Lydia Mechtenberg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lydia Mechtenberg has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Berno Buechel
University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science
2 shared publications - Renke Schmacker
University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Tobias A. F. König
Leibniz-Institut für Polymerforschung Dresden e. V
2 shared publications - Arno Apffelstaedt
Faculty of Management, Economics, and Social Sciences, University of Cologne, 50923 Cologne, Germany
1 shared publication - Jean-Robert Tyran
Univ Vienna, Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication - Marco Battaglini
Cornell University and EIEF
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 July 2023
- Published by American Economic Association
Sanctioning of loophole exploiters
- 23 July 2023
- Published by American Economic Association
Sanctioning of loophole exploiters
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (5) , 2828-2844
Competition for Context-Sensitive Consumers
When preferences are sensitive to context, firms may influence purchase decisions by designing the environment of consumption choices. This paper studies how competitive retailers optimally design their product line if preferences at the store depend on whether the choice set draws consumer attention to the quality or price of a product. Before making a purchase decision, a consumer chooses among retailers without (fully) anticipating that her preferences at the store are malleable. We show that this setup can align evidence on retailer marketing practices and the existence of loss leaders with the experimental literature on decoy effects: in equilibrium, retailers use loss leaders to attract the consumer to the store and decoy products to draw consumer attention at the store to more profitable alternatives featuring a higher price (inducing a profitable upsell) or lower production cost (inducing a profitable downsell). We embed and compare the predictions of three recent specifications of choice-set dependent attention—namely, Salience, Focusing, and Relative Thinking. All three specifications predict that firms construct choice environments that utilize decoy effects to up- or downsell the consumer. Because they differ in how attention can be directed using the product line, however, they differ in their predictions of how the decoy will be positioned in the price-quality space. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (5) , 2828-2844
Competition for Context-Sensitive Consumers
When preferences are sensitive to context, firms may influence purchase decisions by designing the environment of consumption choices. This paper studies how competitive retailers optimally design their product line if preferences at the store depend on whether the choice set draws consumer attention to the quality or price of a product. Before making a purchase decision, a consumer chooses among retailers without (fully) anticipating that her preferences at the store are malleable. We show that this setup can align evidence on retailer marketing practices and the existence of loss leaders with the experimental literature on decoy effects: in equilibrium, retailers use loss leaders to attract the consumer to the store and decoy products to draw consumer attention at the store to more profitable alternatives featuring a higher price (inducing a profitable upsell) or lower production cost (inducing a profitable downsell). We embed and compare the predictions of three recent specifications of choice-set dependent attention—namely, Salience, Focusing, and Relative Thinking. All three specifications predict that firms construct choice environments that utilize decoy effects to up- or downsell the consumer. Because they differ in how attention can be directed using the product line, however, they differ in their predictions of how the decoy will be positioned in the price-quality space. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 118, 241-268
The swing voter's curse in social networks
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 118, 241-268
The swing voter's curse in social networks
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 116, 241-259
Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 116, 241-259
Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
- Open Access
The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks
We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show theoretically and empirically that communication can undermine efficiency of the vote and hence reduce welfare in a common interest setting. Both efficiency and existence of fully informative equilibria in which vote recommendations are always truthfully given and followed hinge on the structure of the communication network. If some voters have distinctly larger audiences than others, their neighbors should not follow their vote recommendation; however, they may do so in equilibrium. We test the model in a lab experiment and strong support for the comparative-statics and, more generally, for the importance of the network structure for voting behavior.
Open AccessThe Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks
We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show theoretically and empirically that communication can undermine efficiency of the vote and hence reduce welfare in a common interest setting. Both efficiency and existence of fully informative equilibria in which vote recommendations are always truthfully given and followed hinge on the structure of the communication network. If some voters have distinctly larger audiences than others, their neighbors should not follow their vote recommendation; however, they may do so in equilibrium. We test the model in a lab experiment and strong support for the comparative-statics and, more generally, for the importance of the network structure for voting behavior.
- 1 April 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- Vol. 2 (2) , 139-151
When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power?
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows”) to share political power with another group (the “blues”). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more inclined to do so under the threat of punishment, despite the fact that punishments are not sub-game perfect. The blue group conditions punishments both on the voting rule and the electoral outcome.
- 1 April 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- Vol. 2 (2) , 139-151
When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power?
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows”) to share political power with another group (the “blues”). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more inclined to do so under the threat of punishment, despite the fact that punishments are not sub-game perfect. The blue group conditions punishments both on the voting rule and the electoral outcome.
- 26 November 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 14 (6) , 945-969
Migration of the Talented: Can Europe Catch Up with the U.S.?
- 26 November 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 14 (6) , 945-969
Migration of the Talented: Can Europe Catch Up with the U.S.?