JFJohanna K. Falben

Johanna K. Falben

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Johanna K. Falben has a total of 67 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Autocorrelated Bayesian Decision Maker: Mental Sampling Processes Capture Preference, Confidence and Response Time in Risky Choice

    by Jake Spicer, Yun-Xiao Li, Lucas Castillo, Johanna Falben, Stella Qian, Adam N Sanborn

    Modern models of preferential decision making have achieved substantial success in predicting choice behaviour both qualitatively and quantitatively, but often overlook related aspects such as response time or confidence. In parallel, recently proposed mental sampling frameworks have offered broad explanations for multiple aspects of behaviour including probability judgments, perceptual estimates and numerical forecasts, but have not yet been applied to preferential choice. Here, we seek to unite these lines of research by extending one such framework, the Autocorrelated Bayesian Sampler (ABS; Zhu et al., 2024), to decisions between alternatives which differ in the value of their potential outcomes. We present a new version of the ABS adapted to such decisions, the Autocorrelated Bayesian Decision Maker (ABDM), able to predict not just choices, but also reaction times and confidence in selections. We compare the predictions of the ABDM against extant choice and response time data in risky choice tasks, finding strong correspondence in both. We also contrast the new model against leading explanations for behaviour in such tasks, showing the ABDM is competitive in choice and ahead in response times. We thus propose this model as a broader approach to decision making capable of explaining multiple measures from a common process.

  • Open Access

    Does Outcome Utility Bias the Mental Simulations of Risky Events?

    by Yun-Xiao Li, Johanna Falben, Lucas Castillo, Jake Spicer, Jian-Qiao Zhu, Stella Qian, Nick Chater, Adam N Sanborn

    Does the utility of an outcome influence people's assessment of risk and uncertainty? Prominent theories propose that people rely on mental simulation to evaluate probabilities and risky events, yet prior empirical findings is mixed as to whether and how utility biases this process. Across four experiments (total N=206, with Experiment 4 pre-registered), we tested this question using a random generation paradigm, in which participants mentally simulated gamble outcomes and said them out loud. Then we compared these responses with probability judgments and predictions. While we identified individual differences, the majority of participants exhibited neutrality, with no systematic impact of utility on their sampling distributions. Nevertheless, an optimism subgroup emerged, with a larger proportion of optimistic participants when the monetary context was more salient. Additionally, outcome utilities have similar effects on probability judgments, predictions, and random generation tasks, consistent with the proposal that these tasks are related to each other and may all rely on mental simulation. These findings indicate that utility does not uniformly distort mental simulation, but can do so for a stable subgroup under particular motivational contexts, and they motivate cognitive models that capture both unbiased and optimistic forms of mental sampling.

  • Open Access

    Belief Elicitation With Random Generation Tasks

    by Pablo León-Villagrá, Lucas Castillo, Johanna K. Falbén, Nick Chater, Adam Sanborn

    Measuring people's beliefs is important for psychology, applied statistics, and AI alignment, yet established elicitation techniques yield only coarse distributional summaries and can introduce systematic biases. Here we propose random generation---asking participants to produce values as unpredictably as possible---as a belief elicitation method. Our approach draws on theories of mental sampling and needs no visual interface. In three preregistered experiments spanning nine domains, we compared random generation to two standard methods: decile elicitation (Experiments~1--2) and likelihood elicitation (Experiment~3). In Experiments~1 and~2, random generation produced distributions that were overall as close or closer to environmental data than decile elicitation, and predicted participants' conditional expectations at least as well. Random generation also captured idiosyncratic distributional features in one of three tested domains, the irregular score structure of NFL games. In Experiment~3, we elicited categorical distributions---participants' beliefs about the popularity of holiday destinations---and assessed whether they could predict participants' conditional judgments in a different domain (holiday flight durations). Random generation again captured environmental regularities comparably to likelihood elicitation for the derived flight-duration distributions, and both methods were similarly effective in capturing people's conditional predictions.Finally, aggregating small groups of participants on average moved the pooled distributions closer to the environment in all three experiments, and predictive accuracy improved at comparable rates for both tasks. These findings establish random generation as a versatile tool for recovering distributional beliefs and a practical complement to established techniques.

  • Open Access

    Eliciting Beliefs with Random Generation Tasks

    by Pablo Leon-Villagra, Lucas Castillo, Johanna Falben, Nick Chater, Adam N Sanborn

    Elicitation methods, such as asking people to produce the deciles of a distribution, are standard practices in policy or applied statistics. Similarly, much of cognitive science and psychology focuses on determining people's people's beliefs or latent traits through questionnaires or judgment tasks. However, these approaches often only capture a rough outline of what people know and are usually limited to point estimates of people's beliefs. Here, we present a novel experimental paradigm that allows us to access people's beliefs and how variable these beliefs are. Our task is based on an established random generation paradigm in which participants produce quantities from a particular domain as randomly as possible. We hypothesize that due to the minds' general-purpose mechanisms for probabilistic inferences, these random sequences represent the participants' underlying prior beliefs. We show that our method can infer participants' beliefs for a wide range of numeric quantities at comparable accuracy as an established elicitation method.Moreover, these inferred beliefs are consistent with individual participants' generalization and inference patterns in a subsequent conditional prediction task. We then extend our approach to non-numeric belief elicitation, highlighting how our method can go beyond numeric elicitation and provide insight into complex beliefs that are challenging to assess experimentally. Empirically, our results highlight that people know the rough shapes of environmental distributions, and these beliefs guide inference and generalization. Moreover, using our novel approach, we also show that people know the fine details of environmental distributions. Finally, our experimental results show that random generation paradigms can be a useful tool for cognitive scientists, psychologists, and applied statisticians.

  • Open Access

    Generated outcomes in risky choice reveal biased sampling and sequential dependencies

    by Jake Spicer, Yun-Xiao Li, Lucas Castillo, Johanna K. Falbén, C. Stella Qian, Adam N. Sanborn

    Recent decision-making models have explained behaviour using mental sampling mechanisms, but there is still little agreement on the specific sampling process, such as whether sampling rates match true probabilities. Here, we seek to trace the sampling process using generation tasks: in two experiments using general online samples ( N s = 52, 51), participants repeatedly produced potential outcomes from pairs of monetary gambles before choosing between them. Results found over-generation of rarer outcomes and under-generation of common outcomes overall, but not in initial responses, as well as avoidance of direct repetitions. Participants also tended to select options with higher average utility across their responses, implying generations guided choice. These findings suggest systematic biases in the information people may consider before a choice, and the influence that this can have on subsequent decisions, carrying implications for mental sampling models of this behaviour. We thus suggest explicit generation is a valuable method to access underlying choice processes, offering new assessments of existing theories of decision making.

  • Open Access

    Random generation is what comes to mind in naturalistic settings

    by Lucas Castillo, Pablo León-Villagrá, Johanna K. Falbén, Nick Chater, Adam N. Sanborn


  • Open Access

    Random Generation is What Comes to Mind in Naturalistic Settings

    by Lucas Castillo, Pablo Leon-Villagra, Johanna Falben, Nick Chater, Adam N Sanborn

    Being unpredictable is useful for creativity, exploration, and good decision-making. Decades of research asking people to generate random sequences of numbers have concluded that people systematically deviate from randomness, but individuals do so in very idiosyncratic ways. However, there is no consensus on the cause of these rich individual differences: most theories postulate that people achieve this by spending cognitive resources monitoring their own output and changing the way they say items accordingly, whereas a Local Sampling account postulates that people tap into a general-purpose ability to produce samples, which they would use to make judgments and choices, and which are inherently somewhat unpredictable. Here we distinguish between these possibilities by asking people to generate sequences both at random and as they come to mind. We employ several measures tapping into different ways sequences could deviate from randomness. We find that, consistent with the Local Sampling explanation, people deviate from randomness in virtually identical ways in both sequences, with high individual differences pointing to a common cognitive process. We follow up these findings by computationally modeling human performance using several Local Sampling models. We find many participants had the same model as best-fitting in both sequences; with estimated parameters correlating strongly across tasks showing individual differences in how dependent on previous items sampling is. Overall, we conclude that random generation is better understood as employing a general-purpose faculty, Local Sampling, which is stable across time and tasks, with differences in the sampler’s features resulting in differences in random generation performance.

  • Open Access

    Does Outcome Utility Bias the Mental Simulations of Risky Events?

    by Yun-Xiao Li, Johanna K. Falbén, Lucas Castillo, Jake Spicer, Jian-Qiao Zhu, C. Stella Qian, Nick Chater, Adam Sanborn

    Does the utility of an outcome influence people's assessment of risk and uncertainty? Prominent theories propose that people rely on mental simulation to evaluate probabilities and risky events, yet prior empirical findings is mixed as to whether and how utility biases this process. Across four experiments (total N=206, with Experiment 4 pre-registered), we tested this question using a random generation paradigm, in which participants mentally simulated gamble outcomes and said them out loud. Then we compared these responses with probability judgments and predictions. While we identified individual differences, the majority of participants exhibited neutrality, with no systematic impact of utility on their sampling distributions. Nevertheless, an optimism subgroup emerged, with a larger proportion of optimistic participants when the monetary context was more salient. Additionally, outcome utilities have similar effects on probability judgments, predictions, and random generation tasks, consistent with the proposal that these tasks are related to each other and may all rely on mental simulation. These findings indicate that utility does not uniformly distort mental simulation, but can do so for a stable subgroup under particular motivational contexts, and they motivate cognitive models that capture both unbiased and optimistic forms of mental sampling.

  • Open Access

    Believing is seeing: Pre-existing beliefs influence information search and shape decisions in dynamic social environments

    by Johanna Falben, David Amodio, Marte Otten

    We investigated whether gender-based societal beliefs shape the way individuals gather information and draw conclusions—an effect that may support the persistence of gender stereotypes. Three pre-registered experiments (N = 210) used a dynamic sampling paradigm, in which participants estimated the gender distribution of the workforce of fictitious companies representing highly gendered professions (e.g., mechanic, hairdresser). Participants could learn about the workforce of each company by viewing up to ten pictures of its employees, in which the gender of the first two faces either confirmed, disconfirmed, or remained neutral with regard to societal expectations about the profession. When initial evidence matched (vs. mismatched) expectations, participants sampled fewer faces. And when participants did view additional faces in belief-confirming sequences, these additional faces also skewed towards the gendered expectations, suggesting that participants actively employed strategies leading to selective exposure. Furthermore, both gender-based beliefs and newly sampled information influenced estimates of the workforce gender distributions, with larger effects of newly sampled evidence as the participant viewed more faces. Thus, pre-existing gendered beliefs shaped information sampling and social judgements. Furthermore, early exposure to belief-disconfirming information elicited more extensive and less biased information search. More extensive information search, in return, led to less biased social judgements. This research shows that when social expectations are quickly confirmed, people tend to not look any further, whereas initial belief-challenging information elicits more extensive exploration and less biased conclusions.

  • Open Access

    Biased Mind or Biased World? Assessing How Cultural Beliefs Underlie Social Sampling

    by Johanna Falben, Lucas Castillo, Pablo Leon-Villagra, Nick Chater, Adam N Sanborn

    Societal expectations have been found to determine which social roles people should occupy. However, so far, these beliefs have been mainly explored with self-report and response conflict measures where expectation-confirming (vs. violating) judgments elicit faster responding. The present lab study (N = 57) applied a novel approach – the random generation paradigm – to understand how pre-existing social assumptions determine which information is retrieved from memory when prompted by different social categories. Specifically, we asked participants to imagine (hypothetical) people working in certain professions and to say their names out loud. We found that the statistics of the uttered names reflected societal gender stereotypes and environmental statistics of actual people working in these occupations. Importantly, the proportion of female and male names generated for each profession by each participant predicted their performance in a sequential priming task (prime = stereotyped professions, target = female and male faces) better than the environmental statistics or participants’ estimates of gender proportions. Together, these findings offer a new, and widely applicable, method for exploring cultural beliefs and help clarify how social information is sampled from memory when making social judgments.