ILIlan Lobel

Ilan Lobel

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Ilan Lobel has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers

    On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in Platforms

    by Daniel Freund, Ilan Lobel, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

    Problem definition: The ongoing large-scale deployment of autonomous vehicle (AV) technology has the potential to fundamentally change the transportation landscape. Due to the high cost of AV hardware, the most likely path to widespread AV use is via platforms that can sustain high utilization, such as ride-hailing and delivery services. Our work studies the incentives of stakeholders in such deployments, possible misalignments, and contracting solutions to overcome them. Methodology/results: We consider four potential operational models to commercialize AVs, which we model as a supply chain game between a platform, an AV supplier, and human individual contractors (ICs), including (1) an open platform in which the AV supplier and ICs bring their own vehicles to the system, (2) an AV-supplier operated platform without ICs, (3) a platform that sources AVs through leasing contracts, and (4) an integrated supply chain. We find that except for the AV-only platform, all deployment models are subject to a risk of AV underutilization due to the need to maintain the ICs’ utilization sufficiently high to ensure ICs remain engaged. As AV underutilization propagates in a nonintegrated supply chain, an open platform can become arbitrarily worse than supply chain integration, and careful usage commitments are needed to overcome the efficiency loss. Managerial implications: This paper identifies a new kind of supply chain misalignment that is likely to emerge as AVs become deployed technology, which both platform operators and AV suppliers should be mindful of. Moreover, we demonstrate the value of usage commitment in the deployment of AVs through an open platform, which makes it more efficient than AV-only/AV leasing platforms. History: This paper was selected as part of the 1RR initiative between the M&SOM Journal and the MSOM Society. This particular paper was part of the 2024 MSOM Service Operations SIG Conference. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1175 .


  • Detours in Shared Rides

    by Ilan Lobel, Sébastien Martin

    Detours are considered key for the efficient operation of a shared rides service, but they are also a major pain point for consumers of such services. This paper studies the relationship between the value generated by shared rides and the detours they create for riders. We establish a limit on the sum of value and detour, and we prove that this leads to a tight bound on the Pareto frontier of values and detours in a general setting with an arbitrary number of requests. We explicitly compute the Pareto frontier for one family of city topologies and construct it via simulation for several more networks, including one based on ride-sharing data from commute hours in Manhattan. We find that average detours are usually small, even in low-demand-density settings. We also find that by carefully choosing the match objective, detours can be reduced with a relatively small impact on values and that the density of ride requests is far more important than detours for the effective operations of a shared rides service. In response, we propose that platforms implement a two-product version of shared rides and limit the worst-case detours of its users. This paper was accepted by Hamid Nazerzadeh, data science. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03125 .


  • Top Cited Papers

    Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning

    by Omar Besbes, Yuri Fonseca, Ilan Lobel

    Learning from data are critical across applications. However, in many applications, past data only gives partial information about the future. In “Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning,” Besbes, Fonseca, and Lobel study a general setting in which historical data are associated with observations of past optimal actions from experts in specific contexts but without the underlying rewards associated with these actions. To what extent can one “reverse engineer” the underlying decision-making process of experts and mimic them? The authors develop results that quantify the performance that is achievable given the data at hand in two types of settings: the offline setting in which data have already been collected and the online setting in which data are collected “on the fly.”


  • Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias via Shadow Prices

    by Ido Bright, Arthur Delarue, Ilan Lobel

    Marketplace companies rely heavily on experimentation when making changes to the design or operation of their platforms. The workhorse of experimentation is the randomized controlled trial (RCT), or A/B test, in which users are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups. However, marketplace interference causes the stable unit treatment value assumption to be violated, leading to bias in the standard RCT metric. In this work, we propose techniques for platforms to run standard RCTs and still obtain meaningful estimates despite the presence of marketplace interference. We specifically consider a generalized matching setting, in which the platform explicitly matches supply with demand via a linear programming algorithm. Our first proposal is for the platform to estimate the value of global treatment and global control via optimization. We prove that this approach is unbiased in the fluid limit. Our second proposal is to compare the average shadow price of the treatment and control groups rather than the total value accrued by each group. We prove that this technique corresponds to the correct first order approximation (in a Taylor series sense) of the value function of interest even in a finite-size system. We then use this result to prove that, under reasonable assumptions, our estimator is less biased than the RCT estimator. At the heart of our result is the idea that it is relatively easy to model interference in matching-driven marketplaces because, in such markets, the platform mediates the spillover. This paper was accepted by Itai Ashlagi, revenue management and market analytics. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01881 .


  • Open Access

    On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in Platforms

    by Daniel Freund, Ilan Lobel, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao

    The likely large-scale deployment of autonomous vehicle (AV) technology in the near future has the potential to fundamentally change the transportation landscape. Due to the high cost of AV hardware, the most likely path to widespread AV use is via platforms that can sustain high utilization, such as ride-hailing and delivery services. In this paper, we consider four potential operational models to commercialize AVs, which we model as a supply chain game between a platform, an AV supplier, and human drivers that join as individual contractors (ICs). Our operational models include (1) an open platform that outsources the high capital burden of AVs by allowing the AV supplier and human drivers to bring their own vehicles into the system, (2) an AV-only platform that is operated independently by the AV supplier, (3) a platform that sources AVs from the supplier through leasing contracts, and (4) an integrated supply chain in which the same entity operates the platform and supplies the AVs. We use (4) as a benchmark to measure the performances of the other models. We find that apart from operational model (2), all deployment models are subject to a risk of AV underutilization due to the need to maintain the ICs' utilization sufficiently high to ensure ICs remain engaged. In the non-integrated models, this risk can propagate backwards in the supply chain and thereby negatively affect its efficiency. In particular, as a result of AV underutilization, the supply chain profit of an open platform model can be arbitrarily smaller than the integrated benchmark. AV underutilization also arises in the presence of leasing contracts and leads to significant supply chain misalignment. The results demonstrate that the platform's optimal dispatch decision, via AV underutilization, may lead to market failures. In light of these market failures we explore potential contracting solutions through usage commitments. We find that when the platform can contractually commit to an AV utilization level under each demand realization in each scenario, the supply chain can be fully aligned. Moreover, even when demand is not fully contractible, well-designed dispatch commitments can still significantly increase the open platform efficiency. As a proof of concept, we show a guarantee of the following flavor for a simple prioritization contract: either the supply chain profit under the contract is at least half of that of an integrated supply chain or the supply chain can achieve half the profit of an integrated supply chain even without a contract. Despite the inability to fully align the supply chain, this contract demonstrates the value of supply chain contracts when compared to the potentially unbounded efficiency loss in the absence of a contract. In particular, with usage commitments, an open platform exhibits stronger theoretical guarantees and superior numerical performances compared to the other operational models considered in the paper, such as AV leasing or AV-only platforms.

  • Frontiers in Operations: Employees vs. Contractors: An Operational Perspective

    by Ilan Lobel, Sébastien Martin, Haotian Song

    Problem definition: We consider a platform’s problem of how to staff its operations given the possibilities of hiring employees and setting up a contractor marketplace. We aim to understand the operational difference between these two work arrangement models. Methodology/results: We consider a model where demand is not only stochastic but also evolving over time, which we capture via a state of the world that determines the demand distribution. In the case of employees, the platform controls the number of employee hours it uses for serving demand, whereas in the case of contractors, it sets the wage paid to them per utilized hour. We show that although the employee problem is equivalent to a standard newsvendor, the contractor one corresponds to an unusual version of the newsvendor model where utilization is the control variable. Managerial implications: This distinction makes the contractor model more flexible, allowing us to prove that it performs significantly better, especially if the order of magnitude of demand is unknown. Meanwhile, hybrid solutions that combine both employees and contractors have complex optimal solutions and offer relatively limited benefits relative to a contractor marketplace. History: This paper has been accepted in the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Frontiers in Operations Initiative. Funding: This research was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 71821002]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0029 .


  • Managing Customer Churn via Service Mode Control

    by Yash Kanoria, Ilan Lobel, Jiaqi Lu

    We introduce a novel stochastic control model for the problem of a service firm interacting over time with one of its customers who probabilistically churns depending on the customer’s satisfaction. The firm has two service modes available, and they determine the drift and volatility of the Brownian reward process. The firm’s objective is to maximize the rewards generated over the customer’s lifetime. Meanwhile, the customer might churn probabilistically if the customer’s satisfaction, modeled as an Orstein–Uhlenbeck process controlled by the firm’s service mode, is below a certain threshold. We build upon Markov processes with spatial delay to solve this problem, and we explicitly characterize the firm’s optimal policy, which is either myopic or a sandwich policy. A sandwich policy is one in which the firm deploys the service mode with inferior reward rate when the customer satisfaction level is in a specific interval near the satisfaction threshold and uses the myopically optimal service mode for all other satisfaction levels. Specifically, we find that the firm should use the safe service mode when the customer is marginally satisfied and the risky service mode when the customer is marginally unsatisfied. We find numerically that the customer lifetime value under the optimal policy is large relative to that under the myopic policy. Our results are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications. Funding: J. Lu gratefully acknowledges financial support from Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [Project 72192805]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.0179 .


  • Open Access

    Signaling Competition in Two-Sided Markets

    by Omar Besbes, Yuri Fonseca, Ilan Lobel, Fanyin Zheng

    Platforms facilitating many-to-many matches in two-sided markets have become ubiquitous across industries ranging from professional services to dating. Differently from standard (one-sided) markets where consumers choose goods or services, in two-sided markets, both sides have preferences. Since these preferences can often be hard to describe, centralized matching is difficult to implement. The alternative option is for the platform to operate in a decentralized fashion, leaving the agents from both sides "free to find each other". While easier to implement, the downside of decentralized systems is that inefficiencies driven by congestion are likely to arise. In the present paper, we are primarily interested in understanding the power of "detail-free" levers that decentralized platforms can leverage to improve market outcomes. In particular, we focus on the lever of information design through competition signaling, where the platform discloses how much competition currently exists for a given supply unit. Signaling that there is competition for a supply unit may reduce the value of that unit but may also redirect the demand's attention to alternative supply units, potentially increasing the value for the platform. To quantify the trade-off at play and tackle the question above, we focus on a specific labor platform and the submarket of cleaning services to answer this question empirically. We partnered with the largest service labor marketplace in Latin America, which operates as follows. Service providers (agents) join the platform to purchase nonexclusive leads for jobs posted by supply-side customers. When they purchase a lead, they are not guaranteed to get the job, but simply purchase the contact information of the customer in order to apply for the job. A key characteristic of this market is the possible congestion on the lead side. In the context of such a platform, to understand the impact of any lever on market outcomes, it is fundamental to first understand how agents make their lead purchasing decisions and, in particular, how they take competition into account when making such decisions. We propose a structural model in which agents use a prediction function to forecast how much competition they may face. We show that if agents are strategic, a natural concept of equilibrium arises. By leveraging the platforms' data and an quasi-experiment, we estimate the structural parameters in the model. We find that agents react strongly to observed competition and predictions of future competition. We then conduct counterfactual analysis to study the impact of signaling competition. Our findings show that it is a powerful lever to improve market outcomes in this market. Signaling competition improves (decreases) congestion, and it also improves (increases) the probability that a lead will receive at least one applicant. Furthermore, displaying competition leads to an increase in overall leads purchased.


  • Open Access

    Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices

    by Ido Bright, Arthur Delarue, Ilan Lobel

    Marketplace companies rely heavily on experimentation when making changes to the design or operation of their platforms. A fundamental challenge in marketplace experimentation is dealing with interference. For instance, consider a ride-hailing platform experimenting with a demand-side price discount. The platform performs a randomized control trial (RCT), or A/B test, where some demand units are offered the discounted price while others are offered the undiscounted price. Because the treated units are more likely to book rides as a result of the discount, they reduce the total supply available to all demand-side units, including the control units. This interference between treatment and control units causes the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) to fail, and consequently induces bias in the standard estimator used to evaluate the value generated by the treatment.