Francesc Llerena
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Francesc Llerena has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pedro Calleja
University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics
9 shared publications - Carles Rafels
Department of Economic, Financial and Actuarial Mathematics and BEAT, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
5 shared publications - Peter Sudhölter
Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
5 shared publications - Marina Núñez
Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial, and Barcelona Economics Analysis Team (BEAT), Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
2 shared publications - Ata Atay
Department of Mathematical Economics, Finance and Actuarial Sciences, University of Barcelona, and Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT), Barcelona, Spain
1 shared publication Cori Vilella
Dep. of Business Administration, CREIP and GRODE, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Av. Universitat, 1, E-43204 Reus, Catalonia, Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 155, 212-227
Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 155, 212-227
Open AccessMerging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result
- 15 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 125, 61-64
Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
- 15 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 125, 61-64
Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Note on Solidarity in Bankruptcy Problems when Agents Merge or Split
We explore the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). We show that although, in general, these non-manipulability properties are not equivalent, under the principle of solidarity, fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules including parametric rules, they coincide.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Note on Solidarity in Bankruptcy Problems when Agents Merge or Split
We explore the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). We show that although, in general, these non-manipulability properties are not equivalent, under the principle of solidarity, fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules including parametric rules, they coincide.
- Open Access
- 10 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 221
Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
- 10 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 221
Open AccessNon-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
- Open Access
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
On Manipulability in Financial Systems
We investigate manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: non-manipulability via merging and nonmanipulability via splitting. Not surprisingly, non-manipulability via splitting is incompatible with some basic axioms: claim boundedness, limited liability, and absolute priority. Outstandingly, we introduce a large class of financial rules that are immune to manipulations via merging. This class includes the proportional financial rule but also financial rules in accordance with parametric bankruptcy rules fulfilling non-manipulability via merging.
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOn Manipulability in Financial Systems
We investigate manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: non-manipulability via merging and nonmanipulability via splitting. Not surprisingly, non-manipulability via splitting is incompatible with some basic axioms: claim boundedness, limited liability, and absolute priority. Outstandingly, we introduce a large class of financial rules that are immune to manipulations via merging. This class includes the proportional financial rule but also financial rules in accordance with parametric bankruptcy rules fulfilling non-manipulability via merging.
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 45 (3) , 1056-1068
Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus ...
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 45 (3) , 1056-1068
Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus ...
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 105, 28-33
Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 105, 28-33
Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value
- Open Access
- 23 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 48 (1) , 287-310
Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
- 23 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 48 (1) , 287-310
Open AccessPath monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
- Open Access
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally. We show that the set of weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open which implies that for weight systems close enough to any regular system the weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM. We also provide a necessary condition for SAM for symmetrically weighted nucleoli. Moreover, we show that the per capita nucleolus on balanced games is characterized by single-valuedness (SIVA), translation and scale covariance (COV), and equal adjusted surplus division (EASD), a property that is comparable but stronger than ESD. These properties together with ESD characterize the per capita prenucleolus on larger sets of TU games. EASD and ESD can be transformed to independence of (adjusted) proportional shifting and these properties may be generalized for arbitrary weight systems p to I(A)Sp. We show that the p-weighted prenucleolus on the set of balanced TU games is characterized by SIVA, COV, and IASp; and on larger sets by additionally requiring ISp.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMonotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally. We show that the set of weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open which implies that for weight systems close enough to any regular system the weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM. We also provide a necessary condition for SAM for symmetrically weighted nucleoli. Moreover, we show that the per capita nucleolus on balanced games is characterized by single-valuedness (SIVA), translation and scale covariance (COV), and equal adjusted surplus division (EASD), a property that is comparable but stronger than ESD. These properties together with ESD characterize the per capita prenucleolus on larger sets of TU games. EASD and ESD can be transformed to independence of (adjusted) proportional shifting and these properties may be generalized for arbitrary weight systems p to I(A)Sp. We show that the p-weighted prenucleolus on the set of balanced TU games is characterized by SIVA, COV, and IASp; and on larger sets by additionally requiring ISp.
- Open Access
- 20 May 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 48 (1) , 197-220
Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
- 20 May 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 48 (1) , 197-220
Open AccessRationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results