Annalisa Coliva
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Annalisa Coliva has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Maria Baghramian
University College Dublin
2 shared publications Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh
1 shared publication- Anna Boncompagni
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
1 shared publication Crispin Wright
University of Stirling
1 shared publication- Delia Belleri
Univ Bologna, COGITO Res Ctr, Bologna, Italy
1 shared publication - Giorgio Volpe
Department of Philosophy Alma Mater Studiorum – University of Bologna Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 123 (3) , 208-212
Matthew Boyle: Transparency and Reflection: A Study of Self-Knowledge and the Nature of the Mind
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 123 (3) , 208-212
Matthew Boyle: Transparency and Reflection: A Study of Self-Knowledge and the Nature of the Mind
- Open Access
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- p. 1-21
Morphology, Knowledge and understanding. prolegomena to a pluralist manifesto
The primary objective of this paper is to tentatively investigate how a family-resemblance approach to concepts might be applied to the related notions of knowledge and understanding, with the aim of deflating or redressing ongoing debates surrounding each. Given that the concept of family-resemblance is frequently misinterpreted, and there is a prevailing tendency to revert to more conventional methods of conceptual analysis, the paper offers a comprehensive overview of the notion. To lay the groundwork, it traces the origins of family-resemblance to Goethe's morphological method, illustrating the approach with an example from botany. It then presents a family-resemblance account of the concept of knowledge and understanding.
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- p. 1-21
Open AccessMorphology, Knowledge and understanding. prolegomena to a pluralist manifesto
The primary objective of this paper is to tentatively investigate how a family-resemblance approach to concepts might be applied to the related notions of knowledge and understanding, with the aim of deflating or redressing ongoing debates surrounding each. Given that the concept of family-resemblance is frequently misinterpreted, and there is a prevailing tendency to revert to more conventional methods of conceptual analysis, the paper offers a comprehensive overview of the notion. To lay the groundwork, it traces the origins of family-resemblance to Goethe's morphological method, illustrating the approach with an example from botany. It then presents a family-resemblance account of the concept of knowledge and understanding.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (6) , 1-23
Deep disagreements and the genealogical challenge
This paper looks at the so-called “genealogical challenge”, encapsulated in the “you just believe that because …” (YJBTB) schema, through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically believed just because one has been brought up to believe them (§1). Yet, due to their extreme variability, it is not always the case that hinges are not rationally held, while fitting into the YJBTB schema. In particular, they are rationally held when either different (de facto empirical) hinges are taken for granted merely because of one’s position in history, or else when (de jure) hinges, constitutive of epistemic rationality, are plugged into the YJBTB schema. By contrast, they are not rationally held when different hinges are taken for granted while aware of the fact that one’s reasons for them are either question-begging or no stronger than the ones in favor of incompatible ones (§ §3–4). These would all be cases of “deep disagreement” – that is, disagreement that depends on different and incompatible hinges, which prevent parties from utilizing a common epistemic method or practice to rationally resolve the disagreement. Finally, we look at the possible extension of this framework to what may be regarded as religious and moral hinges. It is claimed that, depending on the hinge in question, these disagreements may (or may not) be “deep” (§5). Hence, looking at the genealogical challenge through the lens of hinge epistemology helps elucidate its nature, its epistemic significance and its scope.
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (6) , 1-23
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDeep disagreements and the genealogical challenge
This paper looks at the so-called “genealogical challenge”, encapsulated in the “you just believe that because …” (YJBTB) schema, through the lens of hinge epistemology. It is claimed that hinges are typically believed just because one has been brought up to believe them (§1). Yet, due to their extreme variability, it is not always the case that hinges are not rationally held, while fitting into the YJBTB schema. In particular, they are rationally held when either different (de facto empirical) hinges are taken for granted merely because of one’s position in history, or else when (de jure) hinges, constitutive of epistemic rationality, are plugged into the YJBTB schema. By contrast, they are not rationally held when different hinges are taken for granted while aware of the fact that one’s reasons for them are either question-begging or no stronger than the ones in favor of incompatible ones (§ §3–4). These would all be cases of “deep disagreement” – that is, disagreement that depends on different and incompatible hinges, which prevent parties from utilizing a common epistemic method or practice to rationally resolve the disagreement. Finally, we look at the possible extension of this framework to what may be regarded as religious and moral hinges. It is claimed that, depending on the hinge in question, these disagreements may (or may not) be “deep” (§5). Hence, looking at the genealogical challenge through the lens of hinge epistemology helps elucidate its nature, its epistemic significance and its scope.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
Against Quasi-Fideism
In a series of papers, Duncan Pritchard has argued that Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty (OC) provide the foundation for a quasi-fideistic account of religious belief. This account seeks to navigate a middle path between evidentialism—the view that religious belief is rational only if supported by epistemic reasons—and fideism, which holds that religious belief cannot be rationally justified precisely because it is not grounded in epistemic reasons. Central to Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is a parity argument, which asserts that religious and non-religious beliefs are on equal footing. For the rationality of both depends on their connection to a background of a-rational foundational commitments, or “hinges”. In this paper, I challenge Pritchard’s account on two fronts. First, I argue that his quasi-fideism relies on a contentious interpretation of OC, and of Wittgenstein’s views about religious discourse, making it questionable whether it can genuinely be considered an application of Wittgenstein’s views to religious epistemology. Second, I contend that quasi-fideism, as developed by Pritchard, is inherently unstable, as it risks either collapsing into fideism or permitting relativism, contrary to Pritchard’s intentions. I then explore the potential for quasi-fideism—or, at any rate, a position meant to steer a middle path between evidentialism and fideism—under an alternative interpretation of OC. While this alternative framework may offer better prospects than Pritchard’s original formulation for avoiding the pitfalls of fideism and relativism, while sidestepping evidentialism, I argue that it ultimately fails to support a parity argument between religious and non-religious beliefs. Consequently, it cannot sustain a religious epistemology that avoids both evidentialism and fideism.
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAgainst Quasi-Fideism
In a series of papers, Duncan Pritchard has argued that Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty (OC) provide the foundation for a quasi-fideistic account of religious belief. This account seeks to navigate a middle path between evidentialism—the view that religious belief is rational only if supported by epistemic reasons—and fideism, which holds that religious belief cannot be rationally justified precisely because it is not grounded in epistemic reasons. Central to Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is a parity argument, which asserts that religious and non-religious beliefs are on equal footing. For the rationality of both depends on their connection to a background of a-rational foundational commitments, or “hinges”. In this paper, I challenge Pritchard’s account on two fronts. First, I argue that his quasi-fideism relies on a contentious interpretation of OC, and of Wittgenstein’s views about religious discourse, making it questionable whether it can genuinely be considered an application of Wittgenstein’s views to religious epistemology. Second, I contend that quasi-fideism, as developed by Pritchard, is inherently unstable, as it risks either collapsing into fideism or permitting relativism, contrary to Pritchard’s intentions. I then explore the potential for quasi-fideism—or, at any rate, a position meant to steer a middle path between evidentialism and fideism—under an alternative interpretation of OC. While this alternative framework may offer better prospects than Pritchard’s original formulation for avoiding the pitfalls of fideism and relativism, while sidestepping evidentialism, I argue that it ultimately fails to support a parity argument between religious and non-religious beliefs. Consequently, it cannot sustain a religious epistemology that avoids both evidentialism and fideism.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 110 (3) , 939-958
Hinge trust*
Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief. However, trust's nature and role remain conceptually elusive, as the current debate highlights. This paper addresses the foundational question of what trust entails, rather than the conditions under which one is trustworthy. Specifically, we examine Wittgenstein's On Certainty to propose a characterization of trust in its most fundamental form, termed “hinge trust.” Hinge trust is a stance preceding the ability to form justified beliefs, directed not only at people but also at perceptual faculties, objects, and the environment. It underpins our epistemic practices, particularly in acquiring epistemic hinges essential for reasoning and inquiry.Building on this, we advocate a “trust‐first” framework, analogous to the “knowledge‐first” approach in epistemology. Trust is conceptualized as a primitive stance, distinct from “reliance +” a reactive attitude, or goodwill or commitment. These elements, while significant, are not constitutive of trust. Additionally, we explore the interplay between trust and distrust, arguing that trust is both conceptually and axiologically prior to distrust. Finally, we address the role of trust in testimony and hinge epistemology, demonstrating its foundational significance.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 110 (3) , 939-958
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessHinge trust*
Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief. However, trust's nature and role remain conceptually elusive, as the current debate highlights. This paper addresses the foundational question of what trust entails, rather than the conditions under which one is trustworthy. Specifically, we examine Wittgenstein's On Certainty to propose a characterization of trust in its most fundamental form, termed “hinge trust.” Hinge trust is a stance preceding the ability to form justified beliefs, directed not only at people but also at perceptual faculties, objects, and the environment. It underpins our epistemic practices, particularly in acquiring epistemic hinges essential for reasoning and inquiry.Building on this, we advocate a “trust‐first” framework, analogous to the “knowledge‐first” approach in epistemology. Trust is conceptualized as a primitive stance, distinct from “reliance +” a reactive attitude, or goodwill or commitment. These elements, while significant, are not constitutive of trust. Additionally, we explore the interplay between trust and distrust, arguing that trust is both conceptually and axiologically prior to distrust. Finally, we address the role of trust in testimony and hinge epistemology, demonstrating its foundational significance.
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 38 (3) , 1118-1125
Errors through misidentification and the specialness of first-person thought
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 38 (3) , 1118-1125
Errors through misidentification and the specialness of first-person thought
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 299-310
What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore (and Wittgenstein) II
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 299-310
What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore (and Wittgenstein) II
- 24 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- p. 1-6
Liminal Identities and Epistemic Injustice: Introduction to the Special Issue
- 24 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- p. 1-6
Liminal Identities and Epistemic Injustice: Introduction to the Special Issue
- Open Access
- 23 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 39 (2) , 121-133
Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering
- 23 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 39 (2) , 121-133
Open AccessHysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering
- Open Access
- 18 September 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 40 (2) , 426-442
More and Happier Women: On the Political Significance of Wittgenstein and Hinge Epistemology
The paper presents a Wittgensteinian account of the concept woman, in terms of family resemblance. This approach is deemed superior to the Carnapian account, championed by Sally Haslanger, in that it allows for more inclusivity and to locate the source of sexism not so much in the very concept of woman but in the beliefs sexist people have about women. The compatibility of this account with semantic externalism is explored, as well as its relationship with stereotypes and paradigmatic examples of women. It is further shown how present-day attempts to extend the application of the concept of woman beyond human females may be made sense in terms of a change of hinges—that is, of the rules of evidential significance, which a community of speakers brings to bear on the determination of whether a person is a woman. Finally, it is argued that, despite Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical quietism, such an account is politically significant. This in turn shows that in fact Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical pronouncements far from being inimical to political and societal change may in fact be conducive to it.
- 18 September 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 40 (2) , 426-442
Open AccessMore and Happier Women: On the Political Significance of Wittgenstein and Hinge Epistemology
The paper presents a Wittgensteinian account of the concept woman, in terms of family resemblance. This approach is deemed superior to the Carnapian account, championed by Sally Haslanger, in that it allows for more inclusivity and to locate the source of sexism not so much in the very concept of woman but in the beliefs sexist people have about women. The compatibility of this account with semantic externalism is explored, as well as its relationship with stereotypes and paradigmatic examples of women. It is further shown how present-day attempts to extend the application of the concept of woman beyond human females may be made sense in terms of a change of hinges—that is, of the rules of evidential significance, which a community of speakers brings to bear on the determination of whether a person is a woman. Finally, it is argued that, despite Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical quietism, such an account is politically significant. This in turn shows that in fact Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical pronouncements far from being inimical to political and societal change may in fact be conducive to it.