Nick Chater
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Nick Chater has a total of 107 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Adam N Sanborn
20 shared publicationsJian-Qiao Zhu
Princeton University
17 shared publications- Johanna K. Falben
School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland, UK
10 shared publications Jake Spicer
9 shared publications- Mike Oaksford
Department of Psychological Sciences Birkbeck College, University of London
9 shared publications - Adam N. Sanborn
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
8 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Does Outcome Utility Bias the Mental Simulations of Risky Events?
Does the utility of an outcome influence people's assessment of risk and uncertainty? Prominent theories propose that people rely on mental simulation to evaluate probabilities and risky events, yet prior empirical findings is mixed as to whether and how utility biases this process. Across four experiments (total N=206, with Experiment 4 pre-registered), we tested this question using a random generation paradigm, in which participants mentally simulated gamble outcomes and said them out loud. Then we compared these responses with probability judgments and predictions. While we identified individual differences, the majority of participants exhibited neutrality, with no systematic impact of utility on their sampling distributions. Nevertheless, an optimism subgroup emerged, with a larger proportion of optimistic participants when the monetary context was more salient. Additionally, outcome utilities have similar effects on probability judgments, predictions, and random generation tasks, consistent with the proposal that these tasks are related to each other and may all rely on mental simulation. These findings indicate that utility does not uniformly distort mental simulation, but can do so for a stable subgroup under particular motivational contexts, and they motivate cognitive models that capture both unbiased and optimistic forms of mental sampling.
- 31 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessDoes Outcome Utility Bias the Mental Simulations of Risky Events?
Does the utility of an outcome influence people's assessment of risk and uncertainty? Prominent theories propose that people rely on mental simulation to evaluate probabilities and risky events, yet prior empirical findings is mixed as to whether and how utility biases this process. Across four experiments (total N=206, with Experiment 4 pre-registered), we tested this question using a random generation paradigm, in which participants mentally simulated gamble outcomes and said them out loud. Then we compared these responses with probability judgments and predictions. While we identified individual differences, the majority of participants exhibited neutrality, with no systematic impact of utility on their sampling distributions. Nevertheless, an optimism subgroup emerged, with a larger proportion of optimistic participants when the monetary context was more salient. Additionally, outcome utilities have similar effects on probability judgments, predictions, and random generation tasks, consistent with the proposal that these tasks are related to each other and may all rely on mental simulation. These findings indicate that utility does not uniformly distort mental simulation, but can do so for a stable subgroup under particular motivational contexts, and they motivate cognitive models that capture both unbiased and optimistic forms of mental sampling.
- Open Access
- 22 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Should AI Trust Its Gut? The Cost of Deliberative Moral Reasoning in Humans and AI
People prefer deliberation to intuition, when judging how others solve hard problems, and they extend this to artificial agents. Yet in the moral domain, the preference may reverse as intuitive moral responses appear to signal good character. One explanation is that fast, intuitive responses show real emotional engagement. Since machines are thought to lack emotion, it is unclear whether a preference for intuition in the moral domain extends to AI. Across three preregistered studies (N = 2,173), we find that it does, but that it appears to be driven by commitment to moral norms and precedents rather than emotion. In Study 1, participants preferred intuitive reasoning for moral decisions and systematic reasoning for non-moral decisions, for human and AI agents alike. Intuitive moral reasoning signalled better character but was not clearly expected to produce better outcomes. In Study 2, the character preference persisted when the AI was described as being incapable of emotion. In Study 3, we held the decision fixed and varied how firmly the agent held the relevant moral norm. An agent who would never reconsider applying a moral norm was rated above one who would reconsider given sufficiently high stakes; and both above one who weighed costs and benefits case by case. Commitment raised character ratings more than expected-outcome ratings. The character-based cost of moral deliberation appears to be a cost of treating a moral norm as negotiable, and we found strong evidence that people apply this inference to machines and people alike.
