Clinton Gubong Gassi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Clinton Gubong Gassi has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mostapha Diss
Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE (UR 3190), Besançon, France
3 shared publications - Eric Kamwa
LC2S UMR CNRS 8053 Univ. des Antilles Schoelcher Cedex F-97275 Martinique France
2 shared publications - Issofa Moyouwou
Ecole Normale Supérieure - Department of Mathematics, University of Yaounde I, Yaounde, Cameroon
2 shared publications Frank Steffen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 34 (4) , 683-713
Combining Diversity and Excellence in Multiwinner Elections
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 34 (4) , 683-713
Combining Diversity and Excellence in Multiwinner Elections
- Open Access
- 29 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 61
q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules
- 29 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 61
Open Accessq-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules
- Open Access
- 23 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 135
Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule
- 23 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 135
Open AccessMulti-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule
- 18 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (3) , 557-572
A characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures
- 18 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (3) , 557-572
A characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures
- 22 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 56
Weighted scoring rules for selecting a compatible committee
- 22 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 56
Weighted scoring rules for selecting a compatible committee
- Open Access
A characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures
We consider cooperative games where the coalition structure is given by the set of winning coalitions of a simple game. This type of games models some real-life situations in which some agents have economic performances while some others are endowed with a political power. On this class of cooperative games, the Myerson value has been identified as the Harsanyi power solution associated to the Equal Division power index and has been characterized in the large class of Harsanyi power solutions with respect to the associated power index. In this paper, we provide a characterization of the Myerson value for this class of games without focusing on the whole family of Harsanyi power solutions and therefore, without taking into account any power index. We identify the Myerson value as the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, additivity, modularity, extra-null player property, and Equal Treatment of Veto.
Open AccessA characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures
We consider cooperative games where the coalition structure is given by the set of winning coalitions of a simple game. This type of games models some real-life situations in which some agents have economic performances while some others are endowed with a political power. On this class of cooperative games, the Myerson value has been identified as the Harsanyi power solution associated to the Equal Division power index and has been characterized in the large class of Harsanyi power solutions with respect to the associated power index. In this paper, we provide a characterization of the Myerson value for this class of games without focusing on the whole family of Harsanyi power solutions and therefore, without taking into account any power index. We identify the Myerson value as the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, additivity, modularity, extra-null player property, and Equal Treatment of Veto.
- Open Access
On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules
We consider a model of multi-winner elections, where each voter expresses a linear preference over a finite set of alternatives. Based on voters’ preferences, the primary goal is to select a subset of admissible alternatives, forming what is referred to as a committee. We explore (weakly) separable committee scoring rules, the voting mechanisms that assess each alternative individually using a scoring vector and select the top k alternatives, where k represents the committee’s size. Furthermore, we operate under the assumption that alternatives are categorized based on specific attributes. Within each attribute category, there exists a targeted minimum number of alternatives that the selected committee should encompass, emphasizing the necessity for diversity. In this context, we assess the cost associated with imposing such a diversity constraint on the voting process. This assessment is conducted through two methodologies, referred to as the “price of diversity” and the “individual price of diversity”. We set the upper bounds for both prices across all (weakly) separable committee scoring rules. Additionally, we show how the maximum price of diver- sity can be used to discriminate between different voting rules in this context. Ultimately, we illustrate that concentrating on the candidates’ performance yields a more accurate estimation of the price of diversity compared to a focus on the enforced diversity constraint.
Open AccessOn the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules
We consider a model of multi-winner elections, where each voter expresses a linear preference over a finite set of alternatives. Based on voters’ preferences, the primary goal is to select a subset of admissible alternatives, forming what is referred to as a committee. We explore (weakly) separable committee scoring rules, the voting mechanisms that assess each alternative individually using a scoring vector and select the top k alternatives, where k represents the committee’s size. Furthermore, we operate under the assumption that alternatives are categorized based on specific attributes. Within each attribute category, there exists a targeted minimum number of alternatives that the selected committee should encompass, emphasizing the necessity for diversity. In this context, we assess the cost associated with imposing such a diversity constraint on the voting process. This assessment is conducted through two methodologies, referred to as the “price of diversity” and the “individual price of diversity”. We set the upper bounds for both prices across all (weakly) separable committee scoring rules. Additionally, we show how the maximum price of diver- sity can be used to discriminate between different voting rules in this context. Ultimately, we illustrate that concentrating on the candidates’ performance yields a more accurate estimation of the price of diversity compared to a focus on the enforced diversity constraint.
- 6 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 61 (3) , 489-510
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
- 6 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 61 (3) , 489-510
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule