Qian Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Qian Zhang has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jun Wang
Tianjin Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Tianjin 300222, Peoples R China
7 shared publications - Pengwen Hou
Business School Nankai University Tianjin 300071 China
5 shared publications - Baoqin Yu
Business School, Yango University, Fuzhou, China
1 shared publication - Hua Wang
Department of Pediatrics, West China Second University Hospital, Sichuan University
1 shared publication - Huming Gao
School of Management Science and Engineering, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin, China
1 shared publication - Maozhu Jin
Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited Papers
- 18 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 316 (1) , 126-137
Price signal or blockchain technology? Quality information disclosure in dual-channel supply chains
- 18 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 316 (1) , 126-137
Top Cited PapersPrice signal or blockchain technology? Quality information disclosure in dual-channel supply chains
- 23 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 177
Effects of platform’s blockchain strategy on brand manufacturer’s distribution strategy in the presence of counterfeits
- 23 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 177
Effects of platform’s blockchain strategy on brand manufacturer’s distribution strategy in the presence of counterfeits
- 2 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 71 (00189391) , 3951-3963
Combating Deceptive Counterfeits With Blockchain Technology Under Asymmetric Information
Blockchain technology has recently been regarded as a promising anti-counterfeiting strategy. This article explores whether the retailer concerned with goodwill should adopt blockchain to combat counterfeits and disclose demand on the blockchain when both demand information and the supplier's product quality information are asymmetric. We also extend the model by considering the supplier's willingness to join the blockchain, endogenous authenticity proportion, and multiple suppliers. The main results show that when goodwill loss is high, the retailer always prefers blockchain; when this loss is medium, the retailer prefers blockchain only if both the unit production cost and proportion of authentic products are low. In some cases, the retailer has an incentive to disclose demand on the blockchain to motivate the supplier to join the blockchain, thereby achieving a win–win situation. The optimal government subsidy that both incentivizes the retailer to adopt blockchain and improves the supplier's preference for blockchain is also explored.
- 2 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 71 (00189391) , 3951-3963
Combating Deceptive Counterfeits With Blockchain Technology Under Asymmetric Information
Blockchain technology has recently been regarded as a promising anti-counterfeiting strategy. This article explores whether the retailer concerned with goodwill should adopt blockchain to combat counterfeits and disclose demand on the blockchain when both demand information and the supplier's product quality information are asymmetric. We also extend the model by considering the supplier's willingness to join the blockchain, endogenous authenticity proportion, and multiple suppliers. The main results show that when goodwill loss is high, the retailer always prefers blockchain; when this loss is medium, the retailer prefers blockchain only if both the unit production cost and proportion of authentic products are low. In some cases, the retailer has an incentive to disclose demand on the blockchain to motivate the supplier to join the blockchain, thereby achieving a win–win situation. The optimal government subsidy that both incentivizes the retailer to adopt blockchain and improves the supplier's preference for blockchain is also explored.
- RetractionOpen Access
- 16 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Information Systems and e-Business Management
- Vol. 21 (S1) , 39
Retraction Note: Supply chain optimization based on chain management and mass customization
- 16 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Information Systems and e-Business Management
- Vol. 21 (S1) , 39
RetractionOpen AccessRetraction Note: Supply chain optimization based on chain management and mass customization
- 17 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 315 (1) , 507-533
Implications of credit default and yield uncertainty on supply chain’s equilibrium financial strategy
Two financial schemes, i.e., purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF), have been proposed for small and medium-sized manufacturers. This study considers a supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained manufacturer who faces the random yield and has a probability of credit default, a well-capitalized retailer, and a bank. We find that the manufacturer prefers POF scheme if the unit production cost is high and the default risk is low, and BDF scheme otherwise. Whereas the retailer benefits from POF when the unit production cost is small. Thus, the retailer, as the leader, has an incentive to distort the purchase price to induce the manufacturer’s financing strategy towards the retailer’s preference. Furthermore, only BDF can achieve a Pareto improvement since the retailer plays a dual role (i.e., buyer and lender) under BDF.
- 17 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 315 (1) , 507-533
Implications of credit default and yield uncertainty on supply chain’s equilibrium financial strategy
Two financial schemes, i.e., purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF), have been proposed for small and medium-sized manufacturers. This study considers a supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained manufacturer who faces the random yield and has a probability of credit default, a well-capitalized retailer, and a bank. We find that the manufacturer prefers POF scheme if the unit production cost is high and the default risk is low, and BDF scheme otherwise. Whereas the retailer benefits from POF when the unit production cost is small. Thus, the retailer, as the leader, has an incentive to distort the purchase price to induce the manufacturer’s financing strategy towards the retailer’s preference. Furthermore, only BDF can achieve a Pareto improvement since the retailer plays a dual role (i.e., buyer and lender) under BDF.
- 3 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Electronic Commerce
- Vol. 26 (2) , 245-275
Fixed Fee or Proportional Fee? Contracts in Platform Selling Under Asymmetric Information
In platform selling, platforms commonly charge third-party sellers a commission fee, which affects sellers’ decision making and platforms’ contract choice. This study explores this choice where a platform privately knows the market size and intends to signal to a seller. We aim to provide researchers and platform-selling practitioners insights into contract and information strategies. The result shows that the fixed-fee contract leads to either a costly or a costless signaling scenario. In costly scenarios, the high-demand platform must downward distort the fixed rent to distinguish itself from the low-demand platform. This distortion results in a different consensus on two players’ contract preference when the commission rate in the proportional-fee contract is exogenous. Under symmetric information, consensus is achieved only on the proportional-fee contract. However, in asymmetric information settings, this consensus may arise on fixed-fee contracts if market uncertainty is high. Furthermore, the comparison of information strategies reveals that players can reach an agreement on both the information-sharing strategy and the proportional-fee contract under certain conditions. When the platform endogenously determines the commission rate, this decision making can also signal demand type, and only the proportional-fee contract leads to a win–win outcome.
- 3 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Electronic Commerce
- Vol. 26 (2) , 245-275
Fixed Fee or Proportional Fee? Contracts in Platform Selling Under Asymmetric Information
In platform selling, platforms commonly charge third-party sellers a commission fee, which affects sellers’ decision making and platforms’ contract choice. This study explores this choice where a platform privately knows the market size and intends to signal to a seller. We aim to provide researchers and platform-selling practitioners insights into contract and information strategies. The result shows that the fixed-fee contract leads to either a costly or a costless signaling scenario. In costly scenarios, the high-demand platform must downward distort the fixed rent to distinguish itself from the low-demand platform. This distortion results in a different consensus on two players’ contract preference when the commission rate in the proportional-fee contract is exogenous. Under symmetric information, consensus is achieved only on the proportional-fee contract. However, in asymmetric information settings, this consensus may arise on fixed-fee contracts if market uncertainty is high. Furthermore, the comparison of information strategies reveals that players can reach an agreement on both the information-sharing strategy and the proportional-fee contract under certain conditions. When the platform endogenously determines the commission rate, this decision making can also signal demand type, and only the proportional-fee contract leads to a win–win outcome.
- 2 November 2021
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Kybernetes
- Vol. 52 (1) , 463-491
Analysis of sales and financing modes in a green platform supply chain with a capital-constrained manufacturer
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal operational strategies in a green platform supply chain and provide suggestions on the selection of sales and financing modes for the capital-constrained manufacturer.Design/methodology/approach: This study combines different sales channels with financing modes and investigates three sales-financing modes, i.e. traditional sales-prepayment financing (TSPF), traditional sales-bank financing (TSBF) and online sales e-retailer financing (OSEF). By establishing and comparing Stackelberg game models of these sales-financing modes from the perspectives of economy, environment and social welfare, the optimal strategies of emission reduction, financing, pricing and service improvement are obtained.Findings: The results suggest that as the commission rate increases to a certain level, a threshold of the cost coefficient of emission reduction can be found such that the manufacturer should choose OSEF below this threshold and TSBF above this threshold. OSEF is Pareto optimal when this cost coefficient is low, and this mode can lead to the highest social welfare when the platform loan interest rate is relatively low. The Pareto areas in TSBF and OSEF enlarge as the default coefficient decreases.Practical implications: These results can provide operational insights on how to select sales channels and financing modes when manufacturer faces financial constraints in emission reduction.Originality/value: This paper combines different sales and financing modes to study their comprehensive influence on the decision-makings of chain members and the resulting performance of economy, environment and social welfare.
- 2 November 2021
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Kybernetes
- Vol. 52 (1) , 463-491
Analysis of sales and financing modes in a green platform supply chain with a capital-constrained manufacturer
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal operational strategies in a green platform supply chain and provide suggestions on the selection of sales and financing modes for the capital-constrained manufacturer.Design/methodology/approach: This study combines different sales channels with financing modes and investigates three sales-financing modes, i.e. traditional sales-prepayment financing (TSPF), traditional sales-bank financing (TSBF) and online sales e-retailer financing (OSEF). By establishing and comparing Stackelberg game models of these sales-financing modes from the perspectives of economy, environment and social welfare, the optimal strategies of emission reduction, financing, pricing and service improvement are obtained.Findings: The results suggest that as the commission rate increases to a certain level, a threshold of the cost coefficient of emission reduction can be found such that the manufacturer should choose OSEF below this threshold and TSBF above this threshold. OSEF is Pareto optimal when this cost coefficient is low, and this mode can lead to the highest social welfare when the platform loan interest rate is relatively low. The Pareto areas in TSBF and OSEF enlarge as the default coefficient decreases.Practical implications: These results can provide operational insights on how to select sales channels and financing modes when manufacturer faces financial constraints in emission reduction.Originality/value: This paper combines different sales and financing modes to study their comprehensive influence on the decision-makings of chain members and the resulting performance of economy, environment and social welfare.
- 29 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Operational Research
- Vol. 22 (4) , 3945-3988
Emission reduction and coordination of a dynamic supply chain with green reputation
- 29 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Operational Research
- Vol. 22 (4) , 3945-3988
Emission reduction and coordination of a dynamic supply chain with green reputation