- 22 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessShould AI Trust Its Gut? The Cost of Deliberative Moral Reasoning in Humans and AI
People prefer deliberation to intuition, when judging how others solve hard problems, and they extend this to artificial agents. Yet in the moral domain, the preference may reverse as intuitive moral responses appear to signal good character. One explanation is that fast, intuitive responses show real emotional engagement. Since machines are thought to lack emotion, it is unclear whether a preference for intuition in the moral domain extends to AI. Across three preregistered studies (N = 2,173), we find that it does, but that it appears to be driven by commitment to moral norms and precedents rather than emotion. In Study 1, participants preferred intuitive reasoning for moral decisions and systematic reasoning for non-moral decisions, for human and AI agents alike. Intuitive moral reasoning signalled better character but was not clearly expected to produce better outcomes. In Study 2, the character preference persisted when the AI was described as being incapable of emotion. In Study 3, we held the decision fixed and varied how firmly the agent held the relevant moral norm. An agent who would never reconsider applying a moral norm was rated above one who would reconsider given sufficiently high stakes; and both above one who weighed costs and benefits case by case. Commitment raised character ratings more than expected-outcome ratings. The character-based cost of moral deliberation appears to be a cost of treating a moral norm as negotiable, and we found strong evidence that people apply this inference to machines and people alike.
- Open Access
- 14 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Belief Elicitation With Random Generation Tasks
Measuring people's beliefs is important for psychology, applied statistics, and AI alignment, yet established elicitation techniques yield only coarse distributional summaries and can introduce systematic biases. Here we propose random generation---asking participants to produce values as unpredictably as possible---as a belief elicitation method. Our approach draws on theories of mental sampling and needs no visual interface. In three preregistered experiments spanning nine domains, we compared random generation to two standard methods: decile elicitation (Experiments~1--2) and likelihood elicitation (Experiment~3). In Experiments~1 and~2, random generation produced distributions that were overall as close or closer to environmental data than decile elicitation, and predicted participants' conditional expectations at least as well. Random generation also captured idiosyncratic distributional features in one of three tested domains, the irregular score structure of NFL games. In Experiment~3, we elicited categorical distributions---participants' beliefs about the popularity of holiday destinations---and assessed whether they could predict participants' conditional judgments in a different domain (holiday flight durations). Random generation again captured environmental regularities comparably to likelihood elicitation for the derived flight-duration distributions, and both methods were similarly effective in capturing people's conditional predictions.Finally, aggregating small groups of participants on average moved the pooled distributions closer to the environment in all three experiments, and predictive accuracy improved at comparable rates for both tasks. These findings establish random generation as a versatile tool for recovering distributional beliefs and a practical complement to established techniques.
- 14 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBelief Elicitation With Random Generation Tasks
Measuring people's beliefs is important for psychology, applied statistics, and AI alignment, yet established elicitation techniques yield only coarse distributional summaries and can introduce systematic biases. Here we propose random generation---asking participants to produce values as unpredictably as possible---as a belief elicitation method. Our approach draws on theories of mental sampling and needs no visual interface. In three preregistered experiments spanning nine domains, we compared random generation to two standard methods: decile elicitation (Experiments~1--2) and likelihood elicitation (Experiment~3). In Experiments~1 and~2, random generation produced distributions that were overall as close or closer to environmental data than decile elicitation, and predicted participants' conditional expectations at least as well. Random generation also captured idiosyncratic distributional features in one of three tested domains, the irregular score structure of NFL games. In Experiment~3, we elicited categorical distributions---participants' beliefs about the popularity of holiday destinations---and assessed whether they could predict participants' conditional judgments in a different domain (holiday flight durations). Random generation again captured environmental regularities comparably to likelihood elicitation for the derived flight-duration distributions, and both methods were similarly effective in capturing people's conditional predictions.Finally, aggregating small groups of participants on average moved the pooled distributions closer to the environment in all three experiments, and predictive accuracy improved at comparable rates for both tasks. These findings establish random generation as a versatile tool for recovering distributional beliefs and a practical complement to established techniques.
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e420
Tinkering with social tinkering
Our commentators have broadly welcomed the notion of social tinkering, while also offering a range of suggestions, refinements, and potential challenges. In our response, we clarify the concept of social tinkering, sharpen our account of the six stages of cultural evolution, consider whether additional mechanisms are needed to explain the emergence of cultural complexity, and explore a range of possible extensions to the social tinkering framework. We conclude by discussing broader implications and future directions for this research program, including a reconsideration of Rogers’ paradox.
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e420
Tinkering with social tinkering
Our commentators have broadly welcomed the notion of social tinkering, while also offering a range of suggestions, refinements, and potential challenges. In our response, we clarify the concept of social tinkering, sharpen our account of the six stages of cultural evolution, consider whether additional mechanisms are needed to explain the emergence of cultural complexity, and explore a range of possible extensions to the social tinkering framework. We conclude by discussing broader implications and future directions for this research program, including a reconsideration of Rogers’ paradox.
- Open Access
- 10 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Eliciting Beliefs with Random Generation Tasks
Elicitation methods, such as asking people to produce the deciles of a distribution, are standard practices in policy or applied statistics. Similarly, much of cognitive science and psychology focuses on determining people's people's beliefs or latent traits through questionnaires or judgment tasks. However, these approaches often only capture a rough outline of what people know and are usually limited to point estimates of people's beliefs. Here, we present a novel experimental paradigm that allows us to access people's beliefs and how variable these beliefs are. Our task is based on an established random generation paradigm in which participants produce quantities from a particular domain as randomly as possible. We hypothesize that due to the minds' general-purpose mechanisms for probabilistic inferences, these random sequences represent the participants' underlying prior beliefs. We show that our method can infer participants' beliefs for a wide range of numeric quantities at comparable accuracy as an established elicitation method.Moreover, these inferred beliefs are consistent with individual participants' generalization and inference patterns in a subsequent conditional prediction task. We then extend our approach to non-numeric belief elicitation, highlighting how our method can go beyond numeric elicitation and provide insight into complex beliefs that are challenging to assess experimentally. Empirically, our results highlight that people know the rough shapes of environmental distributions, and these beliefs guide inference and generalization. Moreover, using our novel approach, we also show that people know the fine details of environmental distributions. Finally, our experimental results show that random generation paradigms can be a useful tool for cognitive scientists, psychologists, and applied statisticians.
- 10 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessEliciting Beliefs with Random Generation Tasks
Elicitation methods, such as asking people to produce the deciles of a distribution, are standard practices in policy or applied statistics. Similarly, much of cognitive science and psychology focuses on determining people's people's beliefs or latent traits through questionnaires or judgment tasks. However, these approaches often only capture a rough outline of what people know and are usually limited to point estimates of people's beliefs. Here, we present a novel experimental paradigm that allows us to access people's beliefs and how variable these beliefs are. Our task is based on an established random generation paradigm in which participants produce quantities from a particular domain as randomly as possible. We hypothesize that due to the minds' general-purpose mechanisms for probabilistic inferences, these random sequences represent the participants' underlying prior beliefs. We show that our method can infer participants' beliefs for a wide range of numeric quantities at comparable accuracy as an established elicitation method.Moreover, these inferred beliefs are consistent with individual participants' generalization and inference patterns in a subsequent conditional prediction task. We then extend our approach to non-numeric belief elicitation, highlighting how our method can go beyond numeric elicitation and provide insight into complex beliefs that are challenging to assess experimentally. Empirically, our results highlight that people know the rough shapes of environmental distributions, and these beliefs guide inference and generalization. Moreover, using our novel approach, we also show that people know the fine details of environmental distributions. Finally, our experimental results show that random generation paradigms can be a useful tool for cognitive scientists, psychologists, and applied statisticians.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2026
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Physics: Complexity
- Vol. 7 (3) , 035017
Towards macroeconomic analysis without microfoundations: measuring the entropy of simulated exchange economies
The theory of thermal macroeconomics (TM) analyses economic phenomena within the mathematical framework of classical thermodynamics, using a set of axioms that apply to the purely macroscopic aspects of an economy (Chater and MacKay 2025 J Phys. Complex 6 , 045008). The theory shows that the possible macro-behaviours, for example on putting two economies in contact, are governed by an entropy function. It leads to concepts of economic temperature, a foundation for prices, various symmetries and inequalities for economic flexibilities, and other results. In simple idealised cases, the entropy function can be calculated from the rules governing the interactions of individual agents. But where this is not possible, TM predicts that the entropy can nonetheless be measured empirically through an economic analogue of calorimetry in physics. We show, using computer simulations, the in-principle feasibility of this approach: an entropy function can be successfully measured for a range of simulated economies that we tested. In cases where entropy can be calculated analytically from microfoundational assumptions, the measured entropy agrees well. In more complex cases, where microfoundational analysis is infeasible, our method of measuring entropy still applies and is validated by demonstrations that entropy is a state function of an economic system, i.e. exhibits path-independence. This appears to hold even for some systems to which we do not have a proof that the axioms of TM apply. Furthermore, in all cases tested, entropy is found to be concave, as predicted by TM.
- 1 September 2026
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Physics: Complexity
- Vol. 7 (3) , 035017
Open AccessTowards macroeconomic analysis without microfoundations: measuring the entropy of simulated exchange economies
The theory of thermal macroeconomics (TM) analyses economic phenomena within the mathematical framework of classical thermodynamics, using a set of axioms that apply to the purely macroscopic aspects of an economy (Chater and MacKay 2025 J Phys. Complex 6 , 045008). The theory shows that the possible macro-behaviours, for example on putting two economies in contact, are governed by an entropy function. It leads to concepts of economic temperature, a foundation for prices, various symmetries and inequalities for economic flexibilities, and other results. In simple idealised cases, the entropy function can be calculated from the rules governing the interactions of individual agents. But where this is not possible, TM predicts that the entropy can nonetheless be measured empirically through an economic analogue of calorimetry in physics. We show, using computer simulations, the in-principle feasibility of this approach: an entropy function can be successfully measured for a range of simulated economies that we tested. In cases where entropy can be calculated analytically from microfoundational assumptions, the measured entropy agrees well. In more complex cases, where microfoundational analysis is infeasible, our method of measuring entropy still applies and is validated by demonstrations that entropy is a state function of an economic system, i.e. exhibits path-independence. This appears to hold even for some systems to which we do not have a proof that the axioms of TM apply. Furthermore, in all cases tested, entropy is found to be concave, as predicted by TM.
- Open Access
- 29 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
From team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force
Collaboration is essential to social life. Sometimes teams, families, companies, and other organizations agree on explicit rules governing such collaboration, and these are backed by moral force: To violate the rule is wrong. Other times, however, we find ways to collaborate on the fly, without rules or norms, or even explicit communication. This often requires inferring a joint plan — imagining “what coordination would we agree to, if we could?” — and playing our surmised role. Is it also considered morally wrong to violate an implicit or inferred joint plan? In five preregistered experiments (n = 1,506), we show that deviating from an inferred joint plan is perceived as morally problematic, even without prior communication or agreement. In other words, just as the agreements we actually make are morally binding, so too are the patterns of conduct that we infer our social partners would agree upon.
- 29 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessFrom team rationality to morality: Implicit joint plans carry moral force
Collaboration is essential to social life. Sometimes teams, families, companies, and other organizations agree on explicit rules governing such collaboration, and these are backed by moral force: To violate the rule is wrong. Other times, however, we find ways to collaborate on the fly, without rules or norms, or even explicit communication. This often requires inferring a joint plan — imagining “what coordination would we agree to, if we could?” — and playing our surmised role. Is it also considered morally wrong to violate an implicit or inferred joint plan? In five preregistered experiments (n = 1,506), we show that deviating from an inferred joint plan is perceived as morally problematic, even without prior communication or agreement. In other words, just as the agreements we actually make are morally binding, so too are the patterns of conduct that we infer our social partners would agree upon.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Overreaction and Underreaction: How Information Display Impacts Expectation Formation
Forecasting from a stream of past observations is a routine judgment task in organizations and markets, and a large literature holds that people systematically overreact when doing so, placing excessive weight on recent observations. Prominent models of expectation formation, grounded in mechanisms such as increased salience for recent signals and limited memory for past information, have predicted overreaction as a near-universal behavioral pattern, successfully capturing prior empirical findings. Here we identify boundary conditions on overreaction in expectation formation. Reanalyzing prior data in which participants viewed the full history of past realizations as a line graph, we confirm that while overreaction is most prevalent, it also varies systematically with task context, diminishing under high persistence and even reversing into underreaction as the process approaches a random walk. To test whether information display format shapes these patterns, we conducted two new experiments in which past realizations were presented sequentially, with only the most recent observation displayed (ruling out visual extrapolation). This design should, under either salience- or memory-based theories, elicit maximal overreaction. However, we find that participants instead exhibited reduced overreaction and, under high persistence, pronounced underreaction. These results establish information display format as a key moderator of forecast bias direction: reducing available history not only attenuates overreaction but can reverse its direction entirely, posing a novel challenge to prevailing theories of expectation formation.
- 1 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessOverreaction and Underreaction: How Information Display Impacts Expectation Formation
Forecasting from a stream of past observations is a routine judgment task in organizations and markets, and a large literature holds that people systematically overreact when doing so, placing excessive weight on recent observations. Prominent models of expectation formation, grounded in mechanisms such as increased salience for recent signals and limited memory for past information, have predicted overreaction as a near-universal behavioral pattern, successfully capturing prior empirical findings. Here we identify boundary conditions on overreaction in expectation formation. Reanalyzing prior data in which participants viewed the full history of past realizations as a line graph, we confirm that while overreaction is most prevalent, it also varies systematically with task context, diminishing under high persistence and even reversing into underreaction as the process approaches a random walk. To test whether information display format shapes these patterns, we conducted two new experiments in which past realizations were presented sequentially, with only the most recent observation displayed (ruling out visual extrapolation). This design should, under either salience- or memory-based theories, elicit maximal overreaction. However, we find that participants instead exhibited reduced overreaction and, under high persistence, pronounced underreaction. These results establish information display format as a key moderator of forecast bias direction: reducing available history not only attenuates overreaction but can reverse its direction entirely, posing a novel challenge to prevailing theories of expectation formation.
- Open Access
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Sampling from Implicit Bayesian Models: Towards a General Framework for Cognitive Modeling
Computational process models are pivotal tools for studying the human mind, offering explicit algorithmic accounts of how human behavior arises. However, they are often siloed across individual tasks and domains, lacking a coherent framework for examining computational principles shared across cognition. The challenges are twofold. First, existing models rely heavily on researcher-defined and task-dependent representations of the stimuli. Second, they typically capture only a limited range of behavioral responses. To address these limitations, we propose a two-component framework. A neural network, trained on ecologically valid ground-truth data, functions as an Implicit Bayesian Model (IBM) that maps complex real-world stimuli directly onto posterior probability distributions. A human-like sampling process, the Autocorrelated Bayesian Sampler (ABS), then samples hypotheses from those posteriors to generate diverse behavioral responses while accounting for systematic deviations from normative predictions. This combination of realistic representations with a general-purpose algorithmic decision process enables cognitive mechanisms to be implemented and transferred across tasks at real-world scale. Through three case studies spanning multiple domains and stimulus modalities, we demonstrate the generality of the IBM-ABS framework in explaining human behavior both qualitatively and quantitatively, and explore its capacity to yield new theoretical insights through incorporating realistic priors and predicting the effects of experimental manipulations.
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessSampling from Implicit Bayesian Models: Towards a General Framework for Cognitive Modeling
Computational process models are pivotal tools for studying the human mind, offering explicit algorithmic accounts of how human behavior arises. However, they are often siloed across individual tasks and domains, lacking a coherent framework for examining computational principles shared across cognition. The challenges are twofold. First, existing models rely heavily on researcher-defined and task-dependent representations of the stimuli. Second, they typically capture only a limited range of behavioral responses. To address these limitations, we propose a two-component framework. A neural network, trained on ecologically valid ground-truth data, functions as an Implicit Bayesian Model (IBM) that maps complex real-world stimuli directly onto posterior probability distributions. A human-like sampling process, the Autocorrelated Bayesian Sampler (ABS), then samples hypotheses from those posteriors to generate diverse behavioral responses while accounting for systematic deviations from normative predictions. This combination of realistic representations with a general-purpose algorithmic decision process enables cognitive mechanisms to be implemented and transferred across tasks at real-world scale. Through three case studies spanning multiple domains and stimulus modalities, we demonstrate the generality of the IBM-ABS framework in explaining human behavior both qualitatively and quantitatively, and explore its capacity to yield new theoretical insights through incorporating realistic priors and predicting the effects of experimental manipulations.
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e161
Agreements and disagreements with resource-rational contractualism
The commentaries collectively provide a thoughtful and constructive analysis of resource-rational contractualism (RRC), helping both to push the theory forward and clarifying its limitations. We use these as a springboard to revise and improve upon the ideas presented in the target article. Our replies are organized in three main themes: possible extensions, challenges, and wider applications.
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e161
Agreements and disagreements with resource-rational contractualism
The commentaries collectively provide a thoughtful and constructive analysis of resource-rational contractualism (RRC), helping both to push the theory forward and clarifying its limitations. We use these as a springboard to revise and improve upon the ideas presented in the target article. Our replies are organized in three main themes: possible extensions, challenges, and wider applications.