Jan Teorell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jan Teorell has a total of 44 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carl Henrik Knutsen
University of Oslo
4 shared publications - Michael Coppedge
University of Notre Dame
4 shared publications - Staffan I. Lindberg
V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg
4 shared publications - John Gerring
University of Texas at Austin, USA
3 shared publications - Agustín Goenaga
Department of Political Science, Lund University
2 shared publications Bo Rothstein
Department of Political Science Quality of Government Institute University of Gothenburg
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- p. 1-19
Polity size and women’s representation: evidence from two large-scale boundary reforms
Do larger polities hinder gender parity in elected office? We theorize that when populations grow faster than elected assemblies, a “seat congestion” effect intensifies competition for nominations, enabling men candidates to crowd out women. We test this argument using two nationwide natural experiments: Swedish municipal amalgamations in 1952 and 1973 that abruptly increased electorates. We track the effects in newly digitized historical panel data. Where electorate-per-seat ratios rose, growth in women’s representation slowed. Decomposition analyses show that expanding councils only partially offsets congestion. By identifying polity size as a systematic brake on descriptive representation, the study adds a demographic dimension to debates on institutional design and points to an overlooked cost of increasing jurisdictional size.
- 26 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- p. 1-19
Open AccessPolity size and women’s representation: evidence from two large-scale boundary reforms
Do larger polities hinder gender parity in elected office? We theorize that when populations grow faster than elected assemblies, a “seat congestion” effect intensifies competition for nominations, enabling men candidates to crowd out women. We test this argument using two nationwide natural experiments: Swedish municipal amalgamations in 1952 and 1973 that abruptly increased electorates. We track the effects in newly digitized historical panel data. Where electorate-per-seat ratios rose, growth in women’s representation slowed. Decomposition analyses show that expanding councils only partially offsets congestion. By identifying polity size as a systematic brake on descriptive representation, the study adds a demographic dimension to debates on institutional design and points to an overlooked cost of increasing jurisdictional size.
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 379-394
Development and decline of democracies: the role of institutional factors
In this chapter we review literatures on how different institutional factors contribute to democratization or to democratic decline. We identify how institutions fit into four broad theories of what influences regime change and, in our subsequent discussions of specific literatures, we separate between institutional factors that are relevant to both democratization and democratic decline and those that are mainly relevant to one type of change. We, for example, discuss the literatures on state capacity and autocratization, authoritarian regime types or elections and democratization, and presidentialism and democratic decline. While some literatures point to clear institutional correlates of democratization or democratic decline, other literatures are replete with null results. Regardless, we discuss how issues of conceptual overlap and causal identification makes it relatively hard to conclude forcefully on these types of relationships. Still, we end by discussing recent results indicating that (mutually reinforcing) clusters of (quite different) institutions may help spur democratization and avert democratic decline.
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 379-394
Development and decline of democracies: the role of institutional factors
In this chapter we review literatures on how different institutional factors contribute to democratization or to democratic decline. We identify how institutions fit into four broad theories of what influences regime change and, in our subsequent discussions of specific literatures, we separate between institutional factors that are relevant to both democratization and democratic decline and those that are mainly relevant to one type of change. We, for example, discuss the literatures on state capacity and autocratization, authoritarian regime types or elections and democratization, and presidentialism and democratic decline. While some literatures point to clear institutional correlates of democratization or democratic decline, other literatures are replete with null results. Regardless, we discuss how issues of conceptual overlap and causal identification makes it relatively hard to conclude forcefully on these types of relationships. Still, we end by discussing recent results indicating that (mutually reinforcing) clusters of (quite different) institutions may help spur democratization and avert democratic decline.
- Open Access
- 19 October 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 69 (6) , 980-1004
The Double-Edged Sword: How State Capacity Prolongs Autocratic Tenure but Hastens Democratization
This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites to switch tactics to peaceful support for democracy. An autocrat may prolong his tenure by investing in state capacity, but this brings on the downfall of the autocratic regime itself. We analyze the implications of our argument using a variety of historical sources providing information on 47 autocracies from 1800 to 2012. Our empirical findings, in part based on original data collection, are in line with the theoretical expectations: in strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die.
- 19 October 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 69 (6) , 980-1004
Open AccessThe Double-Edged Sword: How State Capacity Prolongs Autocratic Tenure but Hastens Democratization
This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites to switch tactics to peaceful support for democracy. An autocrat may prolong his tenure by investing in state capacity, but this brings on the downfall of the autocratic regime itself. We analyze the implications of our argument using a variety of historical sources providing information on 47 autocracies from 1800 to 2012. Our empirical findings, in part based on original data collection, are in line with the theoretical expectations: in strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 11 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 57 (2) , 162-177
Conceptual and Measurement Issues in Assessing Democratic Backsliding
During the past decade, analyses drawing on several democracy measures have shown a global trend of democratic retrenchment. While these democracy measures use radically different methodologies, most partially or fully rely on subjective judgments to produce estimates of the level of democracy within states. Such projects continuously grapple with balancing conceptual coverage with the potential for bias (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000). Little and Meng (L&M) (2023) reintroduce this debate, arguing that “objective” measures of democracy show little evidence of recent global democratic backsliding.1 By extension, they posit that time-varying expert bias drives the appearance of democratic retrenchment in measures that incorporate expert judgments. In this article, we engage with (1) broader debates on democracy measurement and democratic backsliding, and (2) L&M’s specific data and conclusions.
- 11 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 57 (2) , 162-177
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessConceptual and Measurement Issues in Assessing Democratic Backsliding
During the past decade, analyses drawing on several democracy measures have shown a global trend of democratic retrenchment. While these democracy measures use radically different methodologies, most partially or fully rely on subjective judgments to produce estimates of the level of democracy within states. Such projects continuously grapple with balancing conceptual coverage with the potential for bias (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000). Little and Meng (L&M) (2023) reintroduce this debate, arguing that “objective” measures of democracy show little evidence of recent global democratic backsliding.1 By extension, they posit that time-varying expert bias drives the appearance of democratic retrenchment in measures that incorporate expert judgments. In this article, we engage with (1) broader debates on democracy measurement and democratic backsliding, and (2) L&M’s specific data and conclusions.
- Open Access
- 2 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 47 (1) , 88-112
Pre-electoral coalitions, familiarity, and delays in government formation
During the past decade, many parliamentary democracies have experienced bargaining delays when forming governments. The previous literature has attributed protracted government formation processes to a high degree of preference uncertainty among the political parties and a high level of bargaining complexity. The article draws on such theories, but also adds a third theoretical mechanism, commitment problems, and highlights two explanatory variables that have not received much attention so far. The first is pre-electoral coalitions, which are declarations by parties stating that they intend to collaborate with each other after the election. The second is familiarity, which is the mutual trust between parties that comes from having worked together in the past. By combining a large-N study of government formation processes in 17 West European parliamentary democracies (1945–2019) with an in-depth case study of the prolonged Swedish government formation process in 2018–2019, it is shown that pre-electoral coalitions that fail to win a majority can sometimes delay, not speed up, government formation. In addition, a lack of familiarity may sometimes lead to a breakdown of negotiations and drawn-out government formation processes.
- 2 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 47 (1) , 88-112
Open AccessPre-electoral coalitions, familiarity, and delays in government formation
During the past decade, many parliamentary democracies have experienced bargaining delays when forming governments. The previous literature has attributed protracted government formation processes to a high degree of preference uncertainty among the political parties and a high level of bargaining complexity. The article draws on such theories, but also adds a third theoretical mechanism, commitment problems, and highlights two explanatory variables that have not received much attention so far. The first is pre-electoral coalitions, which are declarations by parties stating that they intend to collaborate with each other after the election. The second is familiarity, which is the mutual trust between parties that comes from having worked together in the past. By combining a large-N study of government formation processes in 17 West European parliamentary democracies (1945–2019) with an in-depth case study of the prolonged Swedish government formation process in 2018–2019, it is shown that pre-electoral coalitions that fail to win a majority can sometimes delay, not speed up, government formation. In addition, a lack of familiarity may sometimes lead to a breakdown of negotiations and drawn-out government formation processes.
- Open Access
- 21 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 18 (2) , 393-418
The state does not live by warfare alone: War and revenue in the long nineteenth century
Previous research shows that wars contributed to the expansion of state revenues in the Early Modern period and in the twentieth century. There are, however, few cross-national studies on the long nineteenth century. Using new unbalanced panel data on wars and public revenues from 1816 to 1913 for 27 American and European countries, this article provides new evidence that military conflicts very rarely triggered lasting increases in public revenues during those years. We argue that the uneven diffusion of military innovations reduced the probability that international wars would be sufficiently intense to push state actors to seek additional resources. Moreover, the distinction between international and civil wars was blurred by the opportunities for non-state actors to mobilize military forces comparable to those of the state. Therefore, only very intense international and civil wars had a lasting impact on state revenues, but such conflicts were extremely rare, both in Europe and the Americas.
- 21 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 18 (2) , 393-418
Open AccessThe state does not live by warfare alone: War and revenue in the long nineteenth century
Previous research shows that wars contributed to the expansion of state revenues in the Early Modern period and in the twentieth century. There are, however, few cross-national studies on the long nineteenth century. Using new unbalanced panel data on wars and public revenues from 1816 to 1913 for 27 American and European countries, this article provides new evidence that military conflicts very rarely triggered lasting increases in public revenues during those years. We argue that the uneven diffusion of military innovations reduced the probability that international wars would be sufficiently intense to push state actors to seek additional resources. Moreover, the distinction between international and civil wars was blurred by the opportunities for non-state actors to mobilize military forces comparable to those of the state. Therefore, only very intense international and civil wars had a lasting impact on state revenues, but such conflicts were extremely rare, both in Europe and the Americas.
- Open Access
- 15 May 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Cooperation and Conflict
- Vol. 58 (2) , 155-174
Rules of recognition? Explaining diplomatic representation since the Congress of Vienna
The aim of this article is to explore the establishment of diplomatic representation as a measure of de facto recognition by other state units and to explain its causes in the “long 19th century” (1817–1914) and the post–World War II (WWII) era (1950–2000). Drawing on the Correlates of War diplomatic exchange data, the article explores the underlying drivers of dyadic acts of recognition in two series of logistic regression analyses, one for each time period. The results indicate that, also when taking alternative explanations into account, recognition of other states in the international system was in the 19th century at least based on one general principle: that of recognizing other de facto states. In the post-WWII era, contrary to expectations, this principle was still in effect. De facto statehood can thus be argued to constitute a rather stable norm for recognition in the international system.
- 15 May 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Cooperation and Conflict
- Vol. 58 (2) , 155-174
Open AccessRules of recognition? Explaining diplomatic representation since the Congress of Vienna
The aim of this article is to explore the establishment of diplomatic representation as a measure of de facto recognition by other state units and to explain its causes in the “long 19th century” (1817–1914) and the post–World War II (WWII) era (1950–2000). Drawing on the Correlates of War diplomatic exchange data, the article explores the underlying drivers of dyadic acts of recognition in two series of logistic regression analyses, one for each time period. The results indicate that, also when taking alternative explanations into account, recognition of other states in the international system was in the 19th century at least based on one general principle: that of recognizing other de facto states. In the post-WWII era, contrary to expectations, this principle was still in effect. De facto statehood can thus be argued to constitute a rather stable norm for recognition in the international system.
- Top Cited Papers
- 15 September 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 30 (3) , 426-449
Assessing Data Quality: An Approach and An Application
Political scientists routinely face the challenge of assessing the quality (validity and reliability) of measures in order to use them in substantive research. While stand-alone assessment tools exist, researchers rarely combine them comprehensively. Further, while a large literature informs dataproducers, dataconsumerslack guidance on how to assess existing measures for use in substantive research. We delineate a three-component practical approach to data quality assessment that integrates complementary multimethod tools to assess: (1) content validity; (2) the validity and reliability of the data generation process; and (3) convergent validity. We apply our quality assessment approach to the corruption measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, both illustrating our rubric and unearthing several quality advantages and disadvantages of the V-Dem measures, compared to other existing measures of corruption.
- 15 September 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 30 (3) , 426-449
Top Cited PapersAssessing Data Quality: An Approach and An Application
Political scientists routinely face the challenge of assessing the quality (validity and reliability) of measures in order to use them in substantive research. While stand-alone assessment tools exist, researchers rarely combine them comprehensively. Further, while a large literature informs dataproducers, dataconsumerslack guidance on how to assess existing measures for use in substantive research. We delineate a three-component practical approach to data quality assessment that integrates complementary multimethod tools to assess: (1) content validity; (2) the validity and reliability of the data generation process; and (3) convergent validity. We apply our quality assessment approach to the corruption measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, both illustrating our rubric and unearthing several quality advantages and disadvantages of the V-Dem measures, compared to other existing measures of corruption.
- Open Access
- 22 January 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 17 (2)
War, Performance, and the Survival of Foreign Ministers
Why do some foreign ministers stay longer in office than others? Are they punished when the country loses a war? Several scholars have focused on the tenure of leaders as an important predictor of foreign policy outcomes, such as war onset, creating an interest in leadership survival. We here shift the focus to the survival of other important politicians in cabinet—foreign ministers, hypothesizing that their tenure depends on their performance in office. For example, we expect that foreign ministers stay longer in office when the country experiences an armed conflict resulting in a win or in a compromise agreement. We evaluate and find support for several of our hypotheses using an original historical dataset, which comprises all foreign ministers of the world's thirteen great powers from the early modern period to the present, covering about 1,100 foreign minister-terms of office.
- 22 January 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 17 (2)
Open AccessWar, Performance, and the Survival of Foreign Ministers
Why do some foreign ministers stay longer in office than others? Are they punished when the country loses a war? Several scholars have focused on the tenure of leaders as an important predictor of foreign policy outcomes, such as war onset, creating an interest in leadership survival. We here shift the focus to the survival of other important politicians in cabinet—foreign ministers, hypothesizing that their tenure depends on their performance in office. For example, we expect that foreign ministers stay longer in office when the country experiences an armed conflict resulting in a win or in a compromise agreement. We evaluate and find support for several of our hypotheses using an original historical dataset, which comprises all foreign ministers of the world's thirteen great powers from the early modern period to the present, covering about 1,100 foreign minister-terms of office.
- 16 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 28 (2) , 308-332
Democracy and human development: issues of conceptualization and measurement
This study attempts to reconcile competing positions in an important debate about the relationship between regime type and human development. We contend that this empirical relationship is contingent upon issues of conceptualization and measurement in democracy. First, the relationship is more likely to be perceived when democracy is measured in a nuanced fashion, taking account of gradations of democracy and autocracy. Second, some aspects of democracy – those associated with competitive elections – are more strongly associated with human development than others. Third, the components of electoral democracy interact in a reinforcing manner. Finally, the impact of democracy on human development is a distal relationship that depends upon a country’s entire regime history. Our approach draws on several new datasets that interrogate change across a century, enhancing empirical leverage on this important question. To measure human development, we employ the Gapminder project, covering most sovereign countries from 1900 to 2012. To measure democracy, we draw on Varieties of Democracy data, which measure democracy in a highly differentiated fashion for most sovereign countries from 1900 to the present. An extensive set of analyses offer strong corroboration for the argument.
- 16 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 28 (2) , 308-332
Democracy and human development: issues of conceptualization and measurement
This study attempts to reconcile competing positions in an important debate about the relationship between regime type and human development. We contend that this empirical relationship is contingent upon issues of conceptualization and measurement in democracy. First, the relationship is more likely to be perceived when democracy is measured in a nuanced fashion, taking account of gradations of democracy and autocracy. Second, some aspects of democracy – those associated with competitive elections – are more strongly associated with human development than others. Third, the components of electoral democracy interact in a reinforcing manner. Finally, the impact of democracy on human development is a distal relationship that depends upon a country’s entire regime history. Our approach draws on several new datasets that interrogate change across a century, enhancing empirical leverage on this important question. To measure human development, we employ the Gapminder project, covering most sovereign countries from 1900 to 2012. To measure democracy, we draw on Varieties of Democracy data, which measure democracy in a highly differentiated fashion for most sovereign countries from 1900 to the present. An extensive set of analyses offer strong corroboration for the argument.