Katharine Steentjes

It is widely believed that younger generations are more engaged with climate change than older generations. However, evidence of a gap in climate-related perceptions and concern is mixed, likely due to the inconsistent use of outcome variables. Here we systematically examine generational differences across different types of climate engagement including cognitive and affective dimensions. Using data from three nationally-representative surveys conducted in the UK in 2020, 2021 and 2022, we show there is an overall pattern of higher levels of climate-related beliefs, risks perceptions and emotions among younger generation groups. However, the gap is larger and more consistent for climate-related emotions than for climate-related beliefs. While generational differences in climate-related emotions were found across all years, the overall gap has disappeared due to narrowing climate-related beliefs and risk perceptions. The generational differences are therefore mainly in emotional engagement rather than in beliefs about anthropogenic climate change.

Since late 2018, young people around the world have united to demand greater action on climate change. Aside from their stated concerns and demands, however, very little is known about why young people have been joining this growing movement. Using a large sample (N = 4057) of people in Switzerland aged between 14 and 25, we show that social identity is most strongly associated with participation, followed by beliefs about the effectiveness of youth strikes, level of education, and worry about climate change. Our findings affirm the relevance of both climate change risk perceptions and social identity-related processes for collective climate change action, and pave the way for promising opportunities in theory development and integration. The study also provides lessons for those who seek to maintain and increase collective action on climate change: concern about climate change is an important motivating factor, but social identity processes are at least as relevant for young people’s participation.

Scientists overwhelmingly agree that climate change exists and is caused by human activity. It has been argued that communicating the consensus can counter climate scepticism, given that perceived scientific consensus is a major factor predicting public belief that climate change is anthropogenic. However, individuals may hold different models of science, potentially affecting their interpretation of scientific consensus. Using representative surveys in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Norway, we assessed whether the relationship between perceived scientific consensus and belief in anthropogenic climate change is conditioned by a person’s viewing science as ‘the search for truth’ or as ‘debate’. Results show that perceived scientific consensus is higher among climate change believers and moreover, significantly predicts belief in anthropogenic climate change. This relationship is stronger among people holding a model of science as the ‘search for truth’. These results help to disentangle the effect of implicit epistemological assumptions underlying the public understanding of the climate change debate.

This paper examines consequence evaluations and moral concerns about climate change across four European countries. Data from nationally representative samples (each n > 1000) were analysed in order to explore the relative importance of consequences versus morality in explaining public support for different climate policies. Most respondents expected climate change to have largely negative consequences for their respective country. Climate change consequences were viewed most negatively in Germany, followed by France, the U.K. and Norway. While the vast majority of respondents expressed at least some degree of moral concern about climate change, a notable minority in each sample stated that they have no such concerns. Moral concerns were highest in France, followed by the U.K. and Norway, and lowest in Germany. It was found that both judgements explain support for policies that aim to mitigate climate change or aim to adapt to the impacts of climate change. However, our results further suggest that moral concern was a stronger predictor of policy support than consequence evaluations. If at all, consequence evaluations were more likely to predict policy support in Germany and Norway than in the U.K. and France. Overall, policies that involved subsidies received the strongest support, whereas policies involving individual costs received the least support. This research broadens our understanding of the intertwining between risk perceptions and public support for climate policies, documenting variability across and within countries. Implications for policy-makers with an interest in communicating climate change risks to the broader public audience are discussed.