Marc Guinjoan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Marc Guinjoan has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Toni Rodon
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
11 shared publications - Sandra Bermúdez
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
5 shared publications - Ignacio Lago
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
4 shared publications - Carol Galais
Department of Political Science and Public Law, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain
3 shared publications - Guillem Rico
Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona
3 shared publications André Blais
Université de Montréal
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Territory, Politics, Governance
- p. 1-16
Electoral institutions, malapportionment and the representation of ethnic minorities
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Territory, Politics, Governance
- p. 1-16
Electoral institutions, malapportionment and the representation of ethnic minorities
- Open Access
- 10 August 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- p. 1-21
Affective, but not ideological, polarization increases tolerance for undemocratic behavior
Over the last years, there have been frequent claims that democracy may be endangered by polarization, which has the potential to push voters and elites to embrace undemocratic practices and hence pave the way for democratic backsliding. But what is more decisive to generate tolerance to such practices: ideological or affective proximity? This article examines the effect of ideological vis-à-vis affective polarization on support for undemocratic practices. By using a conjoint experiment fielded in Catalonia in a sample of citizens and politicians, we find that both voters and elites overall reject politicians with undemocratic attitudes in a sizable and consistent way. Among citizens, while ideological proximity does not mitigate punishment of undemocratic attitudes, affective polarization does: individuals with a more intense affection toward their candidate’s party are less prone to punishing him/her for eroding the losers’ consent. The article has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between affective and ideological polarization, and support for democratic undoing.
- 10 August 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- p. 1-21
Open AccessAffective, but not ideological, polarization increases tolerance for undemocratic behavior
Over the last years, there have been frequent claims that democracy may be endangered by polarization, which has the potential to push voters and elites to embrace undemocratic practices and hence pave the way for democratic backsliding. But what is more decisive to generate tolerance to such practices: ideological or affective proximity? This article examines the effect of ideological vis-à-vis affective polarization on support for undemocratic practices. By using a conjoint experiment fielded in Catalonia in a sample of citizens and politicians, we find that both voters and elites overall reject politicians with undemocratic attitudes in a sizable and consistent way. Among citizens, while ideological proximity does not mitigate punishment of undemocratic attitudes, affective polarization does: individuals with a more intense affection toward their candidate’s party are less prone to punishing him/her for eroding the losers’ consent. The article has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between affective and ideological polarization, and support for democratic undoing.
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-30
Public support for climate policies: costs, redistribution, and ideological divides
If we look at most Western European democracies, there is a fair amount of agreement that climate change and the problems associated with it require individual or public action. ‘Something needs to...
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-30
Public support for climate policies: costs, redistribution, and ideological divides
If we look at most Western European democracies, there is a fair amount of agreement that climate change and the problems associated with it require individual or public action. ‘Something needs to...
- 14 February 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 32 (1) , 139-154
Electoral and partisan consequences of sovereignty referendum outcomes: A comparative analysis
What are the electoral consequences of winning a sovereignty referendum? While some argue that these referendums increase the electoral power of pro-sovereignty parties or even put in motion a slippery slope towards more (radical) demands, others sustain that sovereignty-related referendums are a “once in a generation” event, decrease the salience of territorial politics and hence the electoral appeal of pro-decentralisation parties. We put these narratives to the test using the newly compiled CONREF dataset, which includes comprehensive information on the type of sovereignty referendums, the party electoral outcomes before and after the referendum and their policy position. Our analysis shows no relationship between winning a sovereignty referendum and parties’ electoral fortunes. It also shows that referendums do not affect the territorial position of the parties–irrespective of the referendum outcome. If anything, we observe that the main party in the winner’s block loses support when the referendum passes by a small margin and that the opposition benefits when their side wins. In addition, looking at the EU referendums, we observe that when the position of anti-EU parties wins they become less Eurosceptic. Overall, our article improves our understanding of the dynamics of the winner-loser effects in sovereignty referendums and its spillovers to elections.
