Marina Núñez
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Marina Núñez has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carles Rafels
Department of Economic, Financial and Actuarial Mathematics and BEAT, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
13 shared publications - Ata Atay
Department of Mathematical Economics, Finance and Actuarial Sciences, University of Barcelona, and Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT), Barcelona, Spain
5 shared publications - Tamás Solymosi
Corvinus University of Budapest
4 shared publications - F. Javier Martínez-De-Albéniz
Universitat de Barcelona
2 shared publications - Francesc Llerena
Rovira i Virgili University
2 shared publications - Silvia Miquel
Universitat de Lleida, Lleida, Spain
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Global Optimization
- p. 1-24
On the vertices of the core of a many-to-one assignment game
This paper studies the structure of the core in many-to-one assignment games, where firms with limited capacity hire workers in a transferable utility framework. While it is well-established that the core of these games is always non-empty and contains firm-optimal and worker-optimal outcomes, relatively little is known about its complete geometric structure. In particular, regarding the characterization and enumeration of its extreme points. In this paper, we provide a graph-theoretic criterion for core vertices: a salary vector is a vertex of the core if and only if the base graph of its associated tight digraph is connected. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for each side-optimal allocation in terms of the tight digraph. Based on this characterization, we develop a lexicographic procedure that generates all core vertices as they are supported by a max-min salary vector, where workers sequentially optimize their payoffs with an indication of whether the worker in this position maximizes or minimizes his/her salary.
- 29 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Global Optimization
- p. 1-24
Open AccessOn the vertices of the core of a many-to-one assignment game
This paper studies the structure of the core in many-to-one assignment games, where firms with limited capacity hire workers in a transferable utility framework. While it is well-established that the core of these games is always non-empty and contains firm-optimal and worker-optimal outcomes, relatively little is known about its complete geometric structure. In particular, regarding the characterization and enumeration of its extreme points. In this paper, we provide a graph-theoretic criterion for core vertices: a salary vector is a vertex of the core if and only if the base graph of its associated tight digraph is connected. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for each side-optimal allocation in terms of the tight digraph. Based on this characterization, we develop a lexicographic procedure that generates all core vertices as they are supported by a max-min salary vector, where workers sequentially optimize their payoffs with an indication of whether the worker in this position maximizes or minimizes his/her salary.
- Open Access
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 55 (2) , 39
Assignment markets with capacitated middlemen: core and competitive equilibria
We consider a three-sided market where each buyer-seller pair can attain a profit only if there is a middleman that connects them. This profit does not depend on the identity of the middlemen, and each buyer and seller can take part in at most one partnership while middlemen can establish multiple partnerships, up to their capacity. We show that the core is non-empty and strictly contains the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors that coincides with the set of solutions of the dual q -assignment problem, where q is the total capacity of the middlemen.
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 55 (2) , 39
Open AccessAssignment markets with capacitated middlemen: core and competitive equilibria
We consider a three-sided market where each buyer-seller pair can attain a profit only if there is a middleman that connects them. This profit does not depend on the identity of the middlemen, and each buyer and seller can take part in at most one partnership while middlemen can establish multiple partnerships, up to their capacity. We show that the core is non-empty and strictly contains the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors that coincides with the set of solutions of the dual q -assignment problem, where q is the total capacity of the middlemen.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 156, 58-63
A note on the non-coincidence of the core and the bargaining set in many-to-one assignment markets
- 2 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 156, 58-63
Open AccessA note on the non-coincidence of the core and the bargaining set in many-to-one assignment markets
- 30 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 115
Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
- 30 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 115
Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
- Open Access
A many-to-one job market: more about the core and the competitive salaries
This paper studies many-to-one assignment markets, or matching markets with wages. Although it is well-known that the core of this model is non-empty, the structure of the core has not been fully investigated. To the known dissimilarities with the one-to-one assignment game, we add that the bargaining set does not coincide with the core and the kernel may not be included in the core. Besides, not all extreme core allocations can be obtained by means of a lexicographic maximization or a lexicographic minimization procedure, as it is the case in the one-to-one assignment game. The maximum and minimum competitive salaries are characterized in two ways: axiomatically and by means of easily verifiable properties of an associated directed graph. Regarding the remaining extreme core allocations of the many-to-one assignment game, we propose a lexicographic procedure that, for each order on the set of workers, sequentially maximizes or minimizes each worker's competitive salary. This procedure provides all extreme vectors of competitive salaries, that is all extreme core allocations.
Open AccessA many-to-one job market: more about the core and the competitive salaries
This paper studies many-to-one assignment markets, or matching markets with wages. Although it is well-known that the core of this model is non-empty, the structure of the core has not been fully investigated. To the known dissimilarities with the one-to-one assignment game, we add that the bargaining set does not coincide with the core and the kernel may not be included in the core. Besides, not all extreme core allocations can be obtained by means of a lexicographic maximization or a lexicographic minimization procedure, as it is the case in the one-to-one assignment game. The maximum and minimum competitive salaries are characterized in two ways: axiomatically and by means of easily verifiable properties of an associated directed graph. Regarding the remaining extreme core allocations of the many-to-one assignment game, we propose a lexicographic procedure that, for each order on the set of workers, sequentially maximizes or minimizes each worker's competitive salary. This procedure provides all extreme vectors of competitive salaries, that is all extreme core allocations.
- Open Access
- 9 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 62 (4) , 739-759
Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
We study the problem of allocating packages of different objects to a group of bidders. A rule is overbidding-proof if no bidder has incentives to bid above his actual valuations. We prove that if an efficient rule is overbidding-proof, then each winning bidder pays a price between his winning bid and what he would pay in a Vickrey auction for the same package. In counterpart, the set of rules that satisfy underbidding-proofness always charge a price below the corresponding Vickrey price. A new characterization of the Vickrey allocation rule is provided with a weak form of strategy-proofness. The Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, overbidding-proofness and underbidding-proofness. Our results are also valid on the domains of monotonic valuations and of single-minded bidders. Finally a family of overbidding rules is introduced that price the assigned packages at a fixed average of the Vickrey price and the pay-as-bid price.
- 9 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 62 (4) , 739-759
Open AccessOverbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems
We study the problem of allocating packages of different objects to a group of bidders. A rule is overbidding-proof if no bidder has incentives to bid above his actual valuations. We prove that if an efficient rule is overbidding-proof, then each winning bidder pays a price between his winning bid and what he would pay in a Vickrey auction for the same package. In counterpart, the set of rules that satisfy underbidding-proofness always charge a price below the corresponding Vickrey price. A new characterization of the Vickrey allocation rule is provided with a weak form of strategy-proofness. The Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, overbidding-proofness and underbidding-proofness. Our results are also valid on the domains of monotonic valuations and of single-minded bidders. Finally a family of overbidding rules is introduced that price the assigned packages at a fixed average of the Vickrey price and the pay-as-bid price.
- Open Access
- 20 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 136, 469-484
Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
- 20 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 136, 469-484
Open AccessAxioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
- 1 March 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 98, 10-14
A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
- 1 March 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 98, 10-14
A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
- Open Access
- 14 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 254 (1-2) , 211-234
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
- 14 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 254 (1-2) , 211-234
Open AccessLexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
- Open Access
- 27 May 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in TOP
- Vol. 24 (2) , 327-329
Comments on: Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
- 27 May 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in TOP
- Vol. 24 (2) , 327-329
Open AccessComments on: Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities