Eric Kamwa
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Eric Kamwa has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mostapha Diss
Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE (UR 3190), Besançon, France
8 shared publications - Abdelmonaim Tlidi
University Cadi Ayyad of Marrakesh, LMPEQ, National School of Applied Science-Safi, Route Sidi Bouzid, B.P. 63, 46000 Safi, Morocco
3 shared publications - Gilles Joseph
Univ Antilles, Fac Droit & Econ Martinique, LC2S UMR CNRS 8053, F-97209 Schoelcher, Martinique, France
3 shared publications Vincent Merlin
3 shared publications- Clinton Gubong Gassi
Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE (UR 3190), Besançon, France
2 shared publications - Mohamed Mansour
University of Paris-Dauphine, Tunisia
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 19 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Organization Review
- Vol. 25 (4) , 2085-2101
Understanding Voluntary Citizen Engagement Amid Weak Policy Responses: the Case of the Sargassum Seaweed Crisis in the French West Indies
- 19 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Organization Review
- Vol. 25 (4) , 2085-2101
Understanding Voluntary Citizen Engagement Amid Weak Policy Responses: the Case of the Sargassum Seaweed Crisis in the French West Indies
- Open Access
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 328 (1) , 258-268
On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 328 (1) , 258-268
Open AccessOn the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules
- Open Access
- 29 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 61
q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules
- 29 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 61
Open Accessq-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules
- 1 October 2024
- Published by Bristol University Press in Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice
- Vol. 39 (2) , 163-179
Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries
The aim of this article is to study empirically the relationship between political governance and public debt by testing a number of hypotheses. We examine the effects of the dispersion of power on public debt with an econometric study carried out on a sample of 13 developed countries using macroeconomic and political data covering the period 1996–2012. It is found that the lack of consensus between political parties in a government coalition and the dispersion of power within the government are factors explaining the increase in public debt.
- 1 October 2024
- Published by Bristol University Press in Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice
- Vol. 39 (2) , 163-179
Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries
The aim of this article is to study empirically the relationship between political governance and public debt by testing a number of hypotheses. We examine the effects of the dispersion of power on public debt with an econometric study carried out on a sample of 13 developed countries using macroeconomic and political data covering the period 1996–2012. It is found that the lack of consensus between political parties in a government coalition and the dispersion of power within the government are factors explaining the increase in public debt.
- Open Access
On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules
We consider a model of multi-winner elections, where each voter expresses a linear preference over a finite set of alternatives. Based on voters’ preferences, the primary goal is to select a subset of admissible alternatives, forming what is referred to as a committee. We explore (weakly) separable committee scoring rules, the voting mechanisms that assess each alternative individually using a scoring vector and select the top k alternatives, where k represents the committee’s size. Furthermore, we operate under the assumption that alternatives are categorized based on specific attributes. Within each attribute category, there exists a targeted minimum number of alternatives that the selected committee should encompass, emphasizing the necessity for diversity. In this context, we assess the cost associated with imposing such a diversity constraint on the voting process. This assessment is conducted through two methodologies, referred to as the “price of diversity” and the “individual price of diversity”. We set the upper bounds for both prices across all (weakly) separable committee scoring rules. Additionally, we show how the maximum price of diver- sity can be used to discriminate between different voting rules in this context. Ultimately, we illustrate that concentrating on the candidates’ performance yields a more accurate estimation of the price of diversity compared to a focus on the enforced diversity constraint.
Open AccessOn the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules
We consider a model of multi-winner elections, where each voter expresses a linear preference over a finite set of alternatives. Based on voters’ preferences, the primary goal is to select a subset of admissible alternatives, forming what is referred to as a committee. We explore (weakly) separable committee scoring rules, the voting mechanisms that assess each alternative individually using a scoring vector and select the top k alternatives, where k represents the committee’s size. Furthermore, we operate under the assumption that alternatives are categorized based on specific attributes. Within each attribute category, there exists a targeted minimum number of alternatives that the selected committee should encompass, emphasizing the necessity for diversity. In this context, we assess the cost associated with imposing such a diversity constraint on the voting process. This assessment is conducted through two methodologies, referred to as the “price of diversity” and the “individual price of diversity”. We set the upper bounds for both prices across all (weakly) separable committee scoring rules. Additionally, we show how the maximum price of diver- sity can be used to discriminate between different voting rules in this context. Ultimately, we illustrate that concentrating on the candidates’ performance yields a more accurate estimation of the price of diversity compared to a focus on the enforced diversity constraint.
