Stephan Leuenberger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Stephan Leuenberger has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Journal of Philosophy Inc.
1 shared publication- Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
1 shared publication - Philipp Keller
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico
1 shared publication Philosophy Documentation Center
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
Comparative fundamentality and levels of reality
Much philosophy presupposes a picture of reality as stratified into levels or layers. Yet a precise articulation of such a picture has been missing. It is tempting to think that we now have the tools to remedy this, notably due to ground-theoretic accounts of relative fundamentality. One might expect levels of facts, and their hierarchical arrangement, to be definable from relative fundamentality among facts. I show that such a project can at best partially succeed, by establishing certain limitative results. Moreover, I argue that the limitations should not be surprising, in light of an analogy between levels of reality and instants of time. Facts may exist at more than one level, just like persisting objects exist at more than one time. Finally, I develop a new positive proposal, on which levels are not made up of facts, but of what I call “fact realisations”—roughly, facts together with a complete genealogy of their grounds.
- 22 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
Open AccessComparative fundamentality and levels of reality
Much philosophy presupposes a picture of reality as stratified into levels or layers. Yet a precise articulation of such a picture has been missing. It is tempting to think that we now have the tools to remedy this, notably due to ground-theoretic accounts of relative fundamentality. One might expect levels of facts, and their hierarchical arrangement, to be definable from relative fundamentality among facts. I show that such a project can at best partially succeed, by establishing certain limitative results. Moreover, I argue that the limitations should not be surprising, in light of an analogy between levels of reality and instants of time. Facts may exist at more than one level, just like persisting objects exist at more than one time. Finally, I develop a new positive proposal, on which levels are not made up of facts, but of what I call “fact realisations”—roughly, facts together with a complete genealogy of their grounds.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 13
Constructing a Scrutability Base
How can we construct a concise and ideologically parsimonious scrutability base—a summary that a priori implies everything that is true in a given scenario? A natural approach is to proceed in stages: first, summarise what is true about the world of the scenario; second, what is true about the individual at the centre of the scenario; and third what is true about the time at the centre of the scenario (David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World). I use a fiction involving an a priori intelligence agency to show that this approach fails for certain types of scenarios: those that display glide reflection symmetries, and those that contain coincident entities. I present a solution to the problem raised by glide reflection symmetries. However, I argue that the problem of coincident entities may have wider ramifications for the question of how we can construct an optimally concise and ideologically parsimonious scrutability base.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 13
Open AccessConstructing a Scrutability Base
How can we construct a concise and ideologically parsimonious scrutability base—a summary that a priori implies everything that is true in a given scenario? A natural approach is to proceed in stages: first, summarise what is true about the world of the scenario; second, what is true about the individual at the centre of the scenario; and third what is true about the time at the centre of the scenario (David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World). I use a fiction involving an a priori intelligence agency to show that this approach fails for certain types of scenarios: those that display glide reflection symmetries, and those that contain coincident entities. I present a solution to the problem raised by glide reflection symmetries. However, I argue that the problem of coincident entities may have wider ramifications for the question of how we can construct an optimally concise and ideologically parsimonious scrutability base.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 77 (4) , 385-406
Circular Paths and Infinite Descent
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 77 (4) , 385-406
Open AccessCircular Paths and Infinite Descent
- Open Access
- 9 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 177 (11) , 3571-3593
Structural problems for reductionism
Universal reductionism—the sort of project pursued by Carnap in the Aufbau, Lewis in his campaign on behalf of Humean supervenience, Jackson in From Metaphysics to Ethics, and Chalmers in Constructing the World—aims to reduce everything to some specified base, more or less austere as it may be. In this paper, I identify two constraints that a promising strategy to argue for universal reductionism needs to satisfy: the exhaustion constraint and the chaining constraint. As a case study, I then consider Chalmers’ Constructing the World, in which a priori implication, or “scrutability”, plays the role of reduction. Chalmers first divides up the total vocabulary of our language into different families, and then argues, for each family separately, that truths involving expressions in that family are scrutable from the putative base. He does not systematically address the question whether “cross-family sentences”—sentences involving expressions from more than one family—are scrutable. I shall argue that this lacuna cannot be filled, since scrutability does not allow for the exhaustion constraint and the chaining constraint to be jointly satisfied. I further suggest that Carnap’s account, in which definability plays the role of reduction, has better prospects of meeting these constraints.
- 9 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 177 (11) , 3571-3593
Open AccessStructural problems for reductionism
Universal reductionism—the sort of project pursued by Carnap in the Aufbau, Lewis in his campaign on behalf of Humean supervenience, Jackson in From Metaphysics to Ethics, and Chalmers in Constructing the World—aims to reduce everything to some specified base, more or less austere as it may be. In this paper, I identify two constraints that a promising strategy to argue for universal reductionism needs to satisfy: the exhaustion constraint and the chaining constraint. As a case study, I then consider Chalmers’ Constructing the World, in which a priori implication, or “scrutability”, plays the role of reduction. Chalmers first divides up the total vocabulary of our language into different families, and then argues, for each family separately, that truths involving expressions in that family are scrutable from the putative base. He does not systematically address the question whether “cross-family sentences”—sentences involving expressions from more than one family—are scrutable. I shall argue that this lacuna cannot be filled, since scrutability does not allow for the exhaustion constraint and the chaining constraint to be jointly satisfied. I further suggest that Carnap’s account, in which definability plays the role of reduction, has better prospects of meeting these constraints.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (5) , 4751-4774
Epistemic logic without closure
All standard epistemic logics legitimate something akin to the principle of closure, according to which knowledge is closed under competent deductive inference. And yet the principle of closure, particularly in its multiple premise guise, has a somewhat ambivalent status within epistemology. One might think that serious concerns about closure point us away from epistemic logic altogether—away from the very idea that the knowledge relation could be fruitfully treated as a kind of modal operator. This, however, need not be so. The abandonment of closure may yet leave in place plenty of formal structure amenable to systematic logical treatment. In this paper we describe a family of weak epistemic logics in which closure fails, and describe two alternative semantic frameworks in which these logics can be modelled. One of these—which we termplurality semantics—is relatively unfamiliar. We explore under what conditions plurality frames validate certain much-discussed principles of epistemic logic. It turns out that plurality frames can be interpreted in a very natural way in light of one motivation for rejecting closure, adding to the significance of our technical work. The second framework that we employ—neighbourhood semantics—is much better known. But we show that it too can be interpreted in a way that comports with a certain motivation for rejecting closure.
- 27 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (5) , 4751-4774
Open AccessEpistemic logic without closure
All standard epistemic logics legitimate something akin to the principle of closure, according to which knowledge is closed under competent deductive inference. And yet the principle of closure, particularly in its multiple premise guise, has a somewhat ambivalent status within epistemology. One might think that serious concerns about closure point us away from epistemic logic altogether—away from the very idea that the knowledge relation could be fruitfully treated as a kind of modal operator. This, however, need not be so. The abandonment of closure may yet leave in place plenty of formal structure amenable to systematic logical treatment. In this paper we describe a family of weak epistemic logics in which closure fails, and describe two alternative semantic frameworks in which these logics can be modelled. One of these—which we termplurality semantics—is relatively unfamiliar. We explore under what conditions plurality frames validate certain much-discussed principles of epistemic logic. It turns out that plurality frames can be interpreted in a very natural way in light of one motivation for rejecting closure, adding to the significance of our technical work. The second framework that we employ—neighbourhood semantics—is much better known. But we show that it too can be interpreted in a way that comports with a certain motivation for rejecting closure.
- Open Access
- 14 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 177 (9) , 2647-2669
The fundamental: Ungrounded or all-grounding?
Fundamentality plays a pivotal role in discussions of ontology, supervenience, and possibility, and other key topics in metaphysics. However, there are two different ways of characterising the fundamental: as that which is not grounded, and as that which is the ground of everything else. I show that whether these two characterisations pick out the same property turns on a principle—which I call “Dichotomy”—that is of independent interest in the theory of ground: that everything is either fully grounded or not even partially grounded. I then argue that Dichotomy fails: some facts have partial grounds that cannot be complemented to a full ground. Rejecting Dichotomy opens the door to recognising a bifurcation in our notion of fundamentality. I sketch some of the far-reaching metaphysical consequences this might have, with reference to big-picture views such as Humeanism. Since Dichotomy is entailed by the standard account of partial ground, according to which partial grounds are subpluralities of full grounds, a non-standard account is needed. In a technical “Appendix”, I show that truthmaker semantics furnishes such an account, and identify a semantic condition that corresponds to Dichotomy.
- 14 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 177 (9) , 2647-2669
Open AccessThe fundamental: Ungrounded or all-grounding?
Fundamentality plays a pivotal role in discussions of ontology, supervenience, and possibility, and other key topics in metaphysics. However, there are two different ways of characterising the fundamental: as that which is not grounded, and as that which is the ground of everything else. I show that whether these two characterisations pick out the same property turns on a principle—which I call “Dichotomy”—that is of independent interest in the theory of ground: that everything is either fully grounded or not even partially grounded. I then argue that Dichotomy fails: some facts have partial grounds that cannot be complemented to a full ground. Rejecting Dichotomy opens the door to recognising a bifurcation in our notion of fundamentality. I sketch some of the far-reaching metaphysical consequences this might have, with reference to big-picture views such as Humeanism. Since Dichotomy is entailed by the standard account of partial ground, according to which partial grounds are subpluralities of full grounds, a non-standard account is needed. In a technical “Appendix”, I show that truthmaker semantics furnishes such an account, and identify a semantic condition that corresponds to Dichotomy.
- 8 February 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 79 (2) , 290-303
Why It Matters Whether You Are a Contingentist
- 8 February 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 79 (2) , 290-303
Why It Matters Whether You Are a Contingentist
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 115 (8) , 389-422
Global Supervenience without Reducibility
Does the global supervenience of one class on another entail reductionism, in the sense that any property in the former class is definable from properties in the latter class? This question appears to be at the same time formally tractable and philosophically significant. It seems formally tractable because the concepts involved are susceptible to rigorous definition. It is philosophically significant because in a number of debates about inter-level relationships, there are prima facie plausible positions that presuppose that there is no such entailment: standard versions of non-reductive physicalism and of normative non-naturalism accept global supervenience while rejecting reductionism. I identify a gap in an influential argument for the entailment, due to Frank Jackson and Robert Stalnaker, and draw on the model theory of infinitary languages to argue that some globally supervening properties are not reducible.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 115 (8) , 389-422
Global Supervenience without Reducibility
Does the global supervenience of one class on another entail reductionism, in the sense that any property in the former class is definable from properties in the latter class? This question appears to be at the same time formally tractable and philosophically significant. It seems formally tractable because the concepts involved are susceptible to rigorous definition. It is philosophically significant because in a number of debates about inter-level relationships, there are prima facie plausible positions that presuppose that there is no such entailment: standard versions of non-reductive physicalism and of normative non-naturalism accept global supervenience while rejecting reductionism. I identify a gap in an influential argument for the entailment, due to Frank Jackson and Robert Stalnaker, and draw on the model theory of infinitary languages to argue that some globally supervening properties are not reducible.
- 21 December 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Wolff’s Close Shave with Fatalism
Modality played a central role in Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In his extensive writings on the topic, he was unusually explicit about the definitions of modal notions and what sort of principles they satisfy. His alleged endorsement of fatalism prompted his expulsion from Prussia in 1723, an event that caused a major stir among Europe’s intellectual circles. This chapter examines whether Wolff was indeed committed to fatalism, despite his protestations to the contrary. It is argued that Wolff’s theory of propositions allows him to avoid the letter of view: there are truths that are not necessary. However, Wolff fails to make room for the kind of contingency in which his opponents were interested. On the interpretation proposed, Wolff’s view is in the spirit of fatalism.
- 21 December 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Wolff’s Close Shave with Fatalism
Modality played a central role in Christian Wolff’s philosophy. In his extensive writings on the topic, he was unusually explicit about the definitions of modal notions and what sort of principles they satisfy. His alleged endorsement of fatalism prompted his expulsion from Prussia in 1723, an event that caused a major stir among Europe’s intellectual circles. This chapter examines whether Wolff was indeed committed to fatalism, despite his protestations to the contrary. It is argued that Wolff’s theory of propositions allows him to avoid the letter of view: there are truths that are not necessary. However, Wolff fails to make room for the kind of contingency in which his opponents were interested. On the interpretation proposed, Wolff’s view is in the spirit of fatalism.
- 1 March 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 7 (3) , 529-547
TOTAL LOGIC
A typical first stab at explicating the thesis of physicalism is this: physicalism is true iff every fact about the world is entailed by the conjunction of physical facts. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for other hypotheses about the fundamental nature of our world. But it has been recognized that this would leave such hypotheses without the fighting chance that they deserve: certain negative truths, like the truth (if it is one) that there are no angels, are not entailed by the physical facts, but nonetheless do not threaten physicalism. A plausible remedy that has been suggested by Jackson and Chalmers is that physicalism boils down to the thesis that every truth is entailed by the conjunction of the physical facts prefixed by a “that’s it” or “totality” operator. To evaluate this suggestion, we need to know what that operator means, and—since the truth of physicalism hinges on what is entailed by a totality claim—what its logic is. That is, we need to understand the logic of totality, or total logic. In this paper, I add a totality operator to the language of propositional logic and present a model theory for it, building on a suggestion by Chalmers and Jackson. I then prove determination results for a number of different systems.
- 1 March 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 7 (3) , 529-547
TOTAL LOGIC
A typical first stab at explicating the thesis of physicalism is this: physicalism is true iff every fact about the world is entailed by the conjunction of physical facts. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for other hypotheses about the fundamental nature of our world. But it has been recognized that this would leave such hypotheses without the fighting chance that they deserve: certain negative truths, like the truth (if it is one) that there are no angels, are not entailed by the physical facts, but nonetheless do not threaten physicalism. A plausible remedy that has been suggested by Jackson and Chalmers is that physicalism boils down to the thesis that every truth is entailed by the conjunction of the physical facts prefixed by a “that’s it” or “totality” operator. To evaluate this suggestion, we need to know what that operator means, and—since the truth of physicalism hinges on what is entailed by a totality claim—what its logic is. That is, we need to understand the logic of totality, or total logic. In this paper, I add a totality operator to the language of propositional logic and present a model theory for it, building on a suggestion by Chalmers and Jackson. I then prove determination results for a number of different systems.