategic price effects are generated and the election‐winning emissions caps are less stringent, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. We also show that the morality of election‐winning policymakers differs from the morality of median voters. It is possible that a moral median voter elects a policymaker with zero morality who then implements an emissions cap that might be larger than emissions in the absence of climate policy.
- 14 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 123 (4) , 1190-1226
Open AccessClimate Policy and Moral Consumers*
This paper analyzes climate policy (in the form of emissions caps) in a multi‐country game when consumers have preferences with different degrees of morality. In the absence of climate policy, the larger the consumers’ degree of morality, the lower the energy consumption and climate damage. Moral consumer‐voters elect either emissions caps (direct democracy) under majority rule, or policymakers who then choose emissions caps (representative democracy). If voters take prices as given, then election‐winning emissions caps are tighter, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. If voters seek to influence prices in their favor, then strong strategic price effects are generated and the election‐winning emissions caps are less stringent, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. We also show that the morality of election‐winning policymakers differs from the morality of median voters. It is possible that a moral median voter elects a policymaker with zero morality who then implements an emissions cap that might be larger than emissions in the absence of climate policy.
- 24 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 27 (5) , 1108-1147
Kant–Nash tax competition
- 24 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 27 (5) , 1108-1147
Kant–Nash tax competition
- 27 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 52 (3) , 993-1035
Bottom‐up world climate policies: Preserving fossil fuel deposits vs. capping fuel consumption
The policy of purchasing fossil fuel deposits for preservation is an alternative to the demand‐side climate policies that predominate in practice and in professional studies. This paper analyzes the deposit purchase approach and compares it to the standard demand‐side policy in a model with international trade and non‐cooperative governments that account for the effects of their policies on equilibrium prices. We investigate how the two regimes differ with respect to their equilibrium allocations and, in particular, with respect to the countries’ mitigation effort and welfare. If countries are symmetric, mitigation is stronger in the demand‐side than in the supply‐side regime and the transition from the latter to the former is welfare enhancing for all countries. If countries have different endowments of deposits in a two‐country economy, the country with higher extraction costs does not purchase deposits for preservation, and the country with lower extraction costs is better off with the supply‐side than with the demand‐side policy. Finally, we consider the case of combined policies and find surprisingly that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists, when heterogeneous countries apply both policy instruments.
- 27 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 52 (3) , 993-1035
Bottom‐up world climate policies: Preserving fossil fuel deposits vs. capping fuel consumption
The policy of purchasing fossil fuel deposits for preservation is an alternative to the demand‐side climate policies that predominate in practice and in professional studies. This paper analyzes the deposit purchase approach and compares it to the standard demand‐side policy in a model with international trade and non‐cooperative governments that account for the effects of their policies on equilibrium prices. We investigate how the two regimes differ with respect to their equilibrium allocations and, in particular, with respect to the countries’ mitigation effort and welfare. If countries are symmetric, mitigation is stronger in the demand‐side than in the supply‐side regime and the transition from the latter to the former is welfare enhancing for all countries. If countries have different endowments of deposits in a two‐country economy, the country with higher extraction costs does not purchase deposits for preservation, and the country with lower extraction costs is better off with the supply‐side than with the demand‐side policy. Finally, we consider the case of combined policies and find surprisingly that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists, when heterogeneous countries apply both policy instruments.
- 25 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 74 (1) , 397-420
Supply-Side Climate Policy: On the Role of Exploration and Asymmetric Information
- 25 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 74 (1) , 397-420
Supply-Side Climate Policy: On the Role of Exploration and Asymmetric Information
- 7 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 153, 43-55
Self-enforcing Biodiversity Agreements with Financial Support from North to South
- 7 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 153, 43-55
Self-enforcing Biodiversity Agreements with Financial Support from North to South