- Open Access
Scoring Run-off Rules, Single-peaked Preferences and Paradoxes of Variable Electorate
This paper analyzes the vulnerability of scoring run-off rules to abstention andparticipation paradoxes when voters preferences are single-peaked. These paradoxes occur when the size of the electorate varies (grows or diminishes). In particular, the Abstention or No-show paradox occurs when a voter is better off by not casting his ballot in the election. First, we show that all the scoring run-off rules that always elect the Condorcet winner on this domain are immune to the different forms of Abstention and Participation paradoxes. Secondly, when these paradoxes are still possible, we compute their likelihood in three-candidate elections under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption. We conclude that considering the single-peaked domain drastically reduces, and even sometimes eliminates the impact of No-show paradoxes, for scoring run-off rules.
Open AccessScoring Run-off Rules, Single-peaked Preferences and Paradoxes of Variable Electorate
This paper analyzes the vulnerability of scoring run-off rules to abstention andparticipation paradoxes when voters preferences are single-peaked. These paradoxes occur when the size of the electorate varies (grows or diminishes). In particular, the Abstention or No-show paradox occurs when a voter is better off by not casting his ballot in the election. First, we show that all the scoring run-off rules that always elect the Condorcet winner on this domain are immune to the different forms of Abstention and Participation paradoxes. Secondly, when these paradoxes are still possible, we compute their likelihood in three-candidate elections under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption. We conclude that considering the single-peaked domain drastically reduces, and even sometimes eliminates the impact of No-show paradoxes, for scoring run-off rules.
- 23 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 196 (1-2) , 169-205
On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting
- 23 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 196 (1-2) , 169-205
On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting
- Open Access
On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting
Preference Approval Voting (PAV) and Fallback Voting (FV) are two voting rules that combine approval and preferences, first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, voters rank the candidates and indicate which ones they approve of; with FV, they rank only those candidates they approve of. In this paper, we further develop the work of Brams and Sanver (2009) by exploring some other normative properties of FV and PAV. We show among other things that FV and PAV satisfy and fail the same criteria; they possess two properties that AV does not: Pareto optimality and the fact of always electing the Absolute Condorcet winner when he exists. To provide a practical comparison, we evaluate the probabilities of satisfying the Condorcet majority criteria for three-candidate elections and a considerably large electorate, examining FV and PAV alongside other voting rules. Our findings indicate that PAV outperforms the Borda rule in this regard. Furthermore, we observe that in terms of agreement, FV and PAV align more closely with scoring rules than with Approval Voting. Our analysis is performed under the impartial anonymous culture assumption.
Open AccessOn Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting
Preference Approval Voting (PAV) and Fallback Voting (FV) are two voting rules that combine approval and preferences, first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, voters rank the candidates and indicate which ones they approve of; with FV, they rank only those candidates they approve of. In this paper, we further develop the work of Brams and Sanver (2009) by exploring some other normative properties of FV and PAV. We show among other things that FV and PAV satisfy and fail the same criteria; they possess two properties that AV does not: Pareto optimality and the fact of always electing the Absolute Condorcet winner when he exists. To provide a practical comparison, we evaluate the probabilities of satisfying the Condorcet majority criteria for three-candidate elections and a considerably large electorate, examining FV and PAV alongside other voting rules. Our findings indicate that PAV outperforms the Borda rule in this regard. Furthermore, we observe that in terms of agreement, FV and PAV align more closely with scoring rules than with Approval Voting. Our analysis is performed under the impartial anonymous culture assumption.
- 5 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 25-42
Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures
- Open Access
The Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection
In committee selection setting, we introduce the Condorcet Loser Committee (CLC) which when it exists, is a committee such that each of its members is defeated in pairwise comparisons by any outside candidate. It turns out that most popular committee selection rules can elect the CLC when it exists. From the perspective of the Condorcet majority criterion, the election of the CLC is simply not acceptable. We identify the few rules that will never elect the CLC when it exists. We show among others that the k-Borda rule is the only k-scoring committee rule that never select the CLC. This also holds with k-iterative Borda rule, Nanson rule, Kemeny rule, Copeland rule. As a corollary, it appeared that the Chamberlin-Courant rule can elect the CLC when it exists.
Open AccessThe Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection
In committee selection setting, we introduce the Condorcet Loser Committee (CLC) which when it exists, is a committee such that each of its members is defeated in pairwise comparisons by any outside candidate. It turns out that most popular committee selection rules can elect the CLC when it exists. From the perspective of the Condorcet majority criterion, the election of the CLC is simply not acceptable. We identify the few rules that will never elect the CLC when it exists. We show among others that the k-Borda rule is the only k-scoring committee rule that never select the CLC. This also holds with k-iterative Borda rule, Nanson rule, Kemeny rule, Copeland rule. As a corollary, it appeared that the Chamberlin-Courant rule can elect the CLC when it exists.