Berno Buechel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Berno Buechel has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Heiko Rauhut
University of Zürich
3 shared publicationsAnis Nassar
2 shared publicationsCorinne Dubois
2 shared publicationsGerd Muehlheusser
2 shared publications- Lydia Mechtenberg
Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, 20146 Hamburg, Germany
2 shared publications Martin Lochmmller
University of Hamburg
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 134
Sustainability as a dynamic game
- 15 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 134
Open AccessSustainability as a dynamic game
- Open Access
- 20 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 175
Appetite for Ignorance: Does eating meat cause information avoidance about its harms?
- 20 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 175
Open AccessAppetite for Ignorance: Does eating meat cause information avoidance about its harms?
- Open Access
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 150
Misinformation due to asymmetric information sharing
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 150
Open AccessMisinformation due to asymmetric information sharing
- Open Access
- 20 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Sustainability as a Dynamic Game
Sustainability is a fundamental concept in the environmental domain, but also in other domains such as financial matters or regarding personal health. Sustainability means using resources today in a way that does not compromise the availability of resources tomorrow. In this paper, we propose and test a model that incorporates the essential features of sustainability. First, our Sustainability Game is dynamic in the sense that the actions played in each period have consequences for future periods. Second, there is a contribution threshold that must be reached in order to keep the level of resources. Finally, as in many applications, including environment conservation, cooperation between many individuals is required to reach a sustainable path, while the temptation to over-use resources is strong. We first derive equilibrium behavior analytically and then test these predictions in a lab experiment. Our main results are the following: (i) Theoretically and experimentally, strategic interaction reduces cooperative behavior and undermines sustainability. (ii) theoretically and experimentally, lowering the threshold fosters cooperation and sustainability. Moreover, cooperative behavior correlates positively with a participant's agreeableness, pro-environmental attitudes and, in situations of equilibrium selection, with cognitive ability. Our results suggest that technological advancements that lower the threshold for sustainability and behavioral change toward sustainability need not be viewed as alternatives, but rather as complementary.
- 20 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSustainability as a Dynamic Game
Sustainability is a fundamental concept in the environmental domain, but also in other domains such as financial matters or regarding personal health. Sustainability means using resources today in a way that does not compromise the availability of resources tomorrow. In this paper, we propose and test a model that incorporates the essential features of sustainability. First, our Sustainability Game is dynamic in the sense that the actions played in each period have consequences for future periods. Second, there is a contribution threshold that must be reached in order to keep the level of resources. Finally, as in many applications, including environment conservation, cooperation between many individuals is required to reach a sustainable path, while the temptation to over-use resources is strong. We first derive equilibrium behavior analytically and then test these predictions in a lab experiment. Our main results are the following: (i) Theoretically and experimentally, strategic interaction reduces cooperative behavior and undermines sustainability. (ii) theoretically and experimentally, lowering the threshold fosters cooperation and sustainability. Moreover, cooperative behavior correlates positively with a participant's agreeableness, pro-environmental attitudes and, in situations of equilibrium selection, with cognitive ability. Our results suggest that technological advancements that lower the threshold for sustainability and behavioral change toward sustainability need not be viewed as alternatives, but rather as complementary.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 177, 836-857
Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 177, 836-857
Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 118, 241-268
The swing voter's curse in social networks
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 118, 241-268
The swing voter's curse in social networks
- 18 May 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 23 (2) , 259-293
The strength of weak leaders: an experiment on social influence and social learning in teams
We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a laboratory experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. In our setting, teams with random leaders do not underperform. They even outperform teams with leaders selected on self-confidence. Hence, self-confidence can be a dangerous proxy for competence of a leader. We show that it is the declaration of the selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly influential. To investigate the opinion dynamics, we set up a horse race between several rational and naïve models of social learning. The prevalent conservatism in updating, together with the strong influence of the team leader, imply an information loss since the other team members’ knowledge is not sufficiently integrated.
- 18 May 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 23 (2) , 259-293
The strength of weak leaders: an experiment on social influence and social learning in teams
We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a laboratory experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. In our setting, teams with random leaders do not underperform. They even outperform teams with leaders selected on self-confidence. Hence, self-confidence can be a dangerous proxy for competence of a leader. We show that it is the declaration of the selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly influential. To investigate the opinion dynamics, we set up a horse race between several rational and naïve models of social learning. The prevalent conservatism in updating, together with the strong influence of the team leader, imply an information loss since the other team members’ knowledge is not sufficiently integrated.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 155, 301-314
If I can do it, so can you! Peer effects on perseverance
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 155, 301-314
If I can do it, so can you! Peer effects on perseverance
- Open Access
- 19 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Strength of Weak Leaders - An Experiment on Social Influence and Social Learning in Teams
We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a lab experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. Teams with random leaders do not underperform compared to competent leaders, and they even outperform teams whose leader is selected based on self-confidence. The reason is that random leaders are better able to use the knowledge within the team. We can show that it is the declaration of the selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly influential. We set up a horse race between several rational and naïve models of social learning to investigate the micro-level mechanisms. We find that overconfidence and conservatism contribute to the fact that overly influential leaders mislead their team.
- 19 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Strength of Weak Leaders - An Experiment on Social Influence and Social Learning in Teams
We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a lab experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. Teams with random leaders do not underperform compared to competent leaders, and they even outperform teams whose leader is selected based on self-confidence. The reason is that random leaders are better able to use the knowledge within the team. We can show that it is the declaration of the selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly influential. We set up a horse race between several rational and naïve models of social learning to investigate the micro-level mechanisms. We find that overconfidence and conservatism contribute to the fact that overly influential leaders mislead their team.
- Open Access
- 25 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Strength of Weak Leaders An Experiment on Social Influence and Social Learning in Teams
We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a lab experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. Teams with random leaders do not underperform compared to rather competent leaders, and they even outperform teams whose leader is selected based on self-confidence. The reason is that random leaders are better able to use the knowledge within the team, i.e., the wisdom of crowds. We can show that it is the declaration of the selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly influential. The central position in the communication network already makes a leader highly influential. Knowing that the leader is not selected at random pushes team members to weigh the leader’s opinion even more. We set up a horse race between several rational and naive models of social learning to investigate the micro-level mechanisms. We find that overconfidence and conservatism contribute to the fact that too confident leaders mislead their team in finding good estimates.
- 25 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Strength of Weak Leaders An Experiment on Social Influence and Social Learning in Teams
We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a lab experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. Teams with random leaders do not underperform compared to rather competent leaders, and they even outperform teams whose leader is selected based on self-confidence. The reason is that random leaders are better able to use the knowledge within the team, i.e., the wisdom of crowds. We can show that it is the declaration of the selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly influential. The central position in the communication network already makes a leader highly influential. Knowing that the leader is not selected at random pushes team members to weigh the leader’s opinion even more. We set up a horse race between several rational and naive models of social learning to investigate the micro-level mechanisms. We find that overconfidence and conservatism contribute to the fact that too confident leaders mislead their team in finding good estimates.