Pamela Lyon

The concept of Umwelt refers to the phenomenal world of an organism, defined by its sensesand what it does to stay alive, thrive and reproduce. Umwelt had a powerful influence on howthe scientific study of animal behavior under natural conditions developed in the middledecades of the 20th century and currently is enjoying renewed interest in the field ofcomparative cognition. Traditionally, animals have been the exclusive focus of Umwelt-basedanalysis. This chapter focuses on Myxococcus xanthus, a predatory bacterium with an unusual,complex social lifestyle. The presentation is intended to show that the Umwelt concept can beuseful in unpacking, in radically alien forms of life, processes regarded as cognitive in animalsand in a context (predator–prey interactions) long important to ethology and comparativepsychology, where Umwelt has done most work.

Cognitive biology, as a scientific program-in-waiting, is the direct (if unacknowledged) offspring of the 20th century revolution in molecular biology, which revealed for the first time the deep, nonmetaphorical parallels between the activities of biological components and processes and the knowledge-generating capabilities characteristic of cognition. The article examines cognitive biology’s parentage—Brian C. Goodwin and Ladislav Kováč—and the context which gave birth to it, twice. Special reference is made to Kováč, without whose work, which is honored in this special issue, cognitive biology as such could have perished. Putting to one side Kováč’s own continuing work in the area, cognitive biology developed in the 21st century both in ways he and Goodwin (who died in 2009) would recognize and in ways they would not. One of the paths taken within their lineage is my own, which has travelled under different labels (the biogenic approach to cognition, basal cognition) and developed, also independently, from unorthodox beginnings. It is important to emphasize that cognitive biology is not simply the “biologizing” of the study of cognition. In a very real sense, cognitive biology is not about cognition—as a biological function of whole organisms—at all. It is a recognition that biological processes, what normally passes for mere physiology and development, have properties traditionally associated with cognitive capacities in animals, properties that are inadequately captured by a generic (usually poorly specified) notion of “information processing.” Cognitive biology is related to the search for the biological basis of cognition, and does much to illuminate that search, but was never motivated by that search. It was motivated entirely by the search for a more general biological theory. Inspired by Kováč’s seminal “Fundamental Principles of Cognitive Biology,” a considerably expanded set of principles is gathered here for the first time from multiple sources. Together they show how cognitive biology reunites the sciences of life and cognition on a foundation that is gratifyingly substantial, and which may point the way to a future science.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens'.

Valence is half of the pair of properties that constitute core affect, the foundation of emotion. But what is valence, and where is it found in the natural world? Currently, this question cannot be answered. The idea that emotion is the body's way of driving the organism to secure its survival, thriving and reproduction runs like a leitmotif from the pathfinding work of Antonio Damasio through four book-length neuroscientific accounts of emotion recently published by the field's leading practitioners. Yet while Damasio concluded 20 years ago that the homeostasis–affect linkage is rooted in unicellular life, no agreement exists about whether even non-human animals with brains experience emotions. Simple neural animals—those less brainy than bees, fruit flies and other charismatic invertebrates—are not even on the radar of contemporary affective research, to say nothing of aneural organisms. This near-sightedness has effectively denied the most productive method available for getting a grip on highly complex biological processes to a scientific domain whose importance for understanding biological decision-making cannot be underestimated. Valence arguably is the fulcrum around which the dance of life revolves. Without the ability to discriminate advantage from harm, life very quickly comes to an end. In this paper, we review the concept of valence, where it came from, the work it does in current leading theories of emotion, and some of the odd features revealed via experiment. We present a biologically grounded framework for investigating valence in any organism and sketch a preliminary pathway to a computational model. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Basal cognition: conceptual tools and the view from the single cell’.

The premise of this two-part theme issue is simple: the cognitive sciences should join the rest of the life sciences in how they approach the quarry within their research domain. Specifically, understanding how organisms on the lower branches of the phylogenetic tree become familiar with, value and exploit elements of an ecological niche while avoiding harm can be expected to aid understanding of how organisms that evolved later (including Homo sapiens ) do the same or similar things. We call this approach basal cognition. In this introductory essay, we explain what the approach involves. Because no definition of cognition exists that reflects its biological basis, we advance a working definition that can be operationalized; introduce a behaviour-generating toolkit of capacities that comprise the function (e.g. sensing/perception, memory, valence, learning, decision making, communication), each element of which can be studied relatively independently; and identify a (necessarily incomplete) suite of common biophysical mechanisms found throughout the domains of life involved in implementing the toolkit. The articles in this collection illuminate different aspects of basal cognition across different forms of biological organization, from prokaryotes and single-celled eukaryotes—the focus of Part 1—to plants and finally to animals, without and with nervous systems, the focus of Part 2. By showcasing work in diverse, currently disconnected fields, we hope to sketch the outline of a new multidisciplinary approach for comprehending cognition, arguably the most fascinating and hard-to-fathom evolved function on this planet. Doing so has the potential to shed light on problems in a wide variety of research domains, including microbiology, immunology, zoology, biophysics, botany, developmental biology, neurobiology/science, regenerative medicine, computational biology, artificial life and synthetic bioengineering. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Basal cognition: conceptual tools and the view from the single cell’.

Evidence exists that suggests that women are vulnerable to negative HIV treatment outcomes worldwide. This study explored barriers to treatment outcomes of women in Jimma, Southwest Ethiopia. We interviewed 11 HIV patients, 9 health workers, 10 community advocates and 5 HIV program managers from 10 institutions using an in-depth interview guide designed to probe barriers to HIV care at individual, community, healthcare provider, and government policy levels. To systematically analyze the data, we applied a thematic framework analysis using NVivo. In total, 35 participants were involved in the study and provided the following interrelated barriers: (i) Availability— most women living in rural areas who accessed HIV cared less often than men; (ii) free antiretroviral therapy (ART) is expensive—most women who have low income and who live in urban areas sold ART drugs illegally to cover ART associated costs; (iii) fear of being seen by others—negative consequences of HIV related stigma was higher in women than men; (iv) the role of tradition—the dominance of patriarchy was found to be the primary barrier to women’s HIV care and treatment outcomes. In conclusion, barriers related to culture or tradition constrain women’s access to HIV care. Therefore, policies and strategies should focus on these contextual constrains.

Barrett is to be applauded for attempting to build a case for motivated activity as “reasons that act as causes.” Had he stuck to the plan he set out at the beginning of his essay, and assiduously worked on clarifying the very difficult issues involved in this extremely ambitious venture, he would have had an excellent foundation for further development. Unfortunately, he fell into some conceptual and methodological traps that have claimed many. This commentary aims to suggest some ways forward.