- 14 February 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 32 (1) , 139-154
Electoral and partisan consequences of sovereignty referendum outcomes: A comparative analysis
What are the electoral consequences of winning a sovereignty referendum? While some argue that these referendums increase the electoral power of pro-sovereignty parties or even put in motion a slippery slope towards more (radical) demands, others sustain that sovereignty-related referendums are a “once in a generation” event, decrease the salience of territorial politics and hence the electoral appeal of pro-decentralisation parties. We put these narratives to the test using the newly compiled CONREF dataset, which includes comprehensive information on the type of sovereignty referendums, the party electoral outcomes before and after the referendum and their policy position. Our analysis shows no relationship between winning a sovereignty referendum and parties’ electoral fortunes. It also shows that referendums do not affect the territorial position of the parties–irrespective of the referendum outcome. If anything, we observe that the main party in the winner’s block loses support when the referendum passes by a small margin and that the opposition benefits when their side wins. In addition, looking at the EU referendums, we observe that when the position of anti-EU parties wins they become less Eurosceptic. Overall, our article improves our understanding of the dynamics of the winner-loser effects in sovereignty referendums and its spillovers to elections.
- Open Access
- 21 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 81
I want to believe: The relationship between conspiratorial beliefs and populist attitudes in Spain
- 21 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 81
Open AccessI want to believe: The relationship between conspiratorial beliefs and populist attitudes in Spain
- 30 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Politica
- Vol. 58 (2) , 401-423
How ideology shapes the relationship between populist attitudes and support for liberal democratic values. Evidence from Spain
- 30 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Politica
- Vol. 58 (2) , 401-423
How ideology shapes the relationship between populist attitudes and support for liberal democratic values. Evidence from Spain
- 18 February 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Representation
- Vol. 59 (2) , 347-356
The Ideological Slant of COVID-19-Related Conspiracies. A New Niche for the Far-Right?
What makes believers in COVID-19-related conspiratorial stories different from the usual conspiracy theorists? To date, evidence on conspiratorial beliefs about COVID-19 is scant and it focuses on only a few countries. Moreover, it overlooks political and ideological factors, which might well help in the endeavour of halting misperceptions about the pandemic and understanding their political consequences. This research note examines the role of these explanatory factors (placement on the left-right scale, authoritarianism, freedom, and support for the incumbent party) in relation to conspiracy theories in general and COVID-19-related conspiratorial beliefs in particular. To do so, it uses a new case study: Spain. Relying on a large online survey (N = 3760), we find that right-wing individuals are more prone to embrace COVID-19-specific than general conspiracies. We also find that people that value security over freedom are more prone to falling for pandemic misbeliefs. Those holding more general conspiratorial beliefs stand out for their defence of freedom above anything else, as well as for their rebellion against authority, including the ruling party. This suggests that the pandemic has roused a new sort of conspiratorial believer: a conservative niche that might become attractive to emerging far-right parties.
- 18 February 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Representation
- Vol. 59 (2) , 347-356
The Ideological Slant of COVID-19-Related Conspiracies. A New Niche for the Far-Right?
What makes believers in COVID-19-related conspiratorial stories different from the usual conspiracy theorists? To date, evidence on conspiratorial beliefs about COVID-19 is scant and it focuses on only a few countries. Moreover, it overlooks political and ideological factors, which might well help in the endeavour of halting misperceptions about the pandemic and understanding their political consequences. This research note examines the role of these explanatory factors (placement on the left-right scale, authoritarianism, freedom, and support for the incumbent party) in relation to conspiracy theories in general and COVID-19-related conspiratorial beliefs in particular. To do so, it uses a new case study: Spain. Relying on a large online survey (N = 3760), we find that right-wing individuals are more prone to embrace COVID-19-specific than general conspiracies. We also find that people that value security over freedom are more prone to falling for pandemic misbeliefs. Those holding more general conspiratorial beliefs stand out for their defence of freedom above anything else, as well as for their rebellion against authority, including the ruling party. This suggests that the pandemic has roused a new sort of conspiratorial believer: a conservative niche that might become attractive to emerging far-right parties.
- Open Access
- 17 November 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 10 (3) , 675
Beaten ballots: political participation dynamics amidst police interventions – CORRIGENDUM
- 17 November 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 10 (3) , 675
Open AccessBeaten ballots: political participation dynamics amidst police interventions – CORRIGENDUM
- 14 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 52 (2) , 329-350
Who Backs Separation? An Empirical Assessment of the Objective and Subjective Markers of Identity in Support for Secession in Catalonia
Objective markers of distinctiveness such as language, ethnicity, religion, or origin are instrumental in the formation of territorial identities. In turn, territorial identity tends to be the most powerful factor in explaining differences in support for secession. Along with this subjective identity, objective markers of distinctiveness also play a role in explaining support for secession. In this article, I argue that the literature lacks an empirical assessment of how objective and subjective markers of identity are related to support for secession. In particular, I argue that most of the effect of objective markers on support for secession is indirectly expressed via (changes in) identity. Results from survey data from Catalonia (2015–2020, N = 30,000), confirm that a large share of the effect of the region’s objective markers—language and ancestry—on secession is, as expected, mediated. This evidence has both theoretical and empirical implications for studies on identity formation and support for secession.
- 14 August 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 52 (2) , 329-350
Who Backs Separation? An Empirical Assessment of the Objective and Subjective Markers of Identity in Support for Secession in Catalonia
Objective markers of distinctiveness such as language, ethnicity, religion, or origin are instrumental in the formation of territorial identities. In turn, territorial identity tends to be the most powerful factor in explaining differences in support for secession. Along with this subjective identity, objective markers of distinctiveness also play a role in explaining support for secession. In this article, I argue that the literature lacks an empirical assessment of how objective and subjective markers of identity are related to support for secession. In particular, I argue that most of the effect of objective markers on support for secession is indirectly expressed via (changes in) identity. Results from survey data from Catalonia (2015–2020, N = 30,000), confirm that a large share of the effect of the region’s objective markers—language and ancestry—on secession is, as expected, mediated. This evidence has both theoretical and empirical implications for studies on identity formation and support for secession.
- Open Access
- 7 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 10 (1) , 153-170
Beaten ballots: political participation dynamics amidst police interventions
What is the effect of violence on political mobilization? Taking the repression-mobilization nexus debate as a starting point, we study the effects of police interventions on political participation, focusing on the Spanish police crackdown on Catalonia's independence referendum on 1 October 2017. We analyze the effect of police actions on turnout using detailed aggregate data, as well as a survey conducted a few days after the referendum. The two empirical approaches show that police interventions had both deterrent and inverse spatial spillover effects. Although police raids had a local negative impact on turnout, they induced positive spillover effects in the surrounding areas. Our findings also indicate heterogeneity in the spatial dynamics, with police actions encouraging people to go to vote in nearby areas, but also mobilizing residents in neighboring areas to participate, especially those individuals with fewer incentives to turn out to vote.
- 7 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 10 (1) , 153-170
Open AccessBeaten ballots: political participation dynamics amidst police interventions
What is the effect of violence on political mobilization? Taking the repression-mobilization nexus debate as a starting point, we study the effects of police interventions on political participation, focusing on the Spanish police crackdown on Catalonia's independence referendum on 1 October 2017. We analyze the effect of police actions on turnout using detailed aggregate data, as well as a survey conducted a few days after the referendum. The two empirical approaches show that police interventions had both deterrent and inverse spatial spillover effects. Although police raids had a local negative impact on turnout, they induced positive spillover effects in the surrounding areas. Our findings also indicate heterogeneity in the spatial dynamics, with police actions encouraging people to go to vote in nearby areas, but also mobilizing residents in neighboring areas to participate, especially those individuals with fewer incentives to turn out to vote.