Maria Baghramian
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Maria Baghramian has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Annalisa Coliva
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, USA
2 shared publications - Finnur Dellsén
University of Iceland
2 shared publications Andrew Benjamin
1 shared publicationAnna Nicholson
University College Dublin
1 shared publication- Ashley Shaw
School of Philosophy University College Dublin Dublin Ireland
1 shared publication - Cailin O'Connor
University of California Irvine
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-22
Disagreement and trust: the case from democracy and science
1. That trust in democratic institutions has declined markedly across Western democracies in recent decades is, by now, a commonplace. The banking crisis of 2008, followed by the global COVID-19 pa...
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-22
Open AccessDisagreement and trust: the case from democracy and science
1. That trust in democratic institutions has declined markedly across Western democracies in recent decades is, by now, a commonplace. The banking crisis of 2008, followed by the global COVID-19 pa...
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 275-295
Expert Advice and Institutional Trust
- 17 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 187-210
Truth and Polarization
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 32 (1) , 16-29
Overcoming the Big Divide? The IJPS and the Analytic Continental Schism
The history of Western philosophy, from its beginnings in ancient Greece, can be told as the story of a succession of disputes and disagreements between philosophers and philosophical schools, but ...
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 32 (1) , 16-29
Open AccessOvercoming the Big Divide? The IJPS and the Analytic Continental Schism
The history of Western philosophy, from its beginnings in ancient Greece, can be told as the story of a succession of disputes and disagreements between philosophers and philosophical schools, but ...
- Open Access
- 27 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 31 (3) , 267-278
Introduction: The Ethics and Politics of Disagreement
- 27 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 31 (3) , 267-278
Open AccessIntroduction: The Ethics and Politics of Disagreement
- Open Access
- 16 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-28
Scepticism and the value of distrust
Faced with urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic trust. In this paper, we investigate the tension between the value of mitigated scepticism and the need for trust in experts. We offer four arguments in favour of mitigated scepticism: the argument from loss of intellectual autonomy; the argument from democratic deficit; the argument from the normative failures of science; and the argument from past and current injustices. One solution, which we reject, is the idea that reliance, rather than trust, is sufficient for accommodating experts in policy matters. The solution we endorse is to create a ‘climate of trust’, where questioning experts and expertise is welcomed, but the epistemic trust necessary for acting upon information which the public cannot obtain first-hand is enabled and encouraged through structural, institutional and justice-based measures.
- 16 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-28
Open AccessScepticism and the value of distrust
Faced with urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic trust. In this paper, we investigate the tension between the value of mitigated scepticism and the need for trust in experts. We offer four arguments in favour of mitigated scepticism: the argument from loss of intellectual autonomy; the argument from democratic deficit; the argument from the normative failures of science; and the argument from past and current injustices. One solution, which we reject, is the idea that reliance, rather than trust, is sufficient for accommodating experts in policy matters. The solution we endorse is to create a ‘climate of trust’, where questioning experts and expertise is welcomed, but the epistemic trust necessary for acting upon information which the public cannot obtain first-hand is enabled and encouraged through structural, institutional and justice-based measures.
- 11 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-4
Introduction: Ubiquitous Questions about Experts and Society
- 11 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-4
Introduction: Ubiquitous Questions about Experts and Society
- Open Access
- 1 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 82 (3) , 477-479
Précis
Relativism: New Problems of Philosophy 1 presents, in some detail, the key arguments and justifications for the most prominent relativistic positions in contemporary philosophy and provides critical responses to them. 2 An additional aim of the book is to address the question whether there is a single doctrine of relativism that can be coherently stated.
- 1 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 82 (3) , 477-479
Open AccessPrécis
Relativism: New Problems of Philosophy 1 presents, in some detail, the key arguments and justifications for the most prominent relativistic positions in contemporary philosophy and provides critical responses to them. 2 An additional aim of the book is to address the question whether there is a single doctrine of relativism that can be coherently stated.
- 1 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 82 (3) , 514-525
Replies to Commentators
As is predictable, several comments raise issues about our characterization of relativism. We will focus on these first before discussing Paul Boghossian’s comments, which focus on one particular argument of the book concerning Gilbert Harman’s version of moral relativism. Max Kölbel maintains that it is ‘an old story’ that anti-relativists define relativism in such a way that its features cannot consistently be held together, while it is unclear whether any relativist ever claimed that all those features must be held together. In response, it is important to stress that, as we say in Ch. 1, we do try to give a unified account of relativism by outlining a cluster of core features that we think are central to the characterization of all instances of relativism. To achieve this end, in researching the book, we first went through an extensive survey of positions that, throughout the history of Western philosophy, have been presented as or considered to be relativist. The six features that we identify as central to the notion of relativism stem from this survey of the philosophical literature. The results of the survey have been presented in Ch. 2 as well as in discussions of the specific varieties of relativism Chs. 3–9. Our choices are not ad hoc or arbitrary, nor are they the result of a preconceived notion of relativism. Most importantly, they are not selected to make sure that they cohere with one another. Indeed, as is apparent from the last chapter of the book, we do not think that, as things stand, a coherent formulation of these features has been provided. Of course, we may be wrong about these features, but then we should be shown to be factually wrong in our understanding of a significant number of views in the history of Western philosophy.
- 1 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 82 (3) , 514-525
Replies to Commentators
As is predictable, several comments raise issues about our characterization of relativism. We will focus on these first before discussing Paul Boghossian’s comments, which focus on one particular argument of the book concerning Gilbert Harman’s version of moral relativism. Max Kölbel maintains that it is ‘an old story’ that anti-relativists define relativism in such a way that its features cannot consistently be held together, while it is unclear whether any relativist ever claimed that all those features must be held together. In response, it is important to stress that, as we say in Ch. 1, we do try to give a unified account of relativism by outlining a cluster of core features that we think are central to the characterization of all instances of relativism. To achieve this end, in researching the book, we first went through an extensive survey of positions that, throughout the history of Western philosophy, have been presented as or considered to be relativist. The six features that we identify as central to the notion of relativism stem from this survey of the philosophical literature. The results of the survey have been presented in Ch. 2 as well as in discussions of the specific varieties of relativism Chs. 3–9. Our choices are not ad hoc or arbitrary, nor are they the result of a preconceived notion of relativism. Most importantly, they are not selected to make sure that they cohere with one another. Indeed, as is apparent from the last chapter of the book, we do not think that, as things stand, a coherent formulation of these features has been provided. Of course, we may be wrong about these features, but then we should be shown to be factually wrong in our understanding of a significant number of views in the history of Western philosophy.
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 30 (3) , 193-201
Ethics and the Emotions: An Introduction to the Special Issue
This introduction provides brief outlines of the articles collected in this special issue of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies on the topic of Ethics and Emotions. It also announces the winners of the 2021 Robert Papazian and PERITIA prizes.
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 30 (3) , 193-201
Ethics and the Emotions: An Introduction to the Special Issue
This introduction provides brief outlines of the articles collected in this special issue of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies on the topic of Ethics and Emotions. It also announces the winners of the 2021 Robert Papazian and PERITIA prizes.