Jun Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jun Wang has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pengwen Hou
Business School Nankai University Tianjin 300071 China
7 shared publications - Qian Zhang
School of Management Science and Engineering, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin, China
7 shared publications - Xinman Lu
School of Management Science and Engineering, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin, China
5 shared publications Hongtao Yang
4 shared publicationsPengwen Hou
Business School, Nankai University
4 shared publications- Shuhua Zhang
Zhujiang College, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou, China
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in IISE Transactions
- Vol. 58 (12) , 1-16
Platform’s information sharing strategy in a supplier encroachment context with economies of scale
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in IISE Transactions
- Vol. 58 (12) , 1-16
Platform’s information sharing strategy in a supplier encroachment context with economies of scale
- 21 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Information & Management
- Vol. 62 (8)
Allow or not? Strategic choices of competing platforms in response to ad blockers
- 21 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Information & Management
- Vol. 62 (8)
Allow or not? Strategic choices of competing platforms in response to ad blockers
- 12 June 2024
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 45 (7) , 4696-4711
Impacts of supply chain leadership on dynamic pricing under consumer patience information asymmetry
As the online market rapidly develops, firms will face strategic consumers who differ in buying times. Given that the leadership structure in supply chains affects the chain members' decision‐making and performance, we study this impact in a two‐period dynamic pricing setting with an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, where the patience degree of consumers is the retailer's private information. We examine two leadership scenarios: retailer dominance and manufacturer dominance. The two members play a signaling game under retailer dominance, whereas the manufacturer can only set its wholesale price based on its prior belief under manufacturer dominance. Our analysis indicates that when consumers are more patient, the retailer tends to share its private information with the manufacturer under retailer dominance to avoid the reduction of its retail margin and enhance its profitability. However, the retailer may keep the consumers' patience information private when the manufacturer dominates the supply chain because the manufacturer will set a compromised wholesale price and passively cede profits to the retailer. Finally, we examine consumer surplus and social welfare. We demonstrate that retailer dominance is the Pareto optimal strategy.
- 12 June 2024
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 45 (7) , 4696-4711
Impacts of supply chain leadership on dynamic pricing under consumer patience information asymmetry
As the online market rapidly develops, firms will face strategic consumers who differ in buying times. Given that the leadership structure in supply chains affects the chain members' decision‐making and performance, we study this impact in a two‐period dynamic pricing setting with an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, where the patience degree of consumers is the retailer's private information. We examine two leadership scenarios: retailer dominance and manufacturer dominance. The two members play a signaling game under retailer dominance, whereas the manufacturer can only set its wholesale price based on its prior belief under manufacturer dominance. Our analysis indicates that when consumers are more patient, the retailer tends to share its private information with the manufacturer under retailer dominance to avoid the reduction of its retail margin and enhance its profitability. However, the retailer may keep the consumers' patience information private when the manufacturer dominates the supply chain because the manufacturer will set a compromised wholesale price and passively cede profits to the retailer. Finally, we examine consumer surplus and social welfare. We demonstrate that retailer dominance is the Pareto optimal strategy.
- Top Cited Papers
- 18 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 316 (1) , 126-137
Price signal or blockchain technology? Quality information disclosure in dual-channel supply chains
- 18 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 316 (1) , 126-137
Top Cited PapersPrice signal or blockchain technology? Quality information disclosure in dual-channel supply chains
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 20 (4) , 1435-1457
Impact of deferred payment on decisions and coordination in a dual-channel supply Chain with a risk-averse retailer
As the Internet rapidly grows, manufacturers tend to open a direct channel to distribute the products in addition to traditional channels. Meantime, retailers may have difficulty in making immediate payments due to limited capital. Confronting with the channel encroachment, financial pressure, and uncertain demand, retailers may also show a risk averse attitude, which was rarely considered in literature. This study considers a dual-channel supply chain wherein a retailer may be capital constrained and is risk averse. Two scenarios are respectively modeled as a Stackelberg game. One is that the retailer has adequate capital, the other is that the retailer is capital constrained and a manufacturer prefers to provide a deferred payment contract. The results show that the manufacturer present a high degree of willingness to offer the delayed payment to an extremely risk-averse retailer. Further, when such a payment contract is offered, the manufacturer's or even the entire supply chain's profits may decrease. Moreover, a deferred payment contract may benefit the entire supply chain only if the unit production cost is relatively large. Finally, a mixed contract that combines revenue sharing and deferred payment is introduced to achieve the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 20 (4) , 1435-1457
Impact of deferred payment on decisions and coordination in a dual-channel supply Chain with a risk-averse retailer
As the Internet rapidly grows, manufacturers tend to open a direct channel to distribute the products in addition to traditional channels. Meantime, retailers may have difficulty in making immediate payments due to limited capital. Confronting with the channel encroachment, financial pressure, and uncertain demand, retailers may also show a risk averse attitude, which was rarely considered in literature. This study considers a dual-channel supply chain wherein a retailer may be capital constrained and is risk averse. Two scenarios are respectively modeled as a Stackelberg game. One is that the retailer has adequate capital, the other is that the retailer is capital constrained and a manufacturer prefers to provide a deferred payment contract. The results show that the manufacturer present a high degree of willingness to offer the delayed payment to an extremely risk-averse retailer. Further, when such a payment contract is offered, the manufacturer's or even the entire supply chain's profits may decrease. Moreover, a deferred payment contract may benefit the entire supply chain only if the unit production cost is relatively large. Finally, a mixed contract that combines revenue sharing and deferred payment is introduced to achieve the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain.
- 14 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 183
Implications of selling format on product innovation in platform supply chains under asymmetric information
- 14 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 183
Implications of selling format on product innovation in platform supply chains under asymmetric information
- 17 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 447
Implications of risk aversion behavior on the green product promotion strategy under manufacturer encroachment
- 17 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 447
Implications of risk aversion behavior on the green product promotion strategy under manufacturer encroachment
- 23 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 177
Effects of platform’s blockchain strategy on brand manufacturer’s distribution strategy in the presence of counterfeits
- 23 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 177
Effects of platform’s blockchain strategy on brand manufacturer’s distribution strategy in the presence of counterfeits
- 2 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 71 (00189391) , 3951-3963
Combating Deceptive Counterfeits With Blockchain Technology Under Asymmetric Information
Blockchain technology has recently been regarded as a promising anti-counterfeiting strategy. This article explores whether the retailer concerned with goodwill should adopt blockchain to combat counterfeits and disclose demand on the blockchain when both demand information and the supplier's product quality information are asymmetric. We also extend the model by considering the supplier's willingness to join the blockchain, endogenous authenticity proportion, and multiple suppliers. The main results show that when goodwill loss is high, the retailer always prefers blockchain; when this loss is medium, the retailer prefers blockchain only if both the unit production cost and proportion of authentic products are low. In some cases, the retailer has an incentive to disclose demand on the blockchain to motivate the supplier to join the blockchain, thereby achieving a win–win situation. The optimal government subsidy that both incentivizes the retailer to adopt blockchain and improves the supplier's preference for blockchain is also explored.
- 2 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 71 (00189391) , 3951-3963
Combating Deceptive Counterfeits With Blockchain Technology Under Asymmetric Information
Blockchain technology has recently been regarded as a promising anti-counterfeiting strategy. This article explores whether the retailer concerned with goodwill should adopt blockchain to combat counterfeits and disclose demand on the blockchain when both demand information and the supplier's product quality information are asymmetric. We also extend the model by considering the supplier's willingness to join the blockchain, endogenous authenticity proportion, and multiple suppliers. The main results show that when goodwill loss is high, the retailer always prefers blockchain; when this loss is medium, the retailer prefers blockchain only if both the unit production cost and proportion of authentic products are low. In some cases, the retailer has an incentive to disclose demand on the blockchain to motivate the supplier to join the blockchain, thereby achieving a win–win situation. The optimal government subsidy that both incentivizes the retailer to adopt blockchain and improves the supplier's preference for blockchain is also explored.