Edward J. Balistreri
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Edward J. Balistreri has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Russell H. Hillberry
Department of Economics, Economics and Commerce Building, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia
12 shared publicationsThomas F. Rutherford
University of Wisconsin Madison WI USA
10 shared publications- David G. Tarr
International Trade Analysis
6 shared publications Christoph Böhringer
University of Oldenburg Oldenburg Germany
3 shared publications- Zoryana Olekseyuk
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik Bonn Germany
3 shared publications Christine A. McDaniel
United States International Trade Commission
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 34 (3) , 672-696
Tariff: The Most Beautiful Word in the Dictionary?
We consider the welfare impacts of US tariff policy at levels proposed by President Donald J. Trump. General‐equilibrium simulations under a widely used transparent one‐sector trade model reveal sizable US welfare losses. When we extend the model to include bilateral firm selection and high resolution input–output linkages, the US losses escalate. We adopt a theory‐with‐numbers method to perform comparative static simulations over President Trump's stated tariff goals and consider retaliatory responses. Unified symmetric global retaliation to US protection, at the level of Trump's proposal, places 270% of the global efficiency loss on the US, leading to gains for all other regions except Canada. Our new results are dependent on both our incorporation of data (beyond trade flows and trade elasticities) and our structural extensions to consider bilateral selection of firms. We provide a foundation for our results in a computational analysis of optimal tariffs.
- 12 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 34 (3) , 672-696
Open AccessTariff: The Most Beautiful Word in the Dictionary?
We consider the welfare impacts of US tariff policy at levels proposed by President Donald J. Trump. General‐equilibrium simulations under a widely used transparent one‐sector trade model reveal sizable US welfare losses. When we extend the model to include bilateral firm selection and high resolution input–output linkages, the US losses escalate. We adopt a theory‐with‐numbers method to perform comparative static simulations over President Trump's stated tariff goals and consider retaliatory responses. Unified symmetric global retaliation to US protection, at the level of Trump's proposal, places 270% of the global efficiency loss on the US, leading to gains for all other regions except Canada. Our new results are dependent on both our incorporation of data (beyond trade flows and trade elasticities) and our structural extensions to consider bilateral selection of firms. We provide a foundation for our results in a computational analysis of optimal tariffs.
- Open Access
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- p. 1-8
The Trump Administration’s Reciprocal Duties
This article considers the reciprocal duties proposed by the US administration, 2 April 2025. These are large import tariffs that will significantly disrupt the world trading system. Rather than considering the economic impacts of these tariffs, as others have and are doing, this article documents the rationale used to justify these destructive tariffs and their calculation. Using descriptive examples, the proposed duties are shown to be unfounded as reciprocal and generally ill advised.
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- p. 1-8
Open AccessThe Trump Administration’s Reciprocal Duties
This article considers the reciprocal duties proposed by the US administration, 2 April 2025. These are large import tariffs that will significantly disrupt the world trading system. Rather than considering the economic impacts of these tariffs, as others have and are doing, this article documents the rationale used to justify these destructive tariffs and their calculation. Using descriptive examples, the proposed duties are shown to be unfounded as reciprocal and generally ill advised.
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Center for Global Trade Analysis
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-49
Quantifying Disruptive Trade Policies
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Center for Global Trade Analysis
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-49
Quantifying Disruptive Trade Policies
- Open Access
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Center for Global Trade Analysis
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-49
Quantifying Disruptive Trade Policies
We present an innovative analytical framework that captures key mechanisms of international trade, and we demonstrate its usefulness as a tool for quantitative trade policy analysis. Our application relates to the tariff changes implemented by the United States in 2018 with subsequent retaliations by partner countries, particularly China. The framework is a multi-region multi-sector general equilibrium simulation model of the global economy. Our core contribution is to introduce a new trade structure that includes monopolistic competition among bilateral representative firms (BRF). We compare simulation results from the BRF structure to those from standard trade formulations of perfect and monopolistic competition. We find that the BRF structure leads to substantially larger trade and welfare changes induced by tariff shocks.
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Center for Global Trade Analysis
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-49
Open AccessQuantifying Disruptive Trade Policies
We present an innovative analytical framework that captures key mechanisms of international trade, and we demonstrate its usefulness as a tool for quantitative trade policy analysis. Our application relates to the tariff changes implemented by the United States in 2018 with subsequent retaliations by partner countries, particularly China. The framework is a multi-region multi-sector general equilibrium simulation model of the global economy. Our core contribution is to introduce a new trade structure that includes monopolistic competition among bilateral representative firms (BRF). We compare simulation results from the BRF structure to those from standard trade formulations of perfect and monopolistic competition. We find that the BRF structure leads to substantially larger trade and welfare changes induced by tariff shocks.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2025
- Published by Wiley in The World Economy
- Vol. 48 (7) , 1496-1519
Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement: Potential Gains
We investigate the potential effects of the WTO Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement conditional on the coverage of implemented provisions. The analysis is methodologically based on a multiregion general equilibrium simulation model including bilateral representative firms, foreign direct investment (FDI) and monopolistic competition. The results suggest substantial global welfare gains ranging between 0.63% for the IFD binding provisions and 1.73% for all IFD provisions. Countries in the group of Friends of Investment Facilitation for Development (FIFD) as well as low‐ and middle‐income countries, gain the most. The benefits for all regions increase together with the coverage of the implemented IFD provisions, as well as with the rising number of participating countries. This provides a strong incentive for nonparticipating developing countries to join the IFD, reform their investment frameworks in line with the IFD agenda and use the support structure contained in the section on special and differential treatment.
- 10 April 2025
- Published by Wiley in The World Economy
- Vol. 48 (7) , 1496-1519
Open AccessInvestment Facilitation for Development Agreement: Potential Gains
We investigate the potential effects of the WTO Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement conditional on the coverage of implemented provisions. The analysis is methodologically based on a multiregion general equilibrium simulation model including bilateral representative firms, foreign direct investment (FDI) and monopolistic competition. The results suggest substantial global welfare gains ranging between 0.63% for the IFD binding provisions and 1.73% for all IFD provisions. Countries in the group of Friends of Investment Facilitation for Development (FIFD) as well as low‐ and middle‐income countries, gain the most. The benefits for all regions increase together with the coverage of the implemented IFD provisions, as well as with the rising number of participating countries. This provides a strong incentive for nonparticipating developing countries to join the IFD, reform their investment frameworks in line with the IFD agenda and use the support structure contained in the section on special and differential treatment.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by University of Nebraska Consortium of Libraries - UNCL
Waging a Global Trade War Alone: The Cost of Blanket Tariffs on Friend and Foe
We use an advanced model of the global economy to consider a set of scenarios consistent with the proposal to impose a minimum 60% tariff against Chinese imports and blanket minimum 10% tariff against all other US imports. The model’s structure, which includes imperfect competition in increasing-returns industries, is documented in Balistreri, Böhringer, and Rutherford (2024). The basis for the tariff rates is a proposal from former President Donald Trump (see Wolff 2024). We consider these scenarios with and without symmetric retaliation by our trade partners. Our central finding is that a global trade war between the United States and the rest of the world at these tariff rates would cost the US economy over $910 billion at a global efficiency loss of $360 billion. Thus, on net, US trade partners gain $550 billion. Canada is the only other country that loses from a US go-it-alone trade war because of its exceptionally close trade relationship with the United States.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by University of Nebraska Consortium of Libraries - UNCL
Open AccessWaging a Global Trade War Alone: The Cost of Blanket Tariffs on Friend and Foe
We use an advanced model of the global economy to consider a set of scenarios consistent with the proposal to impose a minimum 60% tariff against Chinese imports and blanket minimum 10% tariff against all other US imports. The model’s structure, which includes imperfect competition in increasing-returns industries, is documented in Balistreri, Böhringer, and Rutherford (2024). The basis for the tariff rates is a proposal from former President Donald Trump (see Wolff 2024). We consider these scenarios with and without symmetric retaliation by our trade partners. Our central finding is that a global trade war between the United States and the rest of the world at these tariff rates would cost the US economy over $910 billion at a global efficiency loss of $360 billion. Thus, on net, US trade partners gain $550 billion. Canada is the only other country that loses from a US go-it-alone trade war because of its exceptionally close trade relationship with the United States.
- Open Access
- 20 December 2022
- Published by Center for Global Trade Analysis
- Vol. 7 (2) , 66-139
Mathematics of Generalized Versions of the Melitz, Krugman and Armington Models with Detailed Derivations
We provide detailed textbook style mathematical derivations of an extended version of the heterogenous firms model of Melitz (2003), as well as the Armington (1969) and Krugman (1980) models. Our model of heterogeneous firms extends the model of Melitz (2003) by allowing multiple sectors, intermediates, heterogeneous regions based on data, labor-leisure choice, initial heterogeneous tariffs as well as iceberg trade costs, multiple factors of production, the possibility of sector-specific inputs and trade balances based on data, and we incorporate global and unilateral tariff policy shocks. Although the models in this paper are extensions in numerous directions of the Melitz trade model of heterogeneous firms, the pedagogical approach in this paper should substantially facilitate the accessibility of the applied heterogenous-firms model of international trade for students and reviewers. Balistreri and Tarr (2020) apply these models to GTAP data where they assess the relative welfare impacts in the Armington, Krugman and Melitz style models of trade cost reductions in eighteen model variants. This paper documents the equations of those models, and we hope it will be a clear roadmap for understanding and constructing modern multi-sector, multi-region international trade models that must be fitted to data.
- 20 December 2022
- Published by Center for Global Trade Analysis
- Vol. 7 (2) , 66-139
Open AccessMathematics of Generalized Versions of the Melitz, Krugman and Armington Models with Detailed Derivations
We provide detailed textbook style mathematical derivations of an extended version of the heterogenous firms model of Melitz (2003), as well as the Armington (1969) and Krugman (1980) models. Our model of heterogeneous firms extends the model of Melitz (2003) by allowing multiple sectors, intermediates, heterogeneous regions based on data, labor-leisure choice, initial heterogeneous tariffs as well as iceberg trade costs, multiple factors of production, the possibility of sector-specific inputs and trade balances based on data, and we incorporate global and unilateral tariff policy shocks. Although the models in this paper are extensions in numerous directions of the Melitz trade model of heterogeneous firms, the pedagogical approach in this paper should substantially facilitate the accessibility of the applied heterogenous-firms model of international trade for students and reviewers. Balistreri and Tarr (2020) apply these models to GTAP data where they assess the relative welfare impacts in the Armington, Krugman and Melitz style models of trade cost reductions in eighteen model variants. This paper documents the equations of those models, and we hope it will be a clear roadmap for understanding and constructing modern multi-sector, multi-region international trade models that must be fitted to data.
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 60 (4) , 1681-1703
Welfare gains in the Armington, Krugman and Melitz models: Comparisons grounded on gravity
Under a wide range of model features, we show that in response to a reduction in global trade costs, the global welfare gains are largest in the Melitz model, followed by the Krugman model, and smallest in Armington. Labor‐leisure choice and intermediate goods are the most important features for differentiating results. We show that the optimal tariff is significantly lower in the monopolistic competition models, thereby moving policy away from protectionism. We are the first to consider multi‐sector comparative‐static welfare impacts of these market structures, while maintaining equal trade responses across the models consistent with a shared structural‐gravity elasticity.
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 60 (4) , 1681-1703
Welfare gains in the Armington, Krugman and Melitz models: Comparisons grounded on gravity
Under a wide range of model features, we show that in response to a reduction in global trade costs, the global welfare gains are largest in the Melitz model, followed by the Krugman model, and smallest in Armington. Labor‐leisure choice and intermediate goods are the most important features for differentiating results. We show that the optimal tariff is significantly lower in the monopolistic competition models, thereby moving policy away from protectionism. We are the first to consider multi‐sector comparative‐static welfare impacts of these market structures, while maintaining equal trade responses across the models consistent with a shared structural‐gravity elasticity.
- Open Access
- 31 May 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 20 (4) , 421-435
What If? Tinkering with the Counterfactual: A Comment on US–Washing Machines (Article 22.6-US)
Typically, the WTO Arbitrator, when charged with evaluating the permissible level of countermeasures (suspension of concessions), has chosen a counterfactual state of the world where the challenged (illegal) measure has not been adopted at all. The Arbitrator then would calculate the trade lost because of the adopted (illegal) measure, and thus, decide on the level of permissible countermeasures. In US–Washing Machines (Article 22.6-US), deviating from this custom, the Arbitrator adopted a different counterfactual, assuming that the complainant had adopted a different, ‘reasonable’ measure. The Arbitrator then evaluated the trade lost based on the distance between the adopted (illegal) and the ‘reasonable’ measure and calculated the level of countermeasures. In this paper, we explain the multitude of perils facing dispute settlement if this approach is adopted in future disputes. We also advance a few thoughts on rethinking the workings of the Arbitrator when measuring the level of permissible countermeasures, since similar slippery slopes risk being reproduced in future cases.
- 31 May 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in World Trade Review
- Vol. 20 (4) , 421-435
Open AccessWhat If? Tinkering with the Counterfactual: A Comment on US–Washing Machines (Article 22.6-US)
Typically, the WTO Arbitrator, when charged with evaluating the permissible level of countermeasures (suspension of concessions), has chosen a counterfactual state of the world where the challenged (illegal) measure has not been adopted at all. The Arbitrator then would calculate the trade lost because of the adopted (illegal) measure, and thus, decide on the level of permissible countermeasures. In US–Washing Machines (Article 22.6-US), deviating from this custom, the Arbitrator adopted a different counterfactual, assuming that the complainant had adopted a different, ‘reasonable’ measure. The Arbitrator then evaluated the trade lost based on the distance between the adopted (illegal) and the ‘reasonable’ measure and calculated the level of countermeasures. In this paper, we explain the multitude of perils facing dispute settlement if this approach is adopted in future disputes. We also advance a few thoughts on rethinking the workings of the Arbitrator when measuring the level of permissible countermeasures, since similar slippery slopes risk being reproduced in future cases.
- 7 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 74 (3) , 1037-1075
Optimal Environmental Border Adjustments Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
- 7 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 74 (3) , 1037-1075
Optimal Environmental Border Adjustments